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Military Affairs

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

CIS Defense Ministers Propose Abolition of Post of CINC

93UM0619A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Jun 93 p 1

[Article by Gennadiy Miranovich: "Council of CIS Defense Ministers Proposes Abolishing Post of Commander-In-Chief"]

[Text] Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander-in-chief of the Unified Armed Forces, who gave a report at the 15 June meeting of the Council of CIS Defense Ministers, analyzed the state of affairs regarding collective security and presented his vision of the ways to strengthen existing coordinating structures of the Unified Armed Forces and creating new ones.

As was reported earlier, the president of the Russian Federation named Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov to the post of secretary of the Security Council. The Council of Defense Ministers proposed abolishing the position of commander-in-chief of the Unified Armed Forces and introducing the position of chief of joint staff for coordination of military cooperation among Commonwealth states.

Colonel General Viktor Samsonov, who is presently chief of staff of the CIS Unified Armed Forces, will apparently be appointed to this position.

Prospects for Summer Training Under Current Conditions

93UM0641A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Jul 93 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Oleg Darev: "Combat Training Returns to the Troops"]

[Text]

Summer Training Period Begins Today

I recently heard from an acquaintance, a regimental commander, a joke which was sad but not devoid of optimism: "Today, as we plan the combat training, one feels like a person who has avoided a fatal outcome following a prolonged and serious illness."

It is not difficult to realize what the officer referred to. Live firing drills, tactical exercises and classes in driving the combat vehicles have not been conducted in the military unit he heads for around a year and a half. There seemed to be just one misfortune after another.

This lamentable situation began to improve perceptibly at the beginning of this year, however. And it was no secret to anyone in the regiment just how this had come about. Even the first, fairly restrained steps by the government to bring the pay and allowances of military personnel into conformity with the actual social value of

their labor significantly altered the morale of the military personnel. The Law of the Russian Federation on the Status of Servicemen was then enacted, which compensated everyone directly connected to the military service for the restrictions of rights typical for citizens in this profession with a number of benefits and social guarantees. In addition, the first contract personnel appeared in the units, which somewhat lessened the severity of the problems linked to the shortage of drafted NCOs and lower-ranking military personnel. And then funds—not large amounts but commensurate with current prices—began to be deposited into the regiment's account.

The job performed professionally by officers and warrant officers seems to have ceased to be the basis for the development of a sense of social inferiority in them. Under conditions still far from ideal they have succeeded in organizing the combat training and maintaining the combat readiness. Incidentally, this is borne out, among other things, by the fairly good results achieved by many units in the final performance evaluation for the winter training period. This fact has been stated in several public speeches by Army Gen Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation minister of defense.

And today the summer combat training period begins. It can realistically be made even more productive. If the personnel do not lose faith in the value of the work they perform for the state, they are capable of a great deal. They themselves then find new ways of organizing their job which are suitable for the times. Costly tactical exercises are resourcefully replaced with computer games, as the Transbaykal Military District has done, and HQ exercises and other forms of training not involving large outlays are being extensively employed, as they have been in the Western Group of Forces.

In short, there is hope that my acquaintance, the regimental commander, and the military collective he heads—indeed the collectives of other units as well—will feel in the summer training period which is now beginning not just that their health is improving but that they are completely healthy.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Problems Facing Emba Ground Troops PVO Training Center

93UM0621A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Jun 93 p 2

[Article by Gennadiy Miranovich: "Hot Summer at Emba"]

[Text] Garrison in the Steppe

For those of you who don't know what Emba is: It is the name of a rather large (712 km long) river in the west of Kazakhstan, and of a small city in the Aktyubinsk oblast at its source, with a railroad station and a meat combine.

The State Testing Range, under the Main Missile-Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, and the PVO Tactical Performance Training Center of the Ground Troops bear the same name.

Essentially the Russian army garrison exists on the territory of sovereign Kazakhstan for this purpose: to equip the PVO troops with modern weapons and to maintain them in combat readiness. Upon arrival here after retraining, a regiment or brigade receives new equipment, learns to use it with plant specialists present, and performs the so-called junction firing. Once every two years (usually from May through October), units which have already mastered their equipment take graded examinations. Of course, in the last 2 or 3 years the hot period (when the firing occurs) has been reduced. And now because of the shortage of personnel in the units and at the range (they are short 100 officers and 400 soldiers and NCOs), and due to the agricultural work in some places until August, there will be no firing at all until the reinforcements arrive.

Meanwhile the "Emba School" is very highly rated in the line units. In addition, the evaluation received here by PVO subunits in many cases is definitive for troops of the district and army. Not to mention the fact that for the soldier this may perhaps be the evaluation of his life. It is no accident, you see, that in the SAM regiment of the Siberian Military District coming to the range there were more than 20 volunteers from among the men whose period of service had already expired.

But then, there is training here not only for those who directly fire on the targets. I watched a division commander from the Ural Military District, Maj-Gen Kokeyev, and the Deputy Commander of PVO Troops of the Ground Troops for Personnel Work Lt-Col Vitaliy Kudravtsev, and many other generals and officers take their "classes" along with them. Their attitude toward the range, it seems to me, was very accurately expressed by the Chief of PVO Troops of the District, Maj-Gen Gennadiy Kupriyanov, who came with the regiment mentioned above from the Siberian MD: "Here you train and you get food for thought."

On the subject of food for thought. The Emba test range has existed for 33 years. They still have the huts where the young Veniamin Yefremov, now the general designer of the "Antey" Science Production Association, worked in his day. The first mention of the range in the fatherland's press was in just October of last year, in connection with a major exercise of the Russian Army called "Oborona-92". As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA wrote at the time, this was in fact the first exercise in the fatherland's history to perform tasks of tactical antimissile defense (or antimissile defense in a theater of operation). One can also add that the troop SAM systems S-300V, "Tor," "Guk," "Osa," "Tunguska" and others utilized there, as well as air force weapons, received their "start in life" right at Emba.

Lt-Gen Vasilii Unuchko runs the range. By seniority he is also the Chief of this steppe garrison, which constitutes a rather complex operation with all the enterprises, institutions and services supporting its self-sufficient existence. Hospital, military store, officer's club, militia, procuracy. There are more hotels in the residential area, hidden in the greenery, than in any other regional center. True, most of them go empty. Before, up to 12 thousand people would gather together simultaneously at the range—missile personnel, equipment builders, and plant representatives—so of course the hotels were not empty. When I was there the situation was this. Besides the small group of representatives of the Commander of PVO Troops of the Ground Forces, the residents of the hotels included two testers observing the launches of the "three-hundred" (S-300V), Capt. 1st Rank Vladimir Aktsel' from the Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, and several officers and generals from line units. The line units themselves were: 2 SAM regiments and as many brigades.

Besides the personnel shortage (try to man a regiment or brigade at fighting strength under these conditions), there are many other factors in play. For example, on the way to the range the brigade commanded by Col Yuriy Tereshchenko had to cross more than just one state border, something which, as you know, does not always happen without a hitch. Deliveries of the necessary equipment are not well organized everywhere.

The garrison lives and works nonetheless. And this summer, as in past years, it is genuinely hot, full of combat training episodes.

A Smell of Powder and Wormwood in the Air

On firing day, the first person with whom I exchanged a word in the combat field at the training center was Maj Andrey Babynin from the Tereshchenko brigade. He was kneeling in a shallow trench behind the "Krug" battalion, which was prepared for battle, and was gazing spellbound at the nearest missile, from time to time raising his arms to the sky and whispering what was not quite an incantation, not quite a prayer. In the pauses between the "prayers" I was able to learn that the major had three children, that the brigade was at one third manning, for which reason the batteries were operating at reduced strength, that neither he nor Major Georgiy Zveryev, who had already fired and had downed a target, and who was also the father of three children, had his own home yet. But then the next shot rang out, and this time the "prayer" was to no avail: the missile missed the mark (either the weapon operator missed or the target failed, which also happens) and the major grew silent, as if he had lost the power of speech. One could understand that: a grade received at Emba is very expensive, both literally and figuratively.

Indeed, there was something in this occurrence that could be measured neither by rubles nor even by the all-powerful dollar. And the state of the people who had

finally gotten the opportunity to work at real combat work, to show themselves in the job in which they serve, cannot be conveyed in words. You see, it must be admitted that organizing effective daily training of troops at their permanent garrison areas is really difficult nowadays, however hard you try. And indeed a base like Emba, where all these "three-hundreds," "Kuby" and "Buki" can be deployed at full power exists neither in Russian nor even less so in the nearby countries. Our thanks to Kazakhstan, which allows its operation, albeit with provisos.

Thus inspiration in combination with professionalism worked wonders. Many exceeded practically all norms. The equipment at times surpassed the capabilities conferred on it by the designers.

But then for fairness sake I should note that there were also those who, it seemed to me, could work better. After all, before getting to Emba, subunits undergo the appropriate preparation at training centers. I had a chance to visit one of them, which was headed by Maj-Gen Vladimir Valyanik. This is a real training combine, fitted with the latest equipment, making it possible to practice all questions of vertical command and control from the level of tactical formation commander to battery commander. And it is characteristic that even the electrified layout indicating the deployment and combat utilization of the S-300V SAM battalion is designed here against the background of the simple landscapes of the Emba combat field.

In general it would seem that you can't rely on lady luck at the Tactical Performance Training Center of PVO Troops of the Ground Troops. First of all, there they practice the elements of combat against high-speed ballistic and cruise missiles, precision weapons, and remotely piloted aircraft. The targets are launched from launch pads which include analogs of present-day foreign missile weapons. The outcome of the fast-moving duel (within 24 seconds) with such an adversary is largely determined by the electronics of the SAM complexes—computers with a capability of more than a hundred thousand operations per second in the S-300V SAM complex, for instance. Second, the training center is equipped with monitors and meters which give an objective evaluation both of our actions and of the "behavior" of the missile. Finally, and this is perhaps most important, there is the work style of the chief of the center, Col Rashid Tagirov and his subordinates. In the line units they are well aware that nothing happens by chance in this tightly knit combat outfit. In any case, the seasoned colonels who received a "good" from Tagirov for their fire were all smiles. And even when our acquaintance General Kupriyanov was reporting by phone to the staff of the Siberian MD that regimental commander Col Yuriy Kondratkov had "passed theory" with a [grade of] five, and incidentally this regiment was acknowledged the best from the results of fire too, his jubilant voice could be heard a mile off.

The manning level in the training center is around 50 percent. Basically these are civilians of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The departments of tactical performance of SAM complexes and target launching battalions are the main subunits of the center. There are also support and repair subunits.

By troop standards it is not a big operation. However it is perhaps no easier to run during combat work than it is to run a major troop organism. It goes without saying that Tagirov has the necessary communications lines and equipment. But this is just a small part of it. Support of fires requires targets, and targets require the corresponding fuel components. Those who launch them must be duly trained, briefed and equipped with everything needed to work autonomously. But it is hundreds of kilometers to some of the target launching pads. Plus there is the rough terrain, and the worn-out vehicles with which the center for some reason was equipped by the "left-overs principle." The column with cargo for the target-launching battalion, commanded by Major Nikolay Grishko, took more than 12 hours to reach its destination (180 km from the staff).

Nonetheless the Chief of the Department of Combat Training of the PVO Troops of the Ground Troops, Col. Sergey Sevastyanov—there is always one of the combat training specialists at Emba—could not recall a case when the working rhythm of the troops arriving for fire was disrupted through the fault of the personnel of the training center. Even during the inter-state uncertainty, when the range seemed to belong to no one and fire could be prohibited by any local head, Tagirov would find a way out of the situation. Only he knows how he obtained permission for fires last year, for a SAM unit from the Moscow region, for instance, from the Defense Ministry of the government of Kazakhstan.

There was a time when officers were unable to receive their pay on time due to this same uncertainty. Some families, especially young ones, lived just about in outright poverty. And again Tagirov came to the rescue. He was able to supply groceries to the people, and the children even had milk. The unit welfare farm helped a lot, of course. The farm is very strong there, with cattle, pigs and fowl. The personnel can provide practically half of all the foods called for by the food-supply standards. And this when every day of the subunits is scheduled to the minute: in the current "hot" season, in the best case no less than 40 regiments and brigades will pass through the tactical performance training center.

But circumstances may vary. It is true that last year, in connection with the appearance of the corresponding agreement signed by the heads of governments of Russia and Kazakhstan, many questions were resolved, including those having to do with support of the daily activity of the training center. Nonetheless there are still lots of problems of concern to these people who live in the combat field, which smells of powder and wormwood.

Problems and Solutions

But here is something remarkable. In my talks with residents of the training center, I heard least of all about everyday problems of the life there, an unusual one for people from the central zone, for instance. What is more, many of them find that they are quite decently equipped for field conditions. With allowance for the fact that the residents here are temporary—after serving ten years at the training center, an officer has the right to replacement—one can probably agree with this, but...

The officers who serve at the range as a rule do not have their own homes in Russia. However great a romantic and patriot of your combat arm you might be (and normally, as far as I could tell, only people who felt genuinely enthusiastic about combat work were at Emba), this factor is not a heartening one. Isn't that why there are 62 apartments going empty in the garrison today?

There is no need especially to recruit lieutenants to the job. First of all, they know that an officer has a better chance of becoming a real professional at Emba than anywhere else. Second, a year of service here is counted as a year and a half, the corresponding increments are paid, and replacement is guaranteed. Many current graduates of the Orenburg Higher Air-Defense Missile Command School simply dream of starting their officer careers at the Emba range. But there is a problem when it comes to those who are a little older. You will not stay to live at the range, or even in the territory of the other state, after discharge to the reserve. And it is not a great joy to wait in line for housing for years upon returning to Russia. But if it were possible to get attached, so to speak, ahead of time to some personally selected garrison, with a guarantee of housing, that would be a different matter.

The problem of manning the training center with soldiers and NCOs is even more urgent. For the time being those who were recruited from Kazakhstan are still serving out their time. By the end of the year, when the "two-year troops" and the "two-and-a-half year troops" go away to the reserves, things will be quite bad. Now both Lt-Gen Unuchko and Col Tagirov have sent messengers to the Siberian, Ural, and Volga military districts to recruit volunteers. The news already arriving from them is, to put it bluntly, not all that reassuring. Here clearly some decisions at the state level are needed. For example, considering the service conditions at the range, why not provide special benefits for soldiers and NCOs? Higher pay, say, a longer leave, some differences in uniform, advantages in entering a higher institute of education after discharge to the reserve etc. In any case, something has to be done while there is still time.

By established rule, the work of the representative of the Commander of PVO Troops of the Ground Forces at the tactical performance training center ends with publication of the corresponding directive. Judging from the reaction of Col Sevastyanov to certain elements in the

work of commanders and staffs during the fires, one can assume what the directive will be about this time. For example, about the fact that in their concern for the results of fire, some neglect tactics and even forget about topological support, with the result that there are often mistakes in the target designations of the battalion commanders and the battery commands have to search for targets themselves. About the neglect of camouflage and concealment, and about carelessness—at times elements of the command post were deployed so close together that the men interfered with one another's work. About the inability of certain officers to perform under rudimentary jamming conditions, and to precisely direct the battle. About the problems of air support of the drills of the missile troops. About defects in targets. (Remember the groans of Major Babynin and the missile flying off to nowhere? It turns out that the target was at fault.) About the need for reconstruction of the training center, which in technical respects already lags behind the troops, and for revision of the outmoded standards.

But then, I don't want to overburden the reader. However wise this directive might be, it will have to be implemented by the personnel. By those who are there now, although they are few in number, and by those who are not there now, and whose arrival date, unfortunately, is still uncertain.

Conditions of Redeployed Armored Equipment in Siberia

93UM0638A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Jun 93 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Aleksandr Beklich: "Conversion' the Siberian Way"]

[Text]

Officers at Storage Bases Forced to Service up to 100 Tanks

The armored equipment withdrawn from the former Soviet republics to Siberia in recent years is experiencing difficult times. The haste with which the political leaders fulfilled unilateral commitments to reduce conventional weapons during the restructuring years placed a heavy burden upon the military. Col Sergey Selin, chief of armored service for the Siberian Military District, attests to this:

"The time allotted for setting up the storage bases was cut to a minimum, and tanks arriving by the trainload had to be placed at sites with practically no preparation, in the open. The absence of technical servicing and repair facilities, battery charging stations and covered storage facilities, which cannot be built within a few months in Siberia with the meager funds allocated from Moscow, forced us to resolve a state problem with our own resources alone.

"The main problem, that of servicing tanks covered by the abundant Siberian snow and washed by rain for more

than a single year now, has not been totally resolved, however. The central storage bases are no more than 20-percent manned, even with personnel recruited under contract. Right now these personnel suffice only for supporting a subunit's vital functioning and for performing internal service."

According to Lt Gen Yuriy Dutov, deputy district commander for armaments and chief of the armament directorate, there are 100 or more pieces of armored equipment for every officer engaged in the servicing and repair of armored vehicles moved to Siberia. There is a way out of the situation. Up to the end of the '80s, as an example, specialists were called up from the reserve for the assemblies for military reservists. The practical part of the assemblies was ordinarily held in the equipment pools, where the reservists took part in the servicing of the equipment, enhancing their own skills and providing considerable assistance to the storage bases. For the third year in a row, however, the assemblies for the registered personnel seem to have been forgotten. Persistent appeals to Moscow from the Siberians for help in resolving the problem of servicing the expensive equipment either in this way or by some other means have not yet been successful, however. At the present time, according to the specialists, the armored equipment located at central storage facilities is suitable for use only as tractors or prime movers.

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Cinc Prudnikov Interviewed on PVO Missions, Problems

93UM0609A Moscow VESTNIK
PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian
No 3, 93 (signed to press 5 Mar 93) pp 1-3

[Interview with Col-Gen Viktor Alekseyevich Prudnikov, commander in chief of the Air Defense Troops, by A. Belousov, A. Ivanov, and S. Ovsienko; postscript by Col Mikhail Zakharchuk, editor in chief; place and date not given: "The Security of Russia Is Our Primary Mission"]

[Text]

[VESTNIK PVO] Reform of the Russian Armed Forces is directed primarily at changing their quality. In this regard, I would like to ask you what place will the Air Defense [PVO] Troops have in the new structure? Will their purpose change?

[Prudnikov] The PVO Troops' place in the structure of Russia's Armed Forces is determined, above all, by the views of the country's political leadership, government, and Ministry of Defense. After the Supreme Soviet reviews the military doctrine, we also will have a legislative approach to its determination. Nevertheless, a specific set of views toward conducting military reform has already taken shape, which determines the place and role of the PVO Troops in Russia's Armed Forces.

First of all, we are proceeding from the principle of reasonable sufficiency. Our troops are charged with providing the president and the government with reliable warning information about a missile attack. And we are obligated to do this in a timely manner. Otherwise the slightest delay will threaten enormous consequences for Russia. The country's leadership makes the decision to use the armed forces based on such information.

[VESTNIK PVO] Including for making a retaliatory strike?

[Prudnikov] Yes. If such a strike is made, we must give the president the necessary information in a limited time for him to make a decision on retaliatory actions.

With the passage of the law on state borders, a question will arise about ensuring the security of the aerial borders, and this is the PVO Troops. In addition, the country's economic potential and its power plants, including nuclear ones, require reliable protection.

Airspace and outer space surveillance, monitoring the borders and air corridors, antiballistic-missile defense—these are also our duties. If you compare with past years, the volume of missions has not changed; only the conditions of accomplishing them have changed.

[VESTNIK PVO] In what direction have they changed?

[Prudnikov] For the worse, unfortunately. The process of the republics gaining their sovereignty has deprived the integrated PVO system of many elements that ensure its reliable functioning.

[VESTNIK PVO] Viktor Alekseyevich, one significant step of reform has been the reduction in personnel strength of the armed forces. What awaits the Air Defense Troops?

[Prudnikov] According to the Law on Defense, the overall strength of the Russian Army will not exceed one percent of the country's population. The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff "allocated," based on this percentage, quotas to the branches of the armed forces. During the course of reducing PVO units and large units, we will get rid of obsolete armament, leaving in service the latest-generation surface-to-air missile systems and radar equipment and in aviation the MiG-31 and Su-27 aircraft. At the same time, we are making reconnaissance and command and control priority issues. The reductions here will be minimal.

I will emphasize that we cannot get by without major organizational changes.

[VESTNIK PVO] What do they involve?

[Prudnikov] They involve creating mobile air defense forces that accomplish airspace surveillance during peacetime. In the event a tense situation arises, these forces are sent to the region that needs heavy coverage.

[VESTNIK PVO] Recently, there have been doubts about the feasibility of having the PVO Troops as a branch of the armed forces. Some experts advocate resubordinating them to other troops. What is your opinion regarding this?

[Prudnikov] Whereas some people have serious arguments in favor of eliminating the PVO Troops as a branch (true, I have not had the opportunity to meet these people), recent regional conflicts have forced us to ponder the place and role of all branches and combat arms, not just the PVO Troops.

As long as I can remember, and this is more than 32 years of service in PVO, someone has always been trying to transfer or break up the PVO Troops... What will the result be? The harmonious system of reconnaissance, warning, and command and control created over the years and decades will be threatened. The last such attempts were in the 1980's, when PVO units were transferred to the military districts. An analysis showed that this "reforming" produced nothing other than damage to security of the state and losses. But on the other hand, the prestige of the PVO Troops was undermined and along with it the combat potential.

Why should we repeat this sad experience?

The transfer and resubordination of troops always involves multiple stages of command and control. And each stage with reference to airspace leads to a loss of time: in this case, either a wrong decision is made, or it is late.

Let us recall the tragedy with the South Korean airliner. I will not touch upon all of its aspects and consequences, but we should have "looked into" that when it violated the airspace, not at the last moment. Maybe the tragedy would not have happened.

I would be surprised if the Main Commissariat [Glavkomat] supported the idea of transferring or resubordinating the PVO Troops to nonspecialists not performing to the conclusion the procedure of carrying out their assigned missions, the subtleties of the organizational structure...

[VESTNIK PVO] Before there was a reliable "roof" over the country. After the collapse of the USSR, gaps formed in it. Did we suffer great losses? Can they be made up?

[Prudnikov] The losses, to be sure, were substantial. As far as Russia is concerned, and about 70 percent of the air defense assets are located on its territory, it takes time and material expenditures to get to the previous level of monitoring the airspace.

[VESTNIK PVO] Some CIS states have announced the transfer of PVO Troops stationed on their territories to their jurisdiction, leaving only operational control to the Glavkomat...

[Prudnikov] I will clarify this. Transferring the PVO Troops to their own jurisdiction, they do not agree very

much with the Glavkomat's operational control. The only thing the leaders of the republics agree with for the time being is to leave as it was the system of collecting, processing, and relaying information on the air situation. It must be noted that we are finding common interests in this with Ukraine, Belarus, and the Central Asian states. We are concerned with the Transcaucasus: there are no specialists left there who know how to maintain in the "working" mode the radar stations and armament. It must be said that we are not refusing to help them, although Azerbaijan has not signed any documents on these problems within the framework of the Commonwealth.

[VESTNIK PVO] Contract recruitment for military service began on 1 December of last year. In your view, will it help bring the army up to full strength?

[Prudnikov] If it is a question of manning problems, contract service is not the solution, but an opportunity to attain a higher level of professionalism in the troops. We still need the compulsory service draft. Why? Manpower acquisition in PVO units has decreased sharply, just as it has throughout the armed forces. For all practical purposes, support and security subunits and units are manned 50 percent with compulsory service personnel, at best. You see, without such subunits it is very difficult to stand alert duty.

At the same time, contract service is needed if we are serious about building a professional army.

[VESTNIK PVO] Viktor Alekseyevich, what do you think about a domestic SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]?

[Prudnikov] SDI is primarily information about a nuclear missile attack. Russia needs it; we are obligated to keep it intact even within the framework of the former Union. We are willing for the specific potential of the system's installations (engineering networks, power plants, computer complexes) to be used in the interests of sovereign states on a distinct legal and contract basis.

[VESTNIK PVO] The Persian Gulf War, in some people's opinion, showed the low combat readiness of the Soviet equipment supplied to Iraq, including the air defense systems. But what is interesting is that the people drawing this conclusion know little about how the air defense system operates. As commander in chief, provide some clarity to this issue.

[Prudnikov] First a few clarifications: the equipment and armament delivered to Iraq are models from the 1970's. The Americans and their allies sent out not modern but advanced weapons against this equipment. Take into account that the Iraqi complexes were simply "suppressed" by electronics. And the strikes came one after another...

Surface-to-air missile [SAM] systems are engaged only when the information system, reconnaissance, and the system for processing incoming information operate;

only after this is the system targeted and the button pressed. All this takes up to 30 percent of the efforts for carrying out the mission, and the remaining 70 percent goes to supporting the launch.

Well, the SAM systems delivered to Iraq were removed from the context of an integrated system that contained reconnaissance, data processing...

To keep such a story that discredits our equipment from being repeated, we should, apparently, talk about the system approach when delivering weapons abroad. Whoever buys the weapons from us must meet a number of our conditions. We must know into what kind of system the armament is being connected.

If this does not happen, we offer our participation in creating the air defense system and its guaranteed servicing.

There are now 10 countries wanting to cooperate with us precisely in this direction. Recently a delegation headed by the chief of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Troops was working in China, where precisely such a variant was proposed.

The level of the equipment being received by the troops suits us. The characteristics of the SAM and radar systems, MiG-31 and Su-27 aircraft meet modern requirements. Not too long ago we conducted the Obozona-92 [Defense-92] exercise, at which we broke in the "300" system and the tactical system. The equipment demonstrated a high degree of effectiveness, of which the foreign observers also could be convinced.

[VESTNIK PVO] What did the results of the past training period in the PVO Troops show?

[Prudnikov] On the whole, the troops accomplished the assigned missions. But the quantitative side, so to speak, of the training process does not suit us. For well-known reasons (fuel shortages and the limit of monetary and other assets) we were unable to conduct all the scheduled exercises, launches, flights...

In regions where the situation is less stable, much of what was scheduled for the training period was not done at all.

The lack of social protection for servicemen and their social guarantees are alarming—if not more. Housing is a difficult problem, especially now, when troops are being withdrawn to Russia.

In the Moscow area, Leningrad Oblast, and Nizhniy Novgorod, for example, local authorities are helping us in resolving social problems. In other regions, they might be glad to help, but apparently do not have the forces and assets. Difficulties remain. No matter what we do, we cannot get rid of the problem.

[VESTNIK PVO] Viktor Alekseyevich, we know that you are one of the authors of the concept of creating a global system of protection. We would like to learn about it in more detail.

[Prudnikov] Negotiations are now being conducted only with the Americans. We believe that the idea of creating such a system is quite important and promising. Its essence is to create a system of protection which would have several levels. Say, a system warning of the launch of ballistic weapons, antiballistic-missile and antispace defense weapons, and so forth.

For the time being, the process of developing the ideology of this system is being carried out. I believe that those countries which join it with some elements or simply wish to participate in it are not miscalculating. After all, this involves a system which will stabilize the situation in the military-political context. It will be one of the most important guarantees of universal security and not permitting anyone to even think about using ballistic weapons.

[VESTNIK PVO] Lately, we have increasingly begun to conduct exercises at which PVO units of the Ground Forces and the PVO Troops practice missions jointly. Is this a new approach in using air defense forces or something else?

[Prudnikov] Everything is taking place in light of the development of the ideology which I spoke of above. Whereas before the PVO Troops carried out their missions totally autonomously, now it is clear that we must abandon this practice. It is my primary mission as commander in chief to gather all the forces into a united fist. I am confident that accomplishing the mission of guarding Russia's airspace through the joint air defense forces and assets of the armed forces will have good results.

The principle of subordination and organizational structure has not yet been developed in final form. But I believe that all the forces and assets should be operationally subordinate to the commander of the air defense zone and the commander responsible for the defense area.

[VESTNIK PVO] At the recent competitions held in the PVO Troops, all-officer crews took part for the first time. Does this mean that things are excessively difficult with compulsory service personnel manpower acquisition?

[Prudnikov] Yes, this is a problem which will take some time to overcome. Even disbanding a number of units and using this to bring existing ones up to strength is not solving the problem. The troops have had a chronic shortage, and this indicator has reached critical marks. We have been forced to get out of the situation that has developed by recruiting women and replacing a number of servicemen positions with civilian workers and employees. We are now working to attract specialist to serve under contract. We have been authorized to recruit 5 percent. For the time being, specialists have a double or triple workload, and that is why the officer crews are being created.

[VESTNIK PVO] At what pace is the rearmament of the troops proceeding, and how is industry satisfying the orders?

[Prudnikov] That is a fairly complicated question. Industry has to produce to survive. There is no reason to talk about the pace of rearmament which we have planned. For us the main task is not to lose quality of armament and to preserve scientific research and experimental design work. And we must not reduce finances for this. As far as series production is concerned, here anything is better than nothing. Now we cannot order equipment and armament in the necessary amounts due to shortages of money, and the enterprises cannot fulfill our orders due to systematic interruptions in deliveries.

The commander in chief of the Air Defense Troops, Colonel-General V.A. Prudnikov, gave this interview to my colleagues A. Belousov, A. Ivanov, and S. Ovsienko. With consent of the parties, we are printing it in our journal. I could have closed after such a preamble. But for some reason I thought that a interested, friendly subscriber of our journal or simply a reader might ask: Why is the editorial staff publishing an interview given to other publications? Can't its own staff meet with the commander in chief and talk with him about timely topics from the life and service of PVO soldiers? You will agree: such questions must not in any way be called idle, even if no one specifically asks them of us. We must explain, and I will try, taking advantage of the opportunity to do this.

I will begin with the fact that the collective of the VESTNIK PVO editorial staff has developed very professional, close relations with the command authorities of our troops, including with Viktor Alekseyevich Prudnikov, who since January 1992 has also been our constituent (as commander in chief of the PVO Troops). (Up to then, the chief of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Troops was the constituent.)

This does not at all mean that we have a serene, carefree life and that we have always been on good terms with our chiefs on everything without exception. There have been both conflicts and misunderstandings. But this, after all, is normal. The main thing is that the cause not suffer. In our opinion, it does not suffer. In the PVO Troops they understand what the press is, and thanks to this understanding we have been able to survive and remain standing in a situation which back in the middle of last year seemed to me personally to be, if not at an impasse, then very close to a stalemate.

Overall, both our commander in chief and his deputies are aware what kind of a mass medium our journal is. If the readers pay attention: the majority of them are members of the editorial council of VESTNIK PVO. Their list is always published on the second page of the cover. This is not a complement to the commanders, but merely a statement of fact, a pleasant one, I will not argue. Just recently the commander in chief himself; his first deputy, Colonel-General V. Miruk; the chief of the Main Staff of

the PVO Troops, Colonel-General V. Sinitsyn; the commander of aviation off the PVO Troops, Lieutenant-General V. Andreyev; the chief of rear services of the PVO Troops, Major-General Yu. Chubenko; and others appeared on the pages of our journal.

In short, what am I trying to say? That we have the opportunity to interview our commander in chief whenever we wish. But we, first of all, do not abuse his good attitude toward us. Second, we do not want to add more work to a man who is already very busy. That is why we took advantage of the opportunity.

The last thing I would like to say concerns the topic of our conversation. If the editorial staff of VESTNIK PVO indeed has good (and, I hope, long-term) business contacts with the commander in chief of the PVO Troops and his deputies, why don't you, dear readers, take advantage of this? Send us letters with questions you would like to ask our commanders. We guarantee you detailed and constructive answers.

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PVO Tactics: Air Defense Ambush

93UM0609B Moscow VESTNIK
PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian
No 3, 93 (signed to press 5 Mar 93) pp 14-15

[Article by Lt-Col Aleksandr Manachinskiy, candidate of military sciences: "Air Defense Ambush"]

[Text] Achieving victory in aerial combat with the enemy depends on a number of factors, including the ability to use available forces and assets with the greatest effect and suddenly in a specific situation.

Surprise involves actions unexpected by the enemy that help in achieving victory in combat. How is surprise achieved? Above all, it is done by misleading the enemy about friendly intentions; keeping the concept of upcoming operations and the preparations for them a secret; employing new air defense [PVO] assets and methods of conducting combat operations; choosing firing and launch positions on axes where the airborne enemy does not expect them, beating him to the punch in making strikes; speed of maneuver and decisiveness of actions; timely bringing of PVO weapons to readiness for repelling an attack; camouflage, concealment, and deception and skillful use of terrain conditions, weather, time of day, and season of the year.

An analysis of the experience of past wars shows the constant desire to search for the most effective methods and techniques of preparing and implementing surprise actions. The importance of the element of surprise has never decreased; on the contrary, it steadily increases as military affairs develop.

The most typical principles of organizing air defense ambushes were revealed during the Great Patriotic War.

The airborne enemy, avoiding flights over the areas where PVO assets were deployed, chose routes to bypass them. Air defense ambushes were used to interdict these flights. They were designed for surprise firing on enemy aircraft from unprotected or poorly protected axes where he least expected opposition.

In the first period of the war, an ambush included one or two anti-aircraft guns, a platoon of light anti-aircraft artillery [MZA]; in the second and third periods of the war, it included a platoon, battery, and sometimes several batteries of light anti-aircraft artillery.

Ambushes were organized, as a rule, after a careful study of the flight routes of enemy aviation. The basic method of operating air defense ambushes is openly lying in wait and subsequent surprise opening of fire by anti-aircraft guns and machineguns when the aircraft are located in the effective kill zone.

Surprise opening of fire deprived German pilots of the opportunity to take any countermeasures, and the fire opened from ambush was the most effective and made it possible to inflict appreciable losses on the airborne enemy and thereby prevent him from operating on this axis.

As soon as the airborne enemy changed his flight routes, the ambushes were moved so as to meet him with surprise fire again. This method of using anti-aircraft artillery proved quite worthwhile.

Subunits designated to operate in the ambush moved up to the positions, as a rule, ahead of time at night, prepared for firing, and, as soon as the German aircraft appeared, opened surprise intensive fire against them.

The following examples attest to the effectiveness of the air defense ambushes.

On 28 August 1942, a reinforced platoon of the 1262d Air Defense Artillery Army Regiment, consisting of two 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and two machinegun mounts, were moved up to .5 km southeast of Kotulban Station, where enemy aircraft flew over most often and where there previously were no anti-aircraft weapons. In the morning, during the first overflight of a group of Ju-88 bombers, two of them were shot down. An Me-109 sent out some time later for reconnaissance was also shot down on a low-level flight. After this, enemy aviation flights in this area ceased.

As a result of a swift advance by our troops in fighting to liberate Belarussia, spots appeared on individual sectors of the front that were not covered by our anti-aircraft artillery. Enemy aviation immediately took advantage of this, shelling infantry and artillery from cannons and machineguns and making low-altitude bomb strikes. After seeing this from his command post, the commander of the 303d Guards Light Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment, Gds Maj I. Yegorov, made a decision and tasked the commander of the 4th Battery, Gds Sr Lt G. Kovalchuk, to organize an air defense ambush.

After receiving the mission, Gds Sr Lt G. Kovalchuk conducted commander's reconnaissance of the proposed area of operations of the air defense ambush and established that about 1 km from his fire position there was a small hollow hidden from enemy observation and suitable for organizing the ambush, which he reported to the regiment commander.

Gds Sr Lt N. Kalachev and several soldiers prepared the route of advance to the ambush area. They stacked young birch tree trunks from the road to the hollow. They ended up with a unique white "thread," a night reference point. With the onset of darkness, the guns were moved to the hollow while observing camouflage measures. Quietly and slowly the battery reached the destination. The guns were set up in open emplacements and were camouflaged with branches.

At dawn on 24 October 1943, the battery members prepared to meet the German ground attack aircraft. They appeared at the same time as the day before, but ended up in the battery's fire zone without reaching our troops' disposition area. The lead aircraft suddenly caught fire and slammed into the forest; the rest soared upward and flew away.

Toward evening, the battery commander reported to the regiment commander that he had noticed an aircraft which had photographed the battery. Gds Sr Lt G. Kovalchuk understood that the battery had been detected. Consequently, an attack from the air or ground could follow. Therefore, he reported to the regiment commander about the need to change position, who authorized him to do so.

Skillfully using the terrain relief, at dusk the battery quietly abandoned the position. Many, especially the young soldiers, were less than enthusiastic about the commander's order, which promised another sleepless night and difficult work to prepare a fire position.

Already toward morning on 25 October, the anti-aircraft gunners had fallen asleep, tired from the second crossing and from digging emplacements and dugout shelters. The sun had barely come into view when the enemy artillery opened fire. And columns of fire and smoke rose where the previous battery position was. Everything was literally plowed up by the shellbursts. But the powerful strike landed on an empty site.

The soldiers always remembered this lesson and raised even higher their commander's prestige and their faith in his combat skills. Thus, Officer G. Kovalchuk, acting prudently, creatively, and with initiative, and by leaving the combat position in a timely manner, misled the enemy, as a result of which he saved the battery from inevitable destruction.

These examples attest to the fact that air defense ambushes were successful only when the actions of the airborne enemy were comprehensively taken into account, the approach routes to the fire positions were carefully prepared, engineer preparation and camouflage

of them were accomplished, and positions were changed after an overflight by enemy reconnaissance.

The actions of subunits from ambushes forced the enemy constantly to change the flight routes and disoriented him with respect to the dispositions of antiaircraft weapons as a whole. In addition, the use of ambushes forced the enemy to update reconnaissance data about the dispositions of antiaircraft artillery and often abandon low-altitude flights where actions of antiaircraft artillery were detected earlier.

During the course of past local wars, it has been confirmed that PVO subunits located in an ambush should not conduct active combat operations until they receive data about the approach of the target. This ensured secrecy and a high effectiveness of the actions by the air defense ambush, for the airborne enemy was not able to detect the antiaircraft weapons prematurely and take steps to suppress them.

The experience of local wars shows that aviation raids were accomplished after repeated reconnaissance for strikes against surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery positions. When making strikes against the installations being covered, the PVO assets were neutralized first, which reduced the losses of the aircraft in the raid. All this made us look for the most expedient methods of operations of air defense ambushes. Above all, this was achieved by quick execution of a maneuver after overflights of reconnaissance aircraft; exceptional attention was given to communications and electronic intelligence denial and deception, which contributed to reliable concealment of the air defense ambushes.

The capability of the air defense ambushes to continue to operate was achieved by mutual covering of PVO units and including in them direct cover weapons, which for all practical purposes precluded the possibility of strikes being made against them from extremely low and low altitudes and made it possible to engage an airborne enemy detecting the ambush immediately after opening fire.

In today's conditions, when the capabilities for reconnaissance of fire (launch) positions of antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile systems have increased considerably, there are increased demands on organizing reconnaissance of the airborne enemy and warning PVO subunits about him, on stable and secure command and control, and also on including in the make-up of air defense ambushes air defense weapons that are able to deploy quickly and fire from short halts and on the move.

In so doing, cooperation of PVO forces and assets located in the ambush with PVO assets deployed at positions for covering troops and installations and also with ground forces acquires great importance.

The experience amassed in the course of the Great Patriotic War and local wars in organizing air defense ambushes has great theoretical and practical significance

in our time, too. Studying this experience, creative assimilation and implementation of all that is useful into combat training is the urgent task of every officer of the Air Defense Troops and will help to accomplish similar tasks in modern conditions.

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Bobrovka PVO Aircraft: CFE Reduction Woes, Other Problems

93UM0630A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jun 93 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Aleksandr Vetakh: "Bobrovka and High-Level Politics: There Where They 'Dismember' Worn-Out Aviation Equipment"]

[Text] Just a few years ago only the airmen on the post and the ubiquitous boys knew about the existence of a special subunit at the Bobrovka air garrison, which handled the storage and dismantling for scrap of interceptors of PVO [air defense] units which had used up their service life or been removed from the arsenal. Not just they, but also local handymen found many valuable parts, assemblies and various items left at the site where the fuselages of the once awesome Su-9, Su-15 and Yak-23 interceptors were cut up.

For years tons of aluminum, magnesium alloys and high-alloy steel lay around underfoot. This might have continued to this day, but a new era began in the life of the nation, and changes came also at Bobrovka. On 19 November 1990 the USSR signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, under which Russia committed itself to reduce its armaments, including its aircraft, considerably. The storage facility was turned into a dismantling shop for PVO interceptors. Following the reorganization the specialists in the subunit headed by Maj Yuriy Baryshev had to perform qualitatively new jobs: to cut up interceptors, the number of which had been strictly stipulated. Furthermore, under the agreement, foreign observers had the right to inspect on-site the process of eliminating the aircraft at any time.

And so, the Bobrovka air garrison found itself involved in high-level politics. The name began appearing prominently in official documents of inspection groups of the nations signing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. And not just in the documents. The West side began obtaining and analyzing information on how many of the interceptors to be eliminated were supposed to be at the airfield, and when, from intelligence satellites. The seriousness of this was illustrated by an unusual incident about which Maj Yuriy Baryshev told me.

"In the spring of 1991," he said, "all at once a protest was leveled against us. The whole uproar came about because on a date stipulated by the two sides an intelligence satellite showed 150 aircraft at the Bobrovka airfield, instead of the 135 interceptors which were

supposed to be scrapped. You will agree, that was not a very pleasant thing at that level, because it raised doubts about placing trust in us...."

Calls from Moscow followed one after another, and Baryshev had to explain the situation more than once. Luckily, it became clear that neither Yuriy Petrovich nor his subordinates were to blame for the violation.

The job which our specialists took on was totally new, of course. And this incident demonstrated that everyone involved in it had to be absolutely accurate and correct in all things pertaining to such a touchy area as arms reduction. The same requirements also applied to the other nations which had signed the treaty, of course.

Several inspection groups visited Bobrovka during that time. Representatives of Germany, the USA, France, Great Britain and Holland came. A group of observers from Italy was recently present. They not only verified our observance of the treaty terms but also observed the dismemberment of Su-15 fighter-interceptors for scrap.

The technology for eliminating the aviation equipment is basically a simple one. First, all of the instrumentation is removed from the aircraft. Special attention is given to that containing valuable metals, of course. There are still quite a few assemblies containing several grams of pure gold on each of the interceptors. Its separation is not done at Bobrovka, of course; it merely makes an exact record and sends the expensive equipment taken from the aircraft off to plants. The aircraft themselves are not completely cut up. The treaty terms do not call for this. And there is no need for it. After all, even the nonspecialist knows that it is enough to cut out some surface areas and cut off the tail unit and the landing gear, and the aircraft is destined never to fly again.

To be honest, I had mixed feelings as I observed all of this. After all, the "greatest creation of human minds and hands" as N. Ye. Zhukovskiy, father of Russian aviation, called the aircraft, is being turned into a pile of metal before your very eyes. And how difficult it is for the officers and warrant officers who devoted many years to preparing the aircraft for flights to engage in cutting them up! On the grand scale, however, these people are involved in high-level politics.

There are big problems in Maj Baryshev's subunit, as there are everywhere right now. There is a shortage of personnel, electrodes for welding machines, motor vehicles.... They say there is no money to buy these things. Then just where is the money generated by the dismembering and subsequent smelting of the aircraft going? The aviators are still hoping for changes, though. They conscientiously perform the job assigned to them.

MIG-29M Technical Specifications

93UM0623A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jun 93 p 1

[Unattributed article: "The MiG Gets a New Look"]

[Text] The 40th International Air Show Opens today in Le Bourget, a suburb of Paris. It will last until June 20.

The "MiG" Aviation Scientific Production Complex im. A.I. Mikoyan is presenting several aircraft at the show. The light single-seat multipurpose all-weather, round-the-clock fighter MIG-29M (in the photo) occupies a special place among them. Although it is similar to its predecessor, it is a qualitatively new aircraft. In terms of its total mission the MIG-29M surpasses the MIG-29 by a factor of nearly 2.5, even more in terms of service life.

The new fighter is capable of effectively destroying both air and ground targets. The radar which it carries can detect targets at a distance of 100 kilometers. Depending on its mission, the MIG-29M can be armed with 8 air-to-air missiles, 4 air-to-ground missiles, or 80-mm, 130-mm, or 240-mm unguided rockets. In addition it can carry 4.5 tonnes of bombs. A 30-mm aircraft cannon is mounted on the aircraft.

The takeoff weight of the MIG-29M is 15,000 kg, the maximal speed is more than 2,600 km/hr, ceiling 18,000 m, range up to 3,200 km.

SAM Regiment Copes with Personnel Shortages

93UM0629A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jun 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Nikolay Poroskov: "At the Village of Kryukovo: The Difficult Days of a PVO Surface-to-air Missile Regiment"]

[Text] Behind the political battles and the reform and reduction of the military, affairs increasingly global, the individual military unit with its daily difficulties and problems is sometimes left in the background of public opinion. This is that very combat entity of the kind which make up the combat capability of the armed forces and provide the nation's security, including the security of its air borders. Our correspondent made a study of this matter, using the example of one of the PVO surface-to-air missile regiments deployed in the Moscow area.

The first impression is that the regiment is just another regiment. Everything seems the same as before: exercises, maintenance work, alert duty.... A closer look, however, shows that the missilemen presently exist under a particular—extreme, one might say—regimen.

Somewhat more frequently than before now one, now another battalion is taken off of alert duty in order to conserve equipment service life, fuel and lubricants, and to give the officers a rest. And it is not that there is a shortage of the latter. On the contrary, almost all of the T/O slots are filled. Two thirds of the officers are of middle-age or older, to be sure. The ranks are replenished with those who did not take the oath in adjacent foreign parts, mainly local people (the same is true of warrant officer slots, by the way) who have a place to live. The unit cannot provide apartments. This situation has recently begun to improve. Several apartments will soon be available, I was told. The main problem is the critical shortage of first-term personnel. Right now fewer than one third of the enlisted men needed are available.

"The fall discharge was carried out," said Maj Mikhail Rudnev, the regiment's senior Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, "and only one out of five was replaced."

So lieutenants and captains take up shovels and brooms mornings to clean the battalion grounds, and in the evening they assume officer guard duty, alternating with the enlisted men. With shoulders not yet recovered from the numbing of the semiautomatic rifle sling, they go on alert duty, then there is motor pool detail to perform.... There will be as many as 16-18 such days a month. Chinese military personnel recently visited the regiment to gain experience and see what was worthwhile. They were impressed with the equipment, but they were amazed at how those Russians manage to operate the extremely complex system with so few specialists.

There are regiments in the Moscow area in which the situation is even more difficult, where there are one or two soldiers for a garrison. How have my acquaintances coped with this situation? That is a whole epic, which has lasted for going on three years now. When it became absolutely clear that they could not expect replacements, they set up a sort of recruitment group of unit officers headed by Lt-Col Konstantin Morozov, deputy commander for personnel, and sent it to the assembly center in Lefortovo. What kind of people assemble there is well known: mostly deserters AWOL from their units. As they say, though, beggars can't be choosers. Some people in administration were talked into joining. An effort was made to win over soldiers, heart-to-talks were conducted with them.... In short, every little bit helps—and you come up with a platoon.

Later they were forbidden to take deserters. They went to the military commissariat, knowing that not even half of the draftees show up at the induction centers. They took down the addresses of those who had failed to show up and went to their apartments, performing the role of military police, which are still in the planning stage. They heard various stories in dozens of apartments. They had to persuade, humble themselves and promise the parents they could visit their sons frequently, that the latter would be serving right near by. They had no authority at all.

They took the ones they caught to assembly centers, where there was some question about turning over all of those the regimental group thought of as theirs, having acquired them through honest labor. The individuals were primarily assigned to the Moscow Military District, to which they were subordinate and which had little to do with the PVO people. And to give the appearance of legality to the matter, they demanded a representative of the military commissariat, a certificate of receipt and other "papers." When the regimental group became upset, for which it had every reason, it was stopped short with this: "No one asked you to make the rounds of the apartments of draft evaders." But damn it, circumstances ask for this, force it to be done.

This incident focuses, as it were, the drama not just of this regiment but of the entire army. Everyone talks as though he understands its problems, but let us not forget how many reasons, some of them legal reasons, the overgrown boys of today can offer for deferments or even for evading military service because the soldier's boots are organically too tight. This is not even to mention their sense of duty. And it all began with a populist clamor about needing to protect the nation's intellectual capability from the spirit of the barracks. A considerable part of this "capability" soon merged into commercial structures, though, and the army instantly began corresponding to its original, anthology-type definition as an army of peasants and workers.

I would like to know what the "authors" of those hasty decisions would say now, if they could visit the regiment and see the harried officers forced to fill two or three positions and work under enormous pressure, to do what is not specified in any obligations just to keep the regiment going, to see that the cause to which these altruistic personnel took the oath is continued.

The easiest thing they could do would be to wash their hands of it all with the justification that the times and circumstances are such. Obviously, however, the terms "responsibility" and "officer's honor" are not empty words for them. One actually wants to bow down before Morozov and his colleagues for the fact that they feel the spiritual pain and concern.

Col Viktor Shevtsov, unit commander, showed me with both pride and sorrow the battalion's position: the missiles, the detection and guidance post, the command post. He showed me the excellent, refined—I would say "intelligent"—equipment of the latest generation. Its creators and designers made a place in it also for the soldier. Today, however, the stations are manned only by officers.

Due to circumstances the subunit and pool details are sometimes retained on duty for a second day. The technical battery has been turned into a guard crew, perhaps the sole exception being the watchman, who is linked directly to combat readiness.

Some people say that today's soldier is not the same. Some of them sense their irreplaceability and recall how

their paternal commanders implored them with tears in their eyes to "become soldiers." They therefore take the liberty not to rush to carry out orders, but do it reluctantly, lazily, or even refuse to do it at all. The pampered one knows that the commander will not rail at him, will not punish him in any way or have him arrested, because he is too valuable to the commander. The laws today are liberal, and the legal personnel are swamped with more serious cases.

The commander could coax the soldier with the coveted leave, of course, except that this is no stimulus either, since everyone is granted a leave by law. The commander could take away 5 days, but the military commissariat at the place of residence would inevitably reinstate them. So the only thing left for him is to keep persuading these men.... primarily with his personal example.

One more little feature... just to add color. The traffic regulation gate is opened for vehicles by women in uniform. The feminization of the military ranks has recently proceeded at an accelerated pace. All the liaison work rests on the weaker sex. They are the plotters and the medics too. And now they are also the entrance guards. Despite the highly progressive nature of all the latest trends, there is a limit to the recruitment of women for military occupations. No one can say at this point just how high that limit is or whether it will pass the critical point. A real situation, as the recent leader liked to say.

The officers dream of past holidays as the brightest of times, with the batteries tramping to the cadence of their own band. All that is left of the band now are the instruments. The band members have been recruited as guards. And the glass case at headquarters which contained that sacred item, the unit's fighting colors, is empty. There is no armed guard next to it. The position was abolished. There is no one to guard the depots and headquarters, but there are a lot of people who would like to have them. The scarlet banner is locked away some place with an alarm system. When people pass the empty "glass," their hand goes by habit up to the forehead for a salute....

This is a temporary decision, naturally, a forced one, but there is a sort of bitter symbolism in it. The fact that difficult circumstances forced the fighting colors to be removed from their rightful place, however, does not mean that what is dear and sacred, devotion to duty and loyalty to the homeland and the people, can also be extracted from the officers. In the conversation with Col Shevtsov, one heard more than once the words "national interests" and "the state's interests."

The regiment is stationed in a place where two forces converged during the first military winter, grinding one another down. Remember "A Platoon Perishes at the Village of Kryukovo." The site where the village stood is in these parts. There is no war right now, but a comparison automatically suggests itself. After all, the regiment

today is engaged in a battle, one might say, to continue as a regiment, to preserve itself as a fighting entity and retain its dignity.

If the fightingmen who defended Kryukovo to the death had not believed in victory, they could probably not have held out. The missilemen have it very difficult today. They believe that we will still achieve a normal life acceptable to the military man, that we will build a powerful and modern army for Russia has not died in them, however. Without this faith, they could not endure....

Development, Specifications, Performance of Il-78 Tanker

93UM0635A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Jun 93 p 2

[Article by Valentine Rudenko: "Il-78: Tanker of the Fifth Ocean"]

[Text] They became enthusiastic at the idea of creating an airborne tanker based on the Il-76 at the Ilyushin design bureau back in the mid-seventies. A rough draft was made and the calculations done, but then it was found that the new aircraft could transfer no more than 10 tonnes of fuel in the air. This was clearly insufficient. Work on the program stopped. They returned to it only after several years, after they succeeded in creating a new modification of the aircraft, the Il-76M, which had a significantly higher takeoff weight. It was on the basis of this aircraft that the group of designers under Academician Gonrikh Novozhilov developed the Il-78 tanker in 1984.

"In terms of performance characteristics, the new tanker significantly surpasses its predecessors, the Tu-16, ZM and others," says the chief designer Radiy Pankovskiy, who directly supervised the work on the tanker. "It completely inherited the merits of the Il-76MD (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported on the latter on October 20 1992—V.R.). This is a short takeoff or landing aircraft. It can operate both from concrete and from dirt and even ice airstrips, and can be operated for a long time (up to two months) independently, far from the airfield, maintained only by the crew members. For that reason the new tanker immediately won the hearts of the flyers.

Outwardly the Il-78 differs little from the Il-76MD. It still required certain design changes, however. New hard points have appeared, two under the outboard sections of the wing and one in the aft part of the fuselage. Universal suspended fueling aggregates [UPAZ] were hung from them. The gunner's cabin was refitted as a work place for the fueling operator, and all armaments were removed from the aircraft. Two fuel tanks with a capacity of 14 tonnes each were mounted inside the fuselage. But most of the fuel intended for refueling (on the order of 84 tonnes) is contained in the wing tanks.

Accurate flight to the fueling area is supported by the search (rendezvous) apparatus. The aircraft is equipped

with a special light signalling system which helps with orientation in space and monitoring of the fueling process.

In contrast to all earlier tankers of the fatherland, the IL-78 is capable of fueling three aircraft simultaneously. Fuel is transferred to the UPAZ by powerful pumps and then goes over the hose-cone to the aircraft to be fueled. The length of the hose is automatically adjusted so that it is always taut.

For flights within a range of 1,000 kilometers, the IL-78 is capable of carrying up to 80 tonnes of fuel. One UPAZ can pump up to 2,000 liters of fuel per minute. The optimal flight speed during fueling is 450 to 600 km/h, at an altitude of 2,000 to 7,500 meters. In addition the IL-78 can also be used as a ground tanker.

An interesting detail: the mating assemblies of ours and western fueling systems are identical, making it possible to use the IL-78 as a rescue aircraft under certain conditions. If we compare the performance characteristics of the IL-78, which for the foreseeable future will remain the main aircraft tanker of the Russian Air Forces, with the Boeing KS-135, the most massive American tanker, they are quite similar.

An important advantage of the IL-78 is the possibility of conversion. Only the two fuselage tanks have to be removed for the tanker to be converted into a transport aircraft.

Basic Performance Characteristics of the IL-78

D-30KP engine	4x12,000 kg
Cruising speed, km/h	750
Length of fueling hose, m	No less than 26
Maximal acceptable closure of aircraft during fueling, m	13
Maximal takeoff weight (t)	
—When operating from concrete	210
—When operating from a dirt airstrip	157.5
Maximal weight (t)	
—When landing on concrete	165
—When landing on a dirt airstrip	135
Amount of fuel dispensed in flight, t	112
Maximal commercial load, t	47
Crew size	6

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Financial Aspects of Black Sea Fleet Dispute

93UM0618A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Jun 93 p 2

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank Yuriy Gladkevich: "The Fleet Sends Out a Distress Signal: The Financial Roots of the Black Sea Drama"]

[Text] It seems to me that the test of the patience and survival capacity of the Black Sea sailors has continued unconsciously long. At any rate, a month or a month and a half ago passions were not this high. But everything has its limit, and finally the Andreyevskiy flag went up over ships and auxiliary vessels. The event was not so much unusual as dramatic. And one must admit that it had an almost instantaneous effect—the attention of the leaders of Russia and Ukraine was drawn to the fate of the fleet. The ministers of foreign affairs of our states held emergency consultations in Kiev and Sevastopol, having been ordered to quickly prepare a meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk on the problem of the Black Sea Fleet.

From far off Moscow and Kiev it might seem to many that this drama was fed by causes of an exclusively political nature. They might think that an independent Russia and Ukraine are each concerned only about how to take over the Black Sea sailors. Hence, one might say, the already commonplace incidents of "grabbing" of ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet by the Ukrainian Naval Forces (VMSU), hence the switch of some two hundred pennants to the Andreyevskiy, historically Russian, naval standard. I don't want to argue, but it seems to me that of course both Ukraine and Russia want to have a strong fleet in the Black Sea, but still I am certain that there are diverse causes. The event itself also has financial roots, in addition to its political ones.

A man I met by chance on the Moscow-Sevastopol railroad is neither a politician nor even a mid-level naval commander. Vladimir B. is a seaman on one of the auxiliary vessels of the Black Sea Fleet. He is married and has two children. He is not weighed down by riches; as he himself puts it, he has not amassed a great fortune, or any fortune at all. But he is burdened in full by everyday problems.

"I won't try to hide it, I traveled to Moscow to earn some money on the side," he says. "I took a couple days. It's a good thing that the ship has been tied up for some time. I bought a few things and sold them in the capital. You've got to live, after all, and my pay is eight thousand coupons. I'm ashamed to say what sort of damn breadwinner that makes me. Just enough for two kilograms of sausage."

As I soon learned, Vladimir was not using the sausage equivalent of his pay just for effect. In the fleet, both the service members and especially the fleet civilian personnel compare their pay mainly to the cost of a month's groceries. And the prices (after arriving in Sevastopol, I immediately went around the stores), they don't merely take a bite, they tear to pieces and swallow whole the meager wages of the Black Sea sailors. Cooked sausage, 1,200-1,500 karbovantsy, half-smoked, from 4,000 to 5,000, ham the same, margarine, from 1,200 to 1,500, beef fat, 800 karbovantsy. A food called "chicken 2nd category" goes for more than 2,500. A loaf of white bread cost a hundred. Although you need not pay that much. Peas without bread costs 52 karbovantsy per kilo.

And these were the prices at the start of June, with an average month's pay on the ships and auxiliary vessels and in the fleet enterprises of 8-10 thousand *karbovantsy*. Starting on 11 June, it was learned, food prices would go even higher.

The great majority of Black Sea sailors are people used to hardship and deprivation. These are only resort areas around here, but service is hard on people. They knew of course that even after the signing of the Yalta and Dagomys agreements on the Black Sea Fleet, there would of course still be plenty of conflict situations. Nonetheless they had reason to hope that since the two presidents, Russian and Ukrainian, had put their signatures on these documents and had assumed responsibility for the fate of the fleet, it would live and operate, and the presidents would not allow its collapse by separating and impoverishing those who serve in it in the interests of two states. And they even tended to think that one should not over-dramatize the facts of Ukraine's "grabbing" of some ships and vessels which, contrary to the agreements, after arbitrary raising of the "zhovto-blakitniy" flags, were immediately included in the national navy by order of the Ukrainian Minister of Defense. The ease with which the Ukrainian military leader signed such orders was perceived as an action which derived from the general context of Russian-Ukrainian relations.

"But our hopes were not much justified," Ivan Chernykh, a senior electrician of the hospital ship *Yenisey* reflects bitterly. And it is not just a matter of prices and our pay. Yes it's low, no, it's not enough to live on. But we are still alive, we are still making ends meet, we get by. Some through minor speculation, some through big callouses from their gardens. But how is the fleet doing? Look at the ships and vessels, it breaks your heart. Iron may be mute, but it also cries out: through the rust spots on the decks, through the ailing boilers and machinery, and through the screens of the navigation, radar, and sonar stations, going out due to a lack of spare parts. Why are we ruining our fleet, what did it do to us?

"Most of the Black Sea sailors feel that way," confirms the Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet for Personnel, Rear Admiral Aleksandr Penkin. "People who have served here for decades, who worked for the good of the fleet and our common power, see that today there are practically no funds for the further life of the fleet. And this is perceived as a tragedy."

In the Finance Service of the Black Sea Fleet I learned that in accordance with the agreement between Ukraine and Russia regarding the joint use and financing of the Black Sea Fleet in the transitional period, in February of this year the finance service of the fleet presented an estimate of expenditures needed to maintain the fleet in 1993 to the military departments of the two states. The Russian side, in the words of the Deputy Chief of the Finance Service of the Black Sea Fleet Col. Aleksandr Zhukov, is meeting the terms of the agreement, but the Ukrainian side to this point has not even approved the

estimate. Hence, in the opinion of Aleksandr Vladimirovich, the financial problems.

The monthly requirement for funds to maintain the fleet is about nine or ten billion *karbovantsy*. But in fact in five months of this year the fleet has received only 16 billion *karbovantsy* from the Ukrainian Defense Ministry. And starting in April, after publication of order No 62 of the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, the fleet has received only two billion, and only to pay the wages of the service members and the civilian personnel. All the other vitally important needs of the fleet have been set aside, as they say. The units and ships, like the people, have been put under survival conditions. There is no money to pay taxes or to make deductions for the pension fund, nothing to pay the communal expenses, nothing to buy even the usual office supplies.

Remember what Chernykh said, that the fleet is rusting? Here are the figures. The master plan for 1993 for ship repairs called for repair of ships and vessels at enterprises of state industry for a sum of 10 billion *karbovantsy*. But in fact just 4 billion *karbovantsy* worth of work was done, and only two and a half billion of that was paid by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry. The debt for the repairs already done thus comes to two billion. And this is not the only debt of the fleet. The food suppliers (only Ukrainians) are owed almost 220 million *karbovantsy*, and the same amount has to be paid as a prepayment to another five Ukrainian sources, otherwise the fleet will not receive food. And this has occurred while food worth a total of a billion *karbovantsy* has been provided from the fleet warehouses in the past five months, free of charge, to units of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry (which have their own budget). In this time the units of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry have been supplied fuel and POL products worth a total of 50 million rubles (i.e. roughly 150 million *karbovantsy*) for free. We note here that the deliveries of fuel and POL products to the fleet this year were made basically by Russia, in five months worth a sum exceeding 3 billion rubles.

The Ukrainian Defense Ministry is hardly financing any production or purchase of clothing or deliveries of engineer and communal equipment, construction materials, general industrial equipment, deck gear and much else. There were no deliveries of medical stores from the Ukrainian Defense Ministry at all this year. Only Russia provided them, almost 200 million rubles' worth. But on the other hand in 1992-1993, units and ships of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry by plan received medical supplies from the fleet worth a total of almost 20 million rubles, and in the fleet hospitals every year a quarter of those receiving treatment are service members of the national army and navy of Ukraine.

But even those funds which the Ukraine Defense Ministry allocates to the fleet are not so easy to get. At one time the fleet command viewed the financial plan of the Black Sea Fleet, under the joint use of Russian and

Ukraine, as acceptable. It was through the finance services of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, the Black Sea Fleet, and formations and units. With the creation of the administrative organs of the Naval Forces of Ukraine, by order of the Ukrainian Defense Minister the Finance Service of the Ukrainian Navy was inserted into this chain. The plan grew more complicated. But clearly the Ukrainian Naval Forces have nothing to do with the Black Sea Fleet under joint jurisdiction of Russia and Ukraine (except for using the Black Sea Fleet in the capacity of "donor"). It is a purely national military level. There are more than enough political and organizational contradictions between the Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy, which of course complicate the fleet financing process.

In short, I would not confuse the causes of the Russian and Ukrainian differences of opinion on the problem of the Black Sea Fleet with the causes which led to the raising of the Andreyevskiy flags. While in the first case they are primarily political in nature, and are the consequence of a different understanding of state interests, in the second they are the consequence of failures of an organizational nature, of a lack of an effective plan for financing and support of the fleet and concern for it as a unified combat and social organism.

"Political disagreements between our countries clearly cannot be settled overnight" believes the Chief of the Finance Service of the Black Sea Fleet Col Nikolay Makarov. "But this certainly does not mean that we can't quickly organize the joint use of the fleet and its maintenance in the necessary degree of combat and technical readiness. After all, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine have already agreed to this in principle. We really hope that the upcoming meeting of Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk will lead to exactly this result."

Nikolay Petrovich is not alone in hoping this. That is also the topic of talk in the staff of the Black Sea Fleet, on the ships and vessels which have raised the Andreyevskiy flag, and on the combat ships. But alas, hopes have the habit of dwindling and running out if real policy does not confirm their soundness. In this regard I would like to recall something which Rear Admiral Aleksandr Penkin said:

"The Andreyevskiy flags have been raised on ships and auxiliary vessels where basically the crews consist of civilian personnel. But it costs us a lot of effort to restrain the crews of combat ships from the same step."

And believe me, that would not be just a scandal but a real tragedy now. One which no sort of sovereignty or independence could justify.

Sea-Borne Evacuation From Abkhaziya

93UM0618B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jun 93 p 1

[Article by Oleg Vladykin and Vladimir Maryukha:
"Russian Humanitarian Action Saves Thousands of

Lives in Abkhaziya: The Military Takes an Active Part in Delivery of Cargoes and Evacuation of the Populace"]

[Text] On 14 June the Prime Minister of Russia Viktor Chernomyrdin signed a government order which granted the Chairman of the State Committee For Emergency Situations [GKChS] of the Russian Federation, Sergey Shoygu, to resolve all questions associated with implementation of the operation to deliver humanitarian assistance and to evacuate the populace from the zone of the conflict in Abkhaziya. Through this same order, the Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Transport, and Finance and the Federal Emigration Service were told to take part as needed in the conduct of this action and to send their authorized representatives as part of the operational group of the GKChS.

Thus the operation begun by the State Committee for Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation back on 10 June with the dispatch of a truck column to the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict has acquired the status and scope of a general state measure. To this point Russia has already spent more than 600 million rubles to carry out this action.

The operation is being carried out in accordance with a precise plan coordinated with all the interested parties. The truck column, consisting of 31 KamAZ trucks, arrived in Sochi on 13 June. There 214 tonnes of food were immediately loaded onto the trucks. The flour, groats and vegetable oil were all intended for the residents of blockaded Tkvarcheli. But the populace of Sukhumi did not go without assistance either. It received 215 tonnes of food by sea.

According to an agreement between the Presidents of Russian and Ukraine, a detachment of ships of the Black Sea Fleet consisting of two large amphibious landing ships and the rescue tug *Shakter* are participating in the delivery of humanitarian cargoes. They are capable of unloading at an unprepared coastal site. This was especially stressed at the Russian Navy press center, since even though agreement has been reached on the deadlines for passage of the ships and on the sites on the coast where, in addition to all else, trucks are to disembark for further independent travel, these might change at any minute due to circumstances.

The detachment of ships proceeded from Sevastopol to Sochi under Rear Admiral Nikolay Mikhalechenko, who heads the naval amphibious forces of the Black Sea Fleet. The crew of the amphibious landing ships were not especially selected and are multi-ethnic in their makeup, but they do have experience in such operations.

Incidentally, we should also express our appreciation of the attitude of the leadership of both warring sides towards the action. During its execution, and according to plan this was 72 hours from the moment the ships departed from Sochi, the military commanders of both Abkhaziya and Georgia ordered the forces under them to cease fire. But in order to ensure against any possible surprises and unsanctioned actions by groups not controlled by the official command of the opposing sides, a

detachment of Russian airborne troops will escort the food column and support its passage through the line of contact.

Returning from Sukhumi and Tkvarcheli, the humanitarian convoy will carry 2.5 thousand peaceful residents, basically representatives of the Russian-speaking populace. The Emigration Service will then see to the transport of these people to the central regions of Russia.

One should note also that Russian Border Troops are participating in the operation. At the request of Eduard Shevardnadze, three patrol boats will deliver foodstuffs and medications to Gagra.

The recruitment of the Russian military in providing humanitarian assistance evidently is adding to confidence in a favorable outcome of the action in all those participating in its implementation, both those conducting it and those awaiting the arrival of the convoy.

"The Russian military units are in general playing the role of a stabilizing factor in this region," stated the Deputy Chairman of the GKChS Yuriy Vorobyev. "If it weren't for them, Abkhaziya would be awash in blood. Their very presence restrains the extremists from committing mass criminal actions."

Now it just remains for us to add that our correspondent Lt-Col Ivan Sergeyev is traveling as part of the humanitarian convoy from Sochi.

Refutation of Russian Press on Black Sea Fleet Funding Shortfalls

*93UM0628A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
16 Jun 93 p 1*

[Interview with Col V. Kobernik, chief of the Finance Service of the Ukrainian Navy, by Lt Yuriy Kirik, press service of the Ukrainian Navy, under the rubric "The Black Sea Fleet in the Glasnost Sight": "Who Finances the BSF"]

[Text] Lately the subject of Ukraine's financial "stifling" of the Black Sea Fleet has been churned up intensely in various of Russia's periodicals and in the newspaper FLAG RODINY. Col V. Kobernik, chief of the Finance Service of the Ukrainian Navy, answers the questions of just who finances the Black Sea Fleet and who is standing in the way.

[Kobernik] The Black Sea Fleet has been financed by Ukraine since January of 1992. Since the beginning of this year the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has remitted more than 10 billion karbovantsy to cover the current costs of maintaining the Black Sea Fleet.

The cost of maintaining the entire fleet has essentially been borne by the Ukrainian state, as nothing has been received from Russia. Navy finance commissions have not been permitted by the Black Sea Fleet command element to check on where the money allocated by Ukraine has gone, however. In May Ukraine adopted a decision in accordance with the existing agreement between it and the Russian Federation to pay only half the cost of the fleet's upkeep.

The Russian Federation remitted a lump sum of 4 billion rubles into the common "pot," paid out as the rate difference between the ruble and the karbovanets in the pay of Black Sea Fleet personnel. This was contrary to the agreement and circumvented the Central Bank of Ukraine, being paid through a Russian commercial bank. This "extra" amount can be classified as nothing other than a cheap attempt to bribe Black Sea Fleet personnel. I believe that the military procuracy will provide a legal assessment of this case.

The Russian command element's unilateral, unlawful behavior has not ended there. Aware that within the next few days the finance services of the Ukrainian Navy and the Black Sea Fleet will complete the process of raising the pay scales for fleet personnel, Vice Adm E. Baltin, Black Sea Fleet commander, issued a directive on 3 June stating that due to the cessation by Ukraine of its financing of the auxiliary fleet, search and rescue, and hydrographic services, all of the fleet's seagoing civilian personnel are being switched to the pay terms contained in orders issued by the Russian Federation's minister of defense.

The Black Sea Fleet Commander was being somewhat crafty in not stating that financing was being halted only for vessels which have raised the Andreyev flag—that is, those which belong to another state. Vice Adm Baltin's decision violates the Agreement for Financing the Black Sea Fleet During the Transitional Period reached by Ukraine and Russia back in February. Article 3 of that agreement states that the pay of the fleet's seagoing civilian personnel is to be based on the standards and terms of that state in which the ships and vessels are located.

For now, the commanders and crews of vessels which have raised the Andreyevskiy flag are receiving partial payment out of the amount set aside by Ukraine for financing 50 percent of the pay and allowances for military personnel and the wages of civilian personnel of fleet units flying the flag of the former USSR. What is the command element planning to pay seagoing personnel in the Black Sea Fleet on payday?

Now, judge for yourselves who is financing the fleet and who is merely attempting to regulate the flow of monetary "oxygen."

Financial, Other Problems for Northern Fleet, Navy Examined

93UM0637A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Jun 93 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Maryukha: "Zero Meridian: Where the Latest History of the Russian Navy Begins"]

[Text] Having raised the Andreyev flags on masts and flagpoles, about a year ago the Russian Navy had reached the point where it was quite possible to start a new stage of its development. Figuratively speaking, this was a kind of historical zero meridian, similar to its geographic brother in that one can count either way from it, into the past or the future, toward development or decline.

When the West was widely marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of the Atlantic, the Guards destroyer Gremyashchiy of the Northern Fleet, which was participating in these celebrations, crossed the zero meridian of the earth. In general the occurrence was an everyday one. But why in that same voyage, just as in other ocean travels of Russian ships, did the historical meridian remain unvanquished? My twenty days on the ship brought far from exhaustive answers to this question.

Prepare the Ship for the Voyage

Soviet Russia inherited only fragments of the Navy from earlier times, and essentially had to create it all over again. And it was created, strong at sea and weak in the umbilicus connecting it to the shore. As a result, Russia renewed is reviving the fleet through its reduction.

"We are now holding onto a certain percentage of our continuous readiness forces," says the deputy commander of a squadron of surface ships of the Northern Fleet, Rear-Admiral Aleksandr Bogatyrev. "But in absolute numbers these forces have significantly diminished."

The number of ships will continue to diminish. However blasphemous this thought might be to those who accuse Russian diplomacy of disarmament vis a vis the West, a fleet reduction is not only inevitable but necessary. Judge for yourself: The Northern Fleet used up almost all of its paint stores to send the Gremyashchiy on an official visit to England. Not that so much was required; there was just very little of it available. And all have little of much else that is necessary for fleet operations: fuel, POL products, components, spare parts. Only after ridding itself of a whole group of outmoded vessels did the Northern Fleet allow itself the "luxury" of doubling the number of sea voyages in comparison with last year. But this burst of activity is just a pitiful trickle of what it was two years ago, and what is needed for professionalization of the fleet.

Considering that in the near future the Navy will receive neither a ship repair base nor much else making up its technical readiness, retention of the most combat-ready portion of the fleet will depend only on the most rapid elimination of "surplus" ships. This long-forgotten old principle of "better less but better" is the only possible

way to keep the combat readiness of the fleet in general. And not only in questions of technical readiness.

The Guard Nods But Does Not Give In

Not even by scrapping several dozen ships has the Northern Fleet yet managed to create a surplus of cadres for service on the floating ships.

"There continues to be shortage of mechanical engineers," says the Deputy Commander of the Northern Fleet Vice-Admiral Yuriy Ustimenko in his summary of the voyage. Nuclear specialists go to the "Atom Fleet," while fleet communications specialists and representatives of other ship's professions are in demand with civilian shipbuilders. Their posts will go vacant even after the fleet cuts.

The question of manning the seaman positions is also a difficult one. In the opinion of Aleksandr Bogatyrev, given the present number of contract seamen (on the Gremyashchiy for example it is exactly a third of the crew), it might be possible to reduce the requirements for the draft contingent to a minimum. But the flow of applications for contracts has already begun to decrease, and some contract seaman are reneging. Their reasons are all the same, economic: while the fleet is able to play considerable sums in accordance with the contracts, the other needs of the contract seaman, the notorious social and cultural needs, remain completely unsatisfied. And this being the case, we can't make professionals out of them: they serve their term, and then off they go home and let the fleet train new ones. In other words, this will be the same compulsory service, but for money, which can't buy military mastery no matter how hard you try.

The crew of the Gremyashchiy are all youthful, only the "mechanic," the commander of the BCh-5 has "stayed put" in his job. The lieutenants and those in the seaman positions who have signed contracts with the fleet have yet to become professionals. But in its time the first experiment of contract service in the Northern Fleet failed precisely because the living problems of the professionals were not resolved, and now the graduates of higher military schools will not be held long either. It will be possible to keep them, and to raise the level of military mastery of all categories of sailors, only in one way: by selecting out the best, accumulating a maximum of resources to support them, and thus creating advantages of shipboard service over shore positions.

But for now, on the Gremyashchiy and indeed on the entire Russian Fleet, the picture is quite different. There is no competition for a post occupied by far from the best officer, so he can take it easy in his work. If there is no paint or spare parts at the required times, then there can be an "all hands" job on the ship when they do turn up: without days off, without already rare visits with the family cooped up in the little apartment, the rent for which exceeds an officer's pay. The result is a drop in the combat readiness of the fleet. But here is an example from those same twenty days of the voyage of the Gremyashchiy.

Before the visit to Liverpool, the Guards crew of the newest destroyer (just four years in service) painted day and night, scraped rust, changed the bridge cloths and the woven mats. When again will the Northern Fleet issue a ship so much gear! On the return voyage there were training fires. But "military equipment is serious," and demands attention not just at the moment of fire, and for this reason, as Yurily Ustimenko noted caustically, the ship did not fire, it expelled some shells. A painter for a week, a soldier for three days, such were the professionals of which the fleet dreamed, seeing how the American and English ships, for example, were looked after by hired workers even in foreign ports. Thank God that in peacetime the Russian Guard, even if it is nods as it goes, still maintains the honor of the fleet. Only, this can't go on much longer.

Don't Mention It

In looking past the zero meridian, in recent years we blindly copied too much and failed to see the main thing.

In Liverpool the second ship over from the Greymashchiy was a military transport of the Republic of South Africa. It is the same age as the Russian destroyer, but has made 15 voyages to foreign ports alone. And this even though there is little mention of the naval traditions of the Republic of South Africa in historical chronicles. But the present Russian fleet goes to sea just about as rarely as in the era of its founding by Peter the First. Where is the professionalism to come from then?

Because of this we ourselves look at foreign fleets in astonishment, and our ships amaze foreigners. It has reached the point that old naval experience was sufficient for this journalist to win first place in the primary control station [GKP] crew in deciding the type and national affiliation of a frigate from one of the NATO countries which escorted the destroyer. And this when in dealings with Russian sailors, the English, Canadians, and Americans long have made no secret of the outward appearance and design of their ships and their most complex mechanisms. We received thanks for cooperation from the crew of a passing Orion for "allowing" the Greymashchiy to be photographed. It was far from the first time that foreign pilots had photographed our ships for their reports. And there are no longer any secrets in their outward appearance. But here the "thank-you" was spoken for the fact that for practically the first time Russian sailors did not fire a "charge" from the radar antennas, of little benefit to the health of those irradiated.

It is understood that you can't wean Russians away all at once from protecting secrets where there aren't any. And the gratitude of the pilots was only a good sign. Cooperation between fleets of different countries, just like the professionalism of the sailors, is forged constantly at sea, but not in a one-time action. But the Russian fleet will still be long kept close to shore by the anchor of old, "uncut" problems.

Yes, the cut in the fleet is a painful process, and it will also bring more than enough new problems. But really, it is time to pass the zero meridian and to start the count of the fleet's history in new coordinates. If, of course, we want to have a fleet and not just the semblance of one. Today's cuts do not mean abandonment of construction of new ships. They are necessary, and in greater numbers than before. But first we must abandon without regret everything for which there is no place in the new Russian Navy: old ships, old stereotypes, people who dream of working by the old methods, taking it easy. Those who remain loyal to the fleet will understand this, and cutting out the fellow travellers will make it possible to materially reward this understanding.

Of course I have covered the circle of problems surrounding the cut only superficially. I am certain, however, that a deeper analysis will only confirm the diagnosis: given the current status, a cure can come only from cutting. Not disarmament, but improvement of armaments and enhancement of readiness of that without which we really cannot get along, by cutting not the excesses, but what is beyond the acceptable. Then even in 300 years, the Russian Fleet will be young and strong, worthy of the greatest praise and thanks.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

On Removal of Reactors From Paldiski Naval Training Facility

93WN0469A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Jun 93 p 5

[Interview with Vyacheslav Perovskiy, chief specialist of the Scientific Research and Planning and Design Technological Association VNIPIET (St. Petersburg), under the rubric "Disarmament and Ecology," conducted by Aleksandr Yemelyanenko: "Russia Leaves the Baltics and Takes the Radioactive Wastes With Her"; date and place not given]

[Text] The Government of Estonia proposed to Russia to dismantle and move outside the republic's borders two nuclear reactors belonging to the Russian Naval Forces training center in Paldiski.

In an interview with our correspondent, Vyacheslav Perovskiy, the chief specialist of the scientific research and planning and design technological association VNIPIET (St. Petersburg), commented on the situation.

[Perovskiy] A training base for nuclear submarine personnel of the former USSR was created in Paldiski 25 years ago; it is the Naval Forces' main training center with operating reactors. There are only two of them: the first was launched in 1968 and the second in 1982. Both steam-generating plants (PPU) with water-cooled reactors were installed in surface modules which by their configuration and contours duplicate the power engineering compartments of submarines exactly.

Information: The first AES in the world, which went on line in 1954 in the city of Obninsk in Kaluga Oblast, has used up its service life, but nothing is known of plans to dismantle it.

Because of public protests after the earthquake in Spitak, the Armenian AES was taken out of operation but not dismantled.

After the accident in 1979, the Three-Mile Island nuclear power plant in the United States was taken out of operation but not dismantled.

After the 1986 accident, the destroyed fourth unit of the Chernobyl AES was put in a sarcophagus but remained in the same place.

Nuclear reactors of atomic submarines and atomic ice-breakers which were damaged or had used up their service life until recently found their final place of refuge in the waters of the World Ocean.

[Yemelyanenko] But the problem, as I understand it, is not only the reactors themselves.

[Perovskiy] Yes, not just them. Located in the technical area of the training center, in addition to the two modules with PPU's, are a storage facility for spent nuclear fuel, settling tanks for gathering liquid and storing solid radioactive wastes, a special water purification unit, a ventilation center, a technical laboratory building for radiation safety services, and many other things which make up the full infrastructure of this level of nuclear power engineering installation.

[Yemelyanenko] And what kind of shape is this entire system in?

[Perovskiy] Both reactors were sealed in 1989. I must mention that they were operated in a most highly skilled way and "broke in" at least 80 percent of the crews of the new nuclear-powered vessels. And, the reactors' active zones have used up no more than one-third of the service life. The settling tanks and storage facilities contain 600 cubic meters of liquid and up to 80 cubic meters of solid radioactive waste.

[Yemelyanenko] Then the reactors were shut down not for technical reasons but for political reasons?

[Perovskiy] Not quite. Already by the end of the 1980s the Navy leadership began to move toward the decision to stop using the existing reactors to train crews. More refined training equipment based on computers came to replace them. But there was, of course, an underlying political reason. Since 1992 training of crews in Paldiski has ceased altogether, but the training center itself has acquired the status of a military unit of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense temporarily located on the territory of independent Estonia.

Information: Back 2 years ago through Decree No 545 of 31 January 1991 the USSR Cabinet of Ministers envisioned resource support of measures to utilize the power

engineering installations in Paldiski. Through Decree No 644 of 31 August 1992 the Gaydar Government ratified the allocation of financial resources. The 2 October 1992 Directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and the 24 September 1992 order of the Russian Federation minister on atomic energy defined the procedure for utilizing all structures at the training center's technical site with the work to be complete by the year 2000.

[Yemelyanenko] By focusing attention on the two reactors in the Baltics, are we not ignoring the general problems which have built up in nuclear power engineering and in the atomic fleet, in particular?

[Perovskiy] On the contrary, we could work out different options for resolving these problems. Take for example the utilization of the nuclear submarines which have used up their service life. Only the bow and stern assemblies are presently being cut out and stripped on the ships which are being decommissioned. The power cells which certainly determine the ship's nuclear affiliation remain untouched. By various methods they are kept afloat or remain on the dock floors of ship repair enterprises. Captain 1st Rank Pavel Smirnov from the Pacific Fleet wrote about this acute problem a year ago in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA ("Nuclear Privatization," 25 May 1992—editor).

In Estonia we have had to work on dismantling the reactor cell, since technical possibilities for transporting a block which weighs 2,000 tonnes do not exist. Without getting into the technical details, I will say that by the most modest estimates the total weight of the radioactive materials which are supposed to be removed is at least 8,000-9,000 tonnes.

[Yemelyanenko] Just who will agree to accept the radioactive "presents" from the Baltics?

[Perovskiy] Let us start with the fact that these are not someone's "presents" there but rather the fruits of our own activity, and we must not leave such a burden as a legacy to the Estonians. But as for the particular place and territory—that is the second question, and, I think, we will resolve it with a civilized approach. The marine option for burial which was being practiced before is definitely ruled out now.

[Yemelyanenko] Some European countries, in particular the FRG, are expressing their readiness to provide assistance to Estonia in eliminating the ecological damage done to its territory by the Russian nuclear installations. There are proposals to work out a special technology for the center in Paldiski too.

[Perovskiy] Even theoretically I find it difficult to imagine foreigners unloading the nuclear fuel from our reactors. And of course no one is going to undertake to move radioactive waste to somewhere in Nevada out of altruistic considerations. As for the financial aspect of the matter, the aid of the Commission of the European Communities would be most welcome for Estonia. I think that small deliveries of individual protective gear

and construction equipment from Germany, in particular excavators and maneuverable 100-tonne cranes, would be found to be suitable.

[Yemelyanenkoy] As far as I know, work at the training center site could already begin this summer. I know that the Estonian side has a great interest in this. It is June now. What has already been done?

[Perovskiy] A radiation survey of the installation has been made, the basic principles for stripping and dismantling the structures have been formulated, possible plans and routes for removing the radioactive materials have been determined, and co-agents have been chosen. The design assignment was officially formulated and registered and confirmed by the client (that is, the Naval Forces) back on 30 December of last year.

And one other thing which is of considerable importance, friendly business relations have been established with the Estonian side and the personnel who service the installation. The chief of the center, Hero of the Soviet Union Rear Admiral Olkhovikov, has invariably met us halfway and helped with what he could when a group of specialists and I had to be at the installation for a long

time in December of last year. We were doing a study of the shutdown reactors. Even then we understood that no matter what we had to keep the qualified personnel of the training center and maintain the diesel station, the boiler-house, and the steam and water lines in working condition. What kind of work can be done without water and steam?!

Information: Vyacheslav Perovskiy began his naval service in 1959 in Andreyev Bay at a coastal base for recharging nuclear reactors. In 1965 he requested a nuclear-powered vessel. From 1973-1986 he was responsible for the recharging and handling of spent nuclear fuel in the technical directorate of the Northern Fleet. In the early 1980s a radioactive leak at an emergency storage facility for spent fuel was eliminated under his leadership. Years later Perovskiy had to perform an even more serious job at the same installation along with Vladimir Bulygin's group—eliminate a dangerous build-up of spent nuclear fuel elements. Bulygin received the Hero for this and his boys got a vehicle apiece, and Perovskiy received the Order of Friendship of Peoples.

The award proved to be far-sighted.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Russian Approach to Peacekeeping Viewed

934F0797A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian
No 24, Jun 93 (Signed to press 8 Jun 93) pp 8-12

[Article by Dmitriy Trenin under the rubric "The Army and Society": "Blessed Are the Peacemakers..."]

[Text] We live in a century of peacekeeping operations. The time has come to reevaluate the concept of "interference in internal affairs."

Hopes for attaining a new world order have been replaced by the reality of world disorder. The threat of nuclear and large-scale conventional war has been reduced to a minimum, but we have seen a sharp increase in the danger of low- and medium-intensity conflict. A gigantic belt of instability and armed conflict extends from Dubrovnik to Dushanbe, the victims of which have come to comprise hundreds of thousands of people over the past two years. Apparently we are dealing not with a transient situation, but one that will last a long period of time.

We see no dearth of gloomy predictions. There exists a likelihood of escalation of conflicts both across the horizontal (involving new countries and regions in them) and through the vertical (expansion of the scale of violence). In short, the Old World finds itself on the brink of an abyss, its bloody past lying at the bottom. Some people see all of this as payment for "the victory over communism."

The sense of danger may lead to despair, even to panic. But it can also assist in mobilizing and concentrating thoughts and efforts. In essence, the opportunities for averting conflicts, managing crises, and resolving disputes have never been so great as they are today. For the first time in many decades, the largest world powers are cooperating more than competing with one another in the sphere of guaranteeing security. As a result, international organizations—from the United Nations to the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe—are beginning to be transformed from forums of confrontation into "workshops of peace." The Atlantic Alliance is undergoing deep transformation. Very interesting prospects are opening up in connection with the North Atlantic Council on Cooperation, uniting the NATO countries and the states of Central and Eastern Europe, including former Soviet republics.

Some Things Are More Important Than Sovereignty

The concept of indivisibility of the world, infused some time ago in the League of Nations Charter, is developing into a doctrine of international interventionism, according to which there are certain things more important than state sovereignty. The United Nations is shifting from limited actions in support of peace to such nontraditional activity as assisting the organization of

general elections in Namibia, humanitarian intervention in Somalia, even ruling an entire country—Cambodia.

The CSCE, which last year proclaimed in the Helsinki document that the violation of human rights in any one country would comprise a subject of legal concern of other member countries, dispatched a mission to Kosovo and Vojvodina, to Sanjak and Georgia. It is attempting to move the peace process in Karabakh out of deadlock and is constantly monitoring the situation in Moldova and Tajikistan.

NATO, which offered its services in 1992 to the UN and CSCE, has concentrated its effort on conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Russia, citing the failure (at least temporarily) of the CIS to establish peacekeeping forces, is undertaking independent actions within the limits of what it considers its own zone of responsibility, i.e., within the borders of the former USSR.

In the meantime, the results of all these efforts are modest to date. Western Europe and Russia are mainly absorbed in internal problems, economic ones for the most part. The United Nations remains too bureaucratized, an extremely sluggish organization. (The whole world heard General MacKenzie, former commander of United Nations forces in Yugoslavia, state: "It is useless to try to reach New York after 1700 local time—the headquarters is empty.") The CSCE, on the other hand, is inadequately organized, and the CIS has never managed to organize anything at all. Having for decades prepared for war on the territory of Yugoslavia, NATO finds itself ill prepared for interethnic conflict.

Joint Response

The danger presented to Russia by the new conflicts is evident: threat to the lives and well-being of millions of ethnic Russians, risk of involvement in combat operations of units of the Russian Armed Forces which are stationed in neighboring countries, and finally, the destabilization of certain regions of the Russian Federation itself (such as the Northern Caucasus, for example).

The countries of Western Europe may have to face not only the influx of refugees from the southeast, but also the prospect of serious divergence of views on foreign policy matters in their own environment. Finally, the United States risks being unable to handle the new world realities.

Insofar as the main overall source of threat (in spite of all the discrepancies between specific situations) lies in instability and lack of ability to control the development of one or another set of processes, the aim of joint efforts of Russia, Europe, and North America must be stabilization, not only in international relations, but—in a number of cases—in internal political relations, first and foremost in the Balkans, the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Tasks to be accomplished include opposing gross, mass violations of human rights, averting conflicts, putting a halt to armed violence, and facilitating peaceful conflict settlements.

Both the classic UN operations to maintain peace and the peacekeeping actions involving use of military force which have just come into fashion comprise simply instruments of a grand strategy whose particular outlines were charted in the well-known report presented by UN Secretary General B. Butrus-Ghali last year entitled: "An Agenda for the World." Drawn up at the request of the Security Council, this document has further stimulated discussion already taking place in the world as to what response the world community should provide to new challenges to security.

In our view, just as was the case 45 years ago, these challenges demand a global—but this time collective—response. The strategy of stabilization has three basic components: first and foremost, to avert conflicts; to manage conflicts already being waged, with the aim of halting them; and finally, to effect postconflict settlements.

Intervention? Yes!

The difference between the strategy being proposed and traditional diplomacy, which also has often set such tasks for itself, consists of a package approach, close coordination of the activities of many countries, and—most importantly—an acknowledgment of the necessity of intervention (under definite, previously stipulated conditions) in the internal affairs of one or another state. In this regard, such intervention—again in certain instances—could be based upon force. Naturally, each case of intervention would require special mandate from the United Nations in full conformance with the UN Charter, recognized by all the member nations.

Thus, effective conflict prevention presupposes the functioning of an early warning system, active preventive diplomacy, and the preventive deployment of armed forces. Early warning can mean not just monitoring the situation and exchanging information, but the establishment of information posts and centers in regions of potential conflict.

Preventive diplomacy would include an entire spectrum of actions—from dispatching missions to collect information and conduct inspections, to effecting consultations, mediation, and services of good will. Its instruments of implementation would include measures of pressure—warnings and sanctions. Force, as necessary, would be standing behind the diplomats—both legal force, based on the reality of international judicial prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and military force, unambiguously indicating the seriousness of warnings given by the world community.

The preventive deployment of military forces in a region of possible conflict could be carried out without the agreement of opposing sides which was mandatory in former UN practice. Sufficiently large-scale and resolute international actions are capable of exercising a deterrent influence on a potential aggressor.

Six and a Half

The management of crises with the aim of eliminating them as quickly as possible requires urgent measures with respect to localizing violence and limiting its scope. Cooperation in the information sphere acquires tremendous importance under these conditions, exposing for example the "puppeteers" who are really in control of the actions of one side or another. It becomes an extremely important task to reach agreement on a cease-fire and on beginning the negotiations process, following which observers and troops may be brought into the region of conflict operating on the basis of a mandate from the international organization.

These troops may find themselves caught in a trap, however, if pressure on the opposing sides towards reaching a political resolution to the conflict abates. In the best case, the conflict may be contained (as happened in Cyprus, for example), and in the worst—the cease-fire will be used as a short break.

Effecting a truce and sending troops to disengage—is standard UN practice and has come to be known as "Article Six-and-a-Half" of the Charter (Article 6 deals with sanctions, Article 7—with military actions, a model for which is seen in actions in Korea and Iraq). This can turn out to be inadequate. In instances where it is impossible to achieve agreement on a cease-fire or when truces are broken, as well as when the preventive deployment of troops has failed to effect deterrence, direct international military intervention may come into consideration.

But only, of course, when all means of exerting influence outside the use of force have been exhausted and certain conditions are met: For example, when the flame of conflict has a real capability of igniting regions not yet affected; when human rights violations have acquired the nature of genocide; and when continuation of a conflict threatens ecological catastrophe in global proportions.

All arguments concerning armed intervention are accompanied by risk to the lives of the peacekeepers themselves and must take into account the position of the world community and its likely evolution. Scenes of violence shown on the television screen give rise to indignation and evoke calls "to do something to restore order," but reports of casualties, if these turn out to be higher than the level acceptable to society, are capable of eliciting an even more powerful reverse reaction. The Vietnam and Afghanistan syndromes will retain their force for many years to come.

We must therefore seek that narrow line between the Scylla of an approach involving use of force and the Charybdis of nonintervention—for they are equally fatal. Carefully taking into account ethnic interests and priorities, ensuring solid public support inside the country, espousing clear goals, and coordinating actions

in the international arena—these conditions are absolutely necessary in order to achieve success in efforts of peacekeeping intervention.

No Philanthropy

In the past, the international-legal settlement of a conflict was the crowning achievement of diplomatic efforts and signified an end to external intervention. Today and in the future, this is merely a transition from its negative phase to a positive, constructive one.

Many countries require assistance in establishing their own modern form of statehood. It is possible that certain countries (Somalia? Cambodia? Bosnia?) will have to become protectorates of international organizations. Long-term external assistance will be required to restore internal order, consolidate legality, and establish conditions for national reconciliation and subsequent national reconstruction. All this is outside the sphere of philanthropy—an unregulated conflict may again flare up, and may entail serious consequences not only for the populace of one individually unfortunate country.

Let us say that a technical mission has been formulated. Who will be able to undertake its execution? Primarily, the largest and, we might say, the most accountable states. International organizations possess only those powers which have been delegated to them. A new coalition is necessary which would include at least North America, Europe and Russia, and other former USSR republics.

As far as international organizations are concerned, only the United Nations—thanks to its unique charter, universal nature, and exclusive authority—is capable of providing the political and legal basis for any operations in support of peace. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to overload the UN or require that it fulfill functions not intrinsic to it.

“Authorized Functionary” of the United Nations

Here we should continue to strengthen the CSCE as a unique Euro-Atlantic forum called upon to play an extremely effective role, especially in the conflict prevention stage. In the crisis regulation stage, however, it is apparent that a different instrument is necessary. Claiming the role of “authorized functionary” of the UN and CSCE is, as we know—NATO.

There can be no doubt but that the existing infrastructure of the North Atlantic Alliance, its resources, and its experience of coalition interaction speak in favor of such a claim. Nonetheless, NATO has one serious limitation—peacekeeping actions of its armed forces on the territory of any of the former Soviet republics are either impossible or counterproductive. But it is here that significant explosive potential is concentrated.

As we know, Russia is poised on the brink of declaring its own version of the Monroe Doctrine for the former USSR republics. But Moscow's unilateral actions are

capable of eliciting a negative reaction from certain of Russia's neighbors and harming its interests. This is a path which holds no promise if the goal is stabilization of our near geopolitical surroundings, and not restoration (under a different name) of the USSR.

And so, who then is capable of implementing a UN mandate? Such a structure has already been in existence a year and a half. It is the above-mentioned North Atlantic Cooperation Council. This body encompasses all the main powers, it includes all the states which are actually threatened by the current instability. With headquarters in Brussels, it obtains support from the powerful NATO infrastructure.

Borrowing everything of value from NATO's experience, but not tied to its antiquated functions, the Council may become the prototype of a new coalition of states concerned with guaranteeing military-political security. And this is possible. Success has finally been achieved in formulating and implementing an anticrisis strategy in the economic sphere, thanks to which the concept of “economic crisis” has become a historical term for a significant portion of mankind.

The time has come to accomplish something similar with respect to wars and other acts of large-scale violence—at least in those places where the right conditions are present. Political contradictions will not disappear, just as economic contradictions have not disappeared, but limiting the forms and scope of their manifestation is a task the world community is now prepared to tackle.

Russia in the Role of Peacekeeper

In the opinion of Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Armed Forces, peacekeeping forces will most likely become the basis of the CIS Combined Armed Forces, if success is achieved in creating these forces at all. For the time being, in spite of the existence of a number of agreements signed over a year ago, the CIS countries, with the exception of Russia, see no need to participate in peacekeeping actions.

In 1992-1993, Russian peacekeeping forces suffered casualties amounting to 32 killed, 66 wounded. (For comparison, casualties of United Nations forces in the former Yugoslavia over the same period amounted to 30 killed.)

A Russian officer serving in a United Nations battalion in Croatia receives \$870-950 per month, while his colleague with Russian peacekeeping forces in Moldova or South Ossetia gets only a supplement to his basic salary in the amount of 18-20 percent of his pay.

Russia's expenditures on military peacekeeping came to slightly more than 2 billion rubles in 1992.

Nagorno-Karabakh

The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict became the first “hot spot” on the territory of the former USSR. Since 1988 about 3,000 individuals have been killed in Karabakh,

and almost half a million have become refugees. Stimulating the emergence of new conflicts, Karabakh has in fact opened up a Caucasian Pandora's box. Even after five years have passed, its conflict potential is far from exhausted—it is possible that the zone of combat operations will spread to as yet peaceful Nakhichevan, and that the war will escalate to the level of full-scale confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia. If the worst happens, major neighboring powers might be drawn into the conflict (Turkey, primarily), which would likely provoke Russian intervention. Iran can hardly be expected to stand idly by.

No serious efforts were undertaken to avert the conflict in Nagornyy Karabakh. Attempts to manage the crisis turned out to be ineffective. The tactics of "divide and rule" have not only failed to bring success, but have exacerbated the situation in the region and undermined the confidence of both sides in Moscow. A Russia-Kazakhstan peace initiative (Zheleznovodsk, autumn 1991) turned out stillborn. The decision carried out at the beginning of 1992 to withdraw units of the former Soviet Army from Karabakh has averted new Russian casualties but has also caused a decline in Moscow's interest in the war in this region, where the Russian population is practically nonexistent. Situating CIS military observers in the region of conflict did less to point out CIS capabilities as it did to expose its limitations. But the success of the Minsk group of CSCE, as that of the "troika" (Russia, United States, Turkey), was not much greater.

Imposing peace upon the warring sides in Karabakh is an unrealizable task. But it is another matter to provide incentive for dialogue, which would lead in the final analysis to an understanding. Maximum use of the diplomatic art will be required here, taking into account the experience of American mediation efforts in the Near East. As soon as the first agreements on a cease-fire are reached, forces will be required with the mission of monitoring its observance. This monitoring will have to be carried out in strict fashion, to the extent of suppressing provocateurs interested in renewing military operations.

It would be advisable for the CSCE to get the opportunity to test itself as a peacekeeping instrument in the case of Karabakh. At the same time, there would exist a United Nations mandate for the use of force, to which end specially allocated forces and resources would be assigned.

Tajikistan

It is likely that 1992 has been the bloodiest year in the modern history of Tajikistan. According to various accounts, the number of casualties during the course of civil war in this country amounts to 20,000-40,000. About 350,000 have been forced to abandon their homes, of whom approximately 60,000 fled to Afghanistan.

Leaders of the states of Central Asia (primarily Uzbekistan) and the Russian military perceive as a serious

threat the specter of Islamic fundamentalism which hangs over Tajikistan. This has led to Moscow's adoption of a more active policy, replacing its former indifference and feebleness. Failure to establish special CIS peacekeeping forces has not prevented Moscow from assigning their functions to the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division, deployed in this former Soviet republic, and has not prevented Tashkent from using its military air assets to crush forces the Uzbek Government considers dangerous.

In this manner, the question of power in Tajikistan is being decided by force. Here we are not talking about keeping peace between the sides. Along with accomplishing humanitarian missions and tasks to maintain minimal order in the country (to the extent this is possible), Russian troops are in fact acting as an external prop for the present government in Dushanbe. It is difficult here to avoid drawing an unpleasant parallel with Afghanistan.

Moldova

Active combat operations during the course of conflict in the Dniester region were carried out in the spring of 1992. A truce was concluded in July of that same year for which Russian peacekeeping forces became the guarantor (as in South Ossetia). Just as in the Tskhinvali region, the truce along the Dniester has been observed on the whole. The difference lies in the fact that whereas in South Ossetia, Russian forces were brought in specially to carry out the peacekeeping mission, the 14th Russian Army remained in the Dniester region over the course of the entire conflict.

Like the troops in Abkhazia, the 14th Army found itself incapable of accomplishing the peacekeeping mission. However, a plan to establish multilateral forces with the participation of Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania was never implemented—perhaps so as not to create the precedent of inviting foreign troops onto the territory of the former USSR. Instead, five battalions were dispatched on an urgent basis to the Dniester.

International organizations may play an important role in regulating the crisis and moving towards its resolution, primarily the CSCE. A permanent mission of the European Conference, which would include a special ombudsman, could play an important role in averting local incidents.

South Ossetia

The conflict in South Ossetia (begun in 1989, with its most critical phase coming at the end of 1991-beginning of 1992), affects not only Georgia, but—in the most direct manner—Russia as well. The presence of tens of thousands of refugees from the south has imposed a heavy burden on the South Ossetian Republic. Many of these refugees were recently resettled on lands from which the Ingush were driven out. The movement to

establish a united Ossetian state, independent or within the Russian Federation, is capable of complicating even more the situation on both sides of the Great Caucasian Range.

At first glance, regulation of the South Ossetian crisis appears to be successful: Advantage was taken of a favorable turn of events, when on 24 June 1992 success was achieved in concluding a trilateral agreement in Dagomys on a cease-fire and on sending combined peacekeeping forces to the region in conflict. The Russian component of these forces (700 men) was numerically equal to the Georgian and Ossetian battalions taken together. In practical terms it is the Russian forces which are guaranteeing the truce in South Ossetia.

A purely operational success, however, may be lost in the final analysis unless success is achieved in reviving and maintaining the process of negotiations between the Georgian and Ossetian sides. Although from time to time representatives of a small CSCE mission arrive in Tskhinvali from Tbilisi, only Russia can emerge as the natural mediator in the matter of restoring productive dialogue here. Russia is the party vitally interested in surmounting this confrontation and the party with the resources necessary to do it.

Abkhazia

In the period from August through December of 1992 alone, the war in Abkhazia has produced 2,000 casualties. For Russia, this involves the fate of tens of thousands of ethnic Russians, whose numbers in Abkhazia in peacetime came to approximately the same level as of the Abkhaz themselves (about 100,000). Then there is the state of Russian Army units which find themselves in the zone of conflict. Finally, the conflict on Russia's border has already activated movement on the part of North Caucasian peoples. In autumn of 1992, from 4,000 to 7,000 fighters of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus participating in combat operations came across the Russian border into Abkhazia.

Under conditions of deep distrust between the sides, the implementation of any peace plan will require the presence of peacekeeping forces. In contrast to South Ossetia, however, Russian troops will hardly become the nucleus of such forces. The Georgian leadership has proposed that Ukrainian units be stationed in Abkhazia under the United Nations flag.

Russo-Ukrainian Friction Over Black Sea Fleet, Start, NPT

Ukraine Parliament Debating START-1, Still Demanding Conditions

93UM0622A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 June 93 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Petrov: "Kiev Insists on Guarantees"]

[Text] On Thursday the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine began considering the question of ratification of the START-1 Treaty and endorsement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Addressing the deputies, Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatoliy Zlenko stated that ratification of the START-1 Treaty and endorsement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty were in the national interests of Ukraine. After the breakup of the USSR, Ukraine in fact became heir to the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory, the minister said. However Ukraine has never had control over these weapons, so she cannot be viewed as a nuclear power in the pure sense.

Anatoliy Zlenko reported that the overwhelming majority of warheads stored on Ukrainian territory have already exhausted a significant fraction of their guaranteed operating lives. "For a year now Russia has not been delivering such components. If we leave everything as it is, by the end of the guarantee period not even those enterprises which assembled the nuclear warheads will agree to disassemble them. So just in that sense it will become impossible to keep operational nuclear weapons in Ukraine" said the minister.

As is known, Ukraine has put forward several conditions under which it can abandon its nuclear status. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported this in detail on June 2. Anatoliy Zlenko, as expected, once again repeated these demands. These were: guarantees of its national security from the nuclear powers, receipt of an undertaking from the U.S. and other western powers for financial assistance in eliminating nuclear weapons, receipt of compensation for nuclear components of devices removed from Ukrainian territory, and also of strategic offensive weapons if the decision is made to disassemble them and process them in Russian enterprises.

Remember that Ukraine has already received preliminary guarantees from the U.S., Great Britain, the Russian Federation, France and China. But with regard to the talks with Russia on these matters, Anatoliy Zlenko repeated the earlier position that the Russian side "is putting great pressure on Ukraine. It is linking solution of the questions of safeguarding nuclear security of the Strategic Forces garrisoned in Ukraine to a mandatory acknowledgment of Russia's right to ownership of the nuclear weapons." Ukraine, the minister stated, cannot agree to this, since its sovereignty and economic interests are at stake.

The report of Anatoliy Zlenko was discussed in a closed session, and some of its results have still not been published. But one can already assume how the process of ratification of the START-1 Treaty will take place. The fact is that on June 2 the Supreme Soviet held hearings on these problems. And the day before the Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on International Affairs Dmitriy Pavlychko announced that Ukraine not will be able to ratify START-1 until this autumn.

At the hearings it was stated unequivocally that the process of nuclear disarmament is directly linked to an increase in financial assistance from the West. Clearly these questions will also be posed during the visit of the U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin planned for next week. It is thought that this is precisely why the Ukrainian Parliament took the formal step of starting to consider the problems of ratification of the START-1 Treaty and endorsement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Russians See Local Support for Fleet, Crimean Status Review

93UM0622B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Jun 93 pp 1-2

[Article by Vladimir Pasyakin: "The Situation in Sevastopol Remains Tense"]

[Text] On May 30 a sanctioned city-wide rally was held in Sevastopol in support of a general Crimean referendum for early suspension of the authority of the Supreme Soviet of the Crimea and of its Chairman Nikolay Bagrov. The initiator of the meeting was a Sevastopol organization, the All-Crimean Voters Movement "For the Crimean Republic."

The congress of this organization was held in Simferopol on 29 May.

Congress delegates who took part in the rally called on the Black Sea sailors to raise the Andreyev flags on their ships. However Commander of the Black Sea Fleet Vice-Admiral Eduard Baltin made the decision to block the attempts of pickets to send Andreyev flags to the brigade of ships protecting the waters of the region.

An ever-increasing number of political and social movements are demonstrating their interest in resolving the problems which have recently arisen around the Black Sea Fleet. There are an increasing number of Black Sea Fleet units adopting appeals to the presidents of the two states to consider at the highest level questions pertaining to the legal status of Black Sea service members, and pay increases for them. The lack of resolution of these problems is putting the Black Sea sailors on an unequal footing both with Russian sailors and with personnel of the Ukrainian Naval Forces.

The crews of auxiliary vessels have found themselves in an especially difficult situation. Suffice to say that the going Ukrainian rate for the work of a sea-going captain is 17-20 thousand *karbovantsy* (around 5 thousand rubles). This is less than a cadet of a higher naval school receives in Russia. It is not surprising, therefore, that in recent days another few ships, this time of the hydrographic service of the Black Sea Fleet, have raised the Andreyev flags. As was reported by the chief of the Black Sea Fleet Press Center, Captain 1st Rank Andrey Lazebnikov, as of today the total number of flags raised is more than two hundred. He noted that the vessels are nonetheless under the complete control of the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet and continue to obey his orders.

The situation in Sevastopol and the Crimea is extremely heated. The mood of the Black Sea sailors is determined today by their hopes for a meeting of the two presidents at the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. As we have learned, the president of Ukraine has already given his consent to this.

Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Critique of Officers' Assembly's Position

93UM0622C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
28 May 93 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Press Service of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Reports"]

[Text] In connection with the increased activeness of the so-called coordination council of officers' assemblies of the Black Sea Fleet, incited by anti-Ukrainian political forces and by the published statement of the officers' assembly of one of the formations of the Black Sea Fleet "on its right" to some sort of measures, Ukrainian Defense Minister Col-Gen Konstantin Morozov issued an order to the chief of the Sevastopol garrison, Rear Admiral Nikolay Kostrov:

Given the weakening and in some cases the loss of control of the fleet on the part of the Black Sea Fleet command, pay attention to the illegal statements of officers' assemblies which lead to politicization of officer personnel.

Do not permit officer participation in political actions which inflame anti-Ukrainian sentiments in the public.

A telegram sent to Sevastopol assessed the wide-scale actions of out-of-control crews of the auxiliary fleet as not in keeping with the spirit of the Yalta agreement, and as an arbitrary departure from it. The defense minister also provided information on the measures taken by the Ukrainian government for social protection of service members.

Ukraine Naval Officers Union Asks Sanctions on 'Politicized' Fleet

93UM0622D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
28 May 93 p 1

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank Yuriy Kondratyev: "Letter of the Officers' Union of the Naval Forces to the President of Ukraine"]

[Text] The Andreyev flag has been raised on more than 100 ships, vessels, and boats of the Black Sea Fleet. This decision by the crews has both an economic and a political background. In this way the service members and sailors of the auxiliary vessels are attempting to attract the attention of the presidents of Ukraine and Russia to the problems of the Black Sea Fleet.

The Naval Officers' Union of the Ukrainian Naval Forces, which is headed by Captain 1st Rank Yevgeniy Lupakov, appealed to the President of Ukraine, Leonid

Kravchuk, in a letter which discusses the actions of the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet and makes proposals.

As was reported by the Press Center of the Ukrainian Naval Forces, the letter states that lately personnel of the Black Sea Fleet have increasingly been involved in the resolution of political questions. The result of the unresolved status of the Black Sea Fleet will be that service members who are citizens of Ukraine will perform their service on ships and vessels which have raised the Andreyev flag.

The Naval Officers' Union of the Ukrainian Naval Forces asks the President to take steps to ensure that all ships of the Black Sea Fleet which have raised the Andreyev flag be given the status of foreign ships, with all the legal consequences flowing therefrom. In the opinion of the officers, the Commission of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine for Questions of Defense and State Security, and the nation's General Procuracy should conduct an investigation into the circumstances of the raising of the Andreyev flags and make a legal assessment of these actions.

The Naval Officers' Union of Ukraine also asked the President of Ukraine to take immediate steps toward swift resolution of the problem of the Black Sea Fleet.

Russian Flag-Raising 'Plot' Alleged

93UM0622E Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
8 Jun 93 p 1

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank Miroslav Mamchak: "How Provocations Are Born, or What Is the Root Cause of the 'Voluntary Expression of Will'"]

[Text] Recently the Press Center of the Black Sea Fleet reported with poorly concealed glee that the 171st Division of rear service auxiliary vessels of the Crimean Naval Base had raised the Andreyev flags in response to unilateral actions of the Ukrainian Naval Forces.

By all appearances, the fact that the Andreyev flag was also raised on the harbor diving craft RVK-450, whose crew consists of Ukrainians commanded by Petty Officer 2nd Class Rodion Volosovich, a conscript from Kiev, was supposed to arouse the special joy of citizens of the CIS and the world. It is too bad that the Black Sea Fleet Press Center had no information on the presence of seaman-diver Vasilov Tvardovskiy, a native of Lvovshchina, in the crew of the RVK-450. Then, perhaps, the picture of the "large scale" of the incident would be more impressive.

I don't know what the press center had in mind, but I personally perceive the accent on the national makeup of this small boat as a clumsy attempt to prove that movement, to which the very idea of development of national naval forces is anathema, is expanding not only in the Black Sea Fleet, but also throughout Ukraine. On the other hand, young, naive and credulous people are simply being used in an unsavory political intrigue, which is being initiated, as was the case before Dagomys

and Yalta, at the threshold of the next meeting of the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia on the problem of the Black Sea Fleet.

In order to study the situation on site, I visited that division and talked with the personnel of the auxiliary vessels.

Yes indeed, a homemade Andreyev flag had been raised on the mast of the RVK-450. And Rodion Volosovich does serve in the Ukrainian crew. This is perhaps the extent of the truth in the report of the Black Sea Press Center. Everything else is all topsy-turvy. True, Volosovich is from Kiev, but he is not a Petty Officer 2nd Class and is not the commander of the boat, but a senior engine operator and senior seaman. Petty Officer 1st Class Sergey Prokopchenko was filling in for the commander of the boat, Warrant Officer P. Lototskiy, who was on leave, at the time of the "voluntary expression of will." The small crew of the boat was outraged at the report of the Black Sea Press Center. The sailors and especially R. Volosovich feel uncomfortable around the employees of the division. After all, there was no crew meeting when the Andreyev flag was raised on the boat.

"We were assembled on the forecastle of the boat," recounts Sr. Seaman Volosovich. "Warrant Officer G. Chuvalov came from division staff and announced that the command had decided to raise the Andreyev flags on the division vessels, including our boat."

Seaman V. Tvardovskiy clarified: "They explained that this flag is common to Ukraine and Russia and if we raised it, our pay would be raised a lot, and they would add a ruble coefficient to the *karbovantsy*, like the officers get. We agreed. After all, what we get isn't even enough for cigarettes. And then, they also promised to give us leave."

Do the sailors know that the Andreyev flag is the flag of the Russian Navy? Do they think about the consequences? I talked with the boat commander, Warrant Officer P. Lototskiy.

"In the division they were well aware that I was taking leave in garrison. They could have consulted with me. But no one in the staff deemed it necessary. As if I wasn't the commander of the boat. When I found out that they had raised the Andreyev flag on it, I reported for service and demanded that the flag of the former auxiliary fleet of the Navy Forces be raised. But they rescinded my order at staff."

Lototskiy was given to understand that he might not get to serve the last two years before his pension.

And what is the attitude toward the incident among the blue and white collar workers of the division? A seaman of harbor craft RK-510, Izmail Sayfullin, for example, believes that the flag-raising business is a provocation, and he is categorically opposed to it. His reason, he explains, is not political, although the RDK members do agitate among the men often enough. It is all a matter of

pay. A seaman 2nd class receives 7,600 *karbovantsy* per day, while a caretaker in the a village receives 17 thousand. Sayfullin's pay together with a bonus barely "stretches" to 3 kilograms of meat. And that's how it is for almost everyone. How do you feed the children? And they have to have clothes. That is why everyone believed the persuasion on the vessels, that when the flags were raised, the civilian specialists would get a raise, like the officers who don't want to serve Ukraine.

From talks with employees of the division, the outlines of the mechanism of political provocation took shape. The future of the men was not a part of the equation. Holed up in their office, for three days the acting commander of the Crimean Naval Base Captain 2nd Rank Morlov and Division Commander Captain 2nd Rank V. Bershadskiy drew up their plan of "action." That same Orlov who on his own tore down the State Flag of Ukraine from the gaff of the minesweeper "Signalshchik," for which he received a promotion. That same Bershadskiy who threw guilty employees into the chain box of the vessel.

The plan was carefully thought out. They assembled ship captains and held a meeting. In the face of promises of pay by the Russian rates, no one stood firm; life has become beggarly both for the captain and for the counter girl. Not everyone in the division flattered the Russian ruble, however. The seagoing tug MB-23, the tanker VTN-99, and the tugs RB-256 and RB-308 refused to raise the Andreyev flag.

Effacing of Prior Soviet Glory of Ukrainian Units Criticized

93UM0622F Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Jun 93 p 2

[Article by Major Grigoriy Nesmyanovich: "Destroy, Build, and Destroy?"]

[Text] Our paper has already written about the problem of creating new symbols in the ranks of the national armies of the states formed on the territory of the former USSR. Analogous problems also exist also in the Ukrainian Army. But there are differences in approaches.

In principle symbols are in themselves secondary things. They are derived from the ideology which is preached by the state or powers that be. The Ukrainian Army at this moment has found its own peculiar algorithm of solution of the problem. For the regiment N-, say, which has a heroic front-line biography, time begins not at the moment of its formation somewhere near Zlatoust in fiery forty-two, but from the moment it became one of the units swearing allegiance to Ukraine. You don't have to look far for examples.

This being the case, the historical record written in soldiers' blood, the battle banners and the awards, the honorary names, practically all the former sacred objects, and the names of heroes eternally carried on unit

rolls, in some place almost unnoticed, in some with incredible indifference are hidden away in cellars or disappear somewhere.

It is hard to "speak for all of Odessa," but for some reason this is particularly flagrant in national guard units. The guardsmen have their share of arrogance. Recently an associate at the guards press center categorically stated: "The Guard is not associated with any past roots."

Is that so? Let's have a look. The First Regiment of the National Guard, both in number and in the "fact of re-swearing," is quartered in the very center of Kiev, in the Podol. No links at all with the past? Really? Post number one, for example, remains. And the banner at the post, and the sentry. Only this is a new banner, or more precisely, a very old one. They say that it was given to the guards by the Metropolitan, the head of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. This is the banner of the Third Iron Rifle Division of the troop of Simon Petlyura. God knows what the attitude is of the lads in the camouflage uniforms, absolutely of the Soviet model, toward Petlyura! But if they do have one, then what about the "roots from the past"—Petlyura did not come from the future, surely.

To speak the unadorned truth, the historical record of the former regiment of internal troops of the USSR MVD goes as follows: 290th Novorossiysk Red-Banner Motorized Rifle Regiment of Internal Troops. Formed at Voronezh, it began its combat career in the Caucasus, where it protected the Georgian Military Road. It won glory at Novorossiysk, for which it received its honorary name. One might see a dismal irony here, for it was in Ukraine that the regiment conducted eradication operations against formations of the OUN-UPA, or more simply, the Banderists. The irony lies in the fact that the images of Petlyura, along with Nestor Makhno and Stepan Bandera, now make up the character frame, as it were, a kind of moral pivot for the education work in the units, and specifically in this regiment.

I do not know about others, but I am not in the least surprised by the fact that former political workers, high-ranking ones, show particular zeal in the history "debunking" campaign. Here in this guard regiment, under the supervision of the former chief of the department of organizational-party work of the political department, and now the chief of the directorate of educational work of the National Guard of Ukraine Col. A. Ryabukhi, the excellent museum of combat glory of the Internal Troops was essentially destroyed. One of his former colleagues, moved by the natural desire to save the priceless exhibits, asked if he could have the originals of the combat banners and the personal items of heroes for safe-keeping, but he was refused. And what did he then see?

The blouse of Hero of the Soviet Union Col. Piskarev lay trampled on the floor, without shoulder boards or regalia. It is not out of place to recall here that the name

of the hero is closely associated with the regiment. He commanded it at Novorossiysk. His personal things, donated to the museum, also disappeared. The club director Lt. Romanovskiy brushed it aside: orders. And they ordered him to free up the spacious hall of the museum, they say, for a banquet on the anniversary of independence. The second hall was freed up even earlier as a "locker room" for the orchestra. The banquet coincided with the award of the rank of major-general to the division commander of the national guard.

Yes, the ways of resolving the problem of Ukrainian military symbolism would appear to be quite simplified: we abandon our past, we blot from our memory the history of seventy-some years, and we build something out of the debris. The army and national guard have already gotten rid of the Lenin rooms—they are now called parlors. Portraits of members of the politburo have been replaced with mustachioed hetmen. The color of the banners has become predominantly blue. The chronicle of Ukraine has somehow strangely narrowed to the history of the Battle of Zaporozhye and the "heroic struggle of the main strike force in the battle for freedom of Ukraine in the Second World War, the OUN-UPA."

Does history teach only that it doesn't teach anything? On the ruins of the old world, torn down in a planned fashion to its foundation, we have already tried once to construct a new one. And incidentally the builders are mostly the same, and the methods too are basically the old ones. Of course, the "building material" is a little the worse for wear. For example, to this point industry has not been able to satisfy the army and guard with the simplest attributes of military symbolism: cockades and buttons with tridents.

But for the rest, as we see, the ideological basis of the symbols of the Ukrainian Army is basically prepared.

Ukraine Naval Officers, Social Groups Oppose Base Leasing

93UM0622G Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
15 Jun 93 p 1

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank Yuriy Kondratyev: "'Ninth Wave' in Sevastopol"]

[Text] One is hearing more and more in the Ukrainian mass media about the transfer of the Sevastopol Naval Base to the Russian Federation in a long-term lease.

The Union of Officers of the Naval Forces of Ukraine issued a protest in this regard. It states that any lease is viewed by the members of the union as betrayal of the interests of the people of Ukraine. The Union of Officers supports the position taken in this matter by the Ukrainian Defense Minister, Konstantin Morozov.

A number of other Sevastopol social and political organizations, departments and parties such as the Sevastopol Department of the URP, the Sevastopol affiliate of *Rukha*, the municipal organization of the *Prosvyta*

society, the Ukrainians Union of Sevastopol and others have expressed their support of the defense minister.

The cossacks of Sevastopol headed by the *kuren* chief V. Zemtsov also expressed their views. They directed their appeal to the President of Ukraine, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and the Prime Minister, stressing that leasing of Sevastopol is absolutely out of the question, and that the Black Sea Fleet must be immediately divided. The situation in Sevastopol even after the negotiations here between the ministers of foreign affairs of Ukraine and Russia continues to be tense. Everyone's hopes are for the meeting of the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia.

UKRAINE

Aspin Meets with Morozov

MoD Gen Morozov, Aspin Discuss Present, Future Defense Cooperation

93UM0614A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
8 Jun 93 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to Ukraine"]

[Text] Secretary of Defense of the United States Les Aspin was in the capital of our independent state on a two-day visit by invitation of Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Kostyantyn Morozov.

The official welcoming ceremony took place on Sunday at the military compound of the Boryspil airport. Colonel-General Kostyantyn Morozov and Les Aspin reviewed an honor guard, and the national anthems of the United States and Ukraine were played. The guest left for his residence after meeting the leadership personnel of the MO [Ministry of Defense] of Ukraine.

Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Kostyantyn Morozov hosted an official dinner in honor of U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin the same day.

Biographical Information on the U.S. Secretary of Defense

Les Aspin was born on July 21, 1938 in the city of Milwaukee (Wisconsin). He completed Yale and Oxford universities and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

He completed military service with the ground forces in Vietnam in 1966-68.

The U.S. Senate confirmed Les Aspin as Secretary of Defense on 20 Jan 93, as proposed by President Bill Clinton.

L. Aspin began his political career as part of the team of former senator from Massachusetts William Proxmire [as published], after which he gained the position of assistant chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers

under U.S. President Kennedy. Les Aspin entered the ground forces of the United States in 1966 within the framework of the reserve officers training program. He served at the Pentagon for two years as an officer assigned to U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Macnamara. He returned to Milwaukee in 1968, where he worked as an instructor of economics at Marquette University.

Les Aspin was elected to the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress in 1970, and was assigned to the Armed Services Committee. He was elected chairman of that committee in 1985.

During his work in Congress, Les Aspin submitted bills that envisaged the closing and conversion of certain military facilities on U.S. territory and abroad. He also came out against the development of several major and costly weapons systems, the B-2 Stealth bomber and the SDI program in particular, but at the same time he supported funding for the MX intercontinental ballistic missile.

In August of 1991 Les Aspin announced his intention to propose the allocation of one billion dollars from the U.S. Defense Department budget to a fund for emergency assistance to prevent social chaos that could arise in the Soviet Union as a consequence of the shortage of foodstuffs and medicines. That would be, in his opinion, "...just one more means of our own defense."

As head of the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives he chaired the discussions on the possibility of resolving the crisis in the Persian Gulf through the imposition of sanctions by diplomatic means or through the use of force, after which a report was issued with his conclusions. L. Aspin proposed the use of force in good time. His position became possible thanks to the achievement of consensus in the Congress with regard to taking that action.

In the position of Secretary of Defense of the United States, L. Aspin is trying to re-organize the armed forces with the aim of ensuring the conformity of their size and structure to the requirements of the new historical period, preserving their combat readiness during re-organization and making the most efficient use of the defense budget with the aim of resolving general economic tasks.

President Clinton, in his words, asked Les Aspin to be his "chief adviser" on military issues, taking into account that he "...is wonderfully familiar with the fine points of defense policy." The opinion of the President of the United States is shared by specialists in the realm of the defense industry and international policy.

There was an official meeting of Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Kostyantyn Morozov and Secretary of State of the United States Les Aspin, who was in Kiev on an official visit, on June 7 of this year. They

discussed issues of bilateral relations between the nations in the military realm. The possibility of collaboration between the military departments of Ukraine and the United States and assistance to our state in developing its own armed forces, as well as the set of problems that constitute the ideas of Ukraine on its own security, were discussed in particular. The minister and the secretary exchanged ideas on the fate of the nuclear weapons based in Ukraine.

Specific areas of collaboration were defined during the meeting, namely the creation of a standing joint working group that has as its aim reviewing issues of the exchange of delegations, expansion of ties at all levels etc. The question of an official visit by Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Kostyantyn Morozov to Washington was discussed.

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine and the Secretary of Defense of the United States emphasized that this meeting has launched a qualitatively new stage in the relations of the military departments, which could be inherent in the expansion of collaboration between Ukraine and the United States.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin was received by President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Affairs of Defense and National Security Valentyn Lemish.

A joint press conference was devoted to the results of the meeting between the Minister of Defense of Ukraine and the Secretary of Defense of the United States, and we will be publishing materials from it in tomorrow's edition of NARODNA ARMIYA.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin departed yesterday from Ukraine.

Current Issues, Wider Cooperation, Morozov US Visit Discussed

*93UM0614B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
9 Jun 93 p 1*

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Vasyl Bilan: "The Start of Mutual Relations on a New Level"]

[Text] *A joint press conference of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Kostyantyn Morozov and U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, devoted to the results of the visit of the head of the American military department to Ukraine.*

Opening the meeting with Ukrainian and foreign journalists, Colonel-General Kostyantyn Morozov stated that we perceive the visit to Ukraine by the U.S. Secretary of Defense as confirmation of the intentions of the administration of the United States of America to launch a new stage in our relations. This corresponds to our

sincere desires as well, and to the spirit of democratic partnership that was proclaimed by the presidents of our nations in May of last year in Washington. Notwithstanding the brief time that the U.S. delegation was here in Ukraine, a large quantity of issues that are of mutual interest were considered during the meeting of Mr. Les Aspin with the president and minister of defense of Ukraine and during the plenary session of the delegations, the work at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Commission of the Supreme Soviet on Issues of Defense and State Security. We can speak of concrete areas in the development of collaboration between our military departments. First of all, the decision to form a joint working group immediately following the conclusion of the visit, which will consider practical steps in the realization of the agreements to expand and deepen collaboration between the two military departments and the armed forces, is a very important agreement.

Colonel-General Kostyantyn Morozov assessed the visit of Les Aspin and the consequences of the meetings that took place as very fruitful and constructive. Our relations were launched at a new level during this visit, and that will have a substantial influence on the expansion and deepening of relations. And that in turn will lay a very important foundation for strengthening peace and the mutual relations between the nations on issues of international security.

Les Aspin also called his visit to Ukraine very successful. We came here with two intentions, he explained. First, we wanted to let the government and people of Ukraine know the gratitude with which the people of the United States regard your contribution to the peacekeeping forces around the world.

The minister indicated that since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has changed and is not yet clearly understood. That world requires very many forces for peacekeeping operations. Ukraine is doing more than is required of other nations. The gratitude to Ukraine increases even more when one takes into account the losses that it has sustained in the region of the former Yugoslavia.

The other intention was to establish long-lasting and broad-scale relations between the military departments of the United States and Ukraine.

The statement that was made in this regard by Les Aspin is undoubtedly authoritative, and has very great significance for us: "It is in the national interest of America to see an independent and economically viable Ukraine." Serious and successful relations between the armed forces of both nations must arise from that position, in the opinion of the high-level military guest.

Les Aspin announced that the Americans had invited Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Kostyantyn Morozov to make a trip to Washington in July of this year, where the signing of an international memorandum of understanding is planned between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Department of

Defense of the United States. A whole series of meetings and exchanges on various problems will take place within the framework of that visit.

The mass media properly devoted a great deal of attention to this visit. That is first of all because it coincided with another important event—debate in the Ukrainian parliament with regard to Ukrainian ratification of the START-1 treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. So it was namely that question that naturally aroused the greatest interest among the journalists.

In answering a question of whether the information on the position of Ukraine with regard to the START-1 treaty and nuclear non-proliferation was satisfactory to the Americans, Les Aspin indicated that the United States was certain that Ukraine has to be a non-nuclear state. And, he noted, we heard with gratitude the words of President Kravchuk on that very position of Ukraine on these problems.

Les Aspin, as was generally known, had met the day before with Russian Minister of Defense Grachev, who had rejected the possibility of keeping strategic nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine before cutbacks in them. What is the position of Ukraine on this?

Colonel-General Kostyantyn Morozov announced that during the meeting of the minister of defense of Ukraine and the secretary of defense of the United States, they discussed issues that constitute general approaches to seeking such solutions, which could foster a reduction in security on the territory of Ukraine in connection with the retention of nuclear weapons. The individual position of the minister of defense with regard to the possibility of retaining them was a positive one.

The official position of the government of Ukraine was set forth in writing in an appeal by the prime minister to the Supreme Soviet on the day before the submission of documents for ratification, and in the speech of the minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine at the session.

The U.S. Secretary of Defense shared his impressions from a meeting with a group of Ukrainian parliamentarians who expressed various areas of thought, and which did not allow him to predict, at the request of the journalists, the further development of affairs in the Supreme Soviet with regard to the consideration of the aforementioned treaties.

Many questions were asked, from "Did Mr. Aspin inform Kostyantyn Morozov of the substance of the discussions with Russian Minister of Defense Grachev?" to "Will the United States make an agreement with Ukraine on the manufacture and supply of those types of arms in which Ukraine is the leader?" There was unfortunately not an opportunity to answer all of them with the specificity desired by the journalists. The brief time of the visit of the American delegation did not permit them to attain such specificity in considering military

problems. A great process of teaching one another has essentially been launched. The next step is a meeting in Washington.

Colonel-General Kostyantyn Morozov stated in conclusion, "I felt understanding and a great desire to study the situation on the part of Mr. Aspin, so as to find the correct approaches to resolving common problems. I am very grateful for that stance by the Secretary of Defense of the United States of America."

Law on Formation of Ukrainian National Guard

93UM0669A Kiev PUBLISHING OFFICE OF
UKRAINIAN NATIONAL GUARD in Ukrainian
29 Jan 93 pp 1-11

[Text of law]

[Text]

The Law of Ukraine "The National Guard of Ukraine"

The Statute "Procedure for Manpower Acquisition and Military, Logistical and Financial Support for the NGU"

The Statute "The Duties and Rights of NGU Personnel"

(with the changes and additions adopted by the Supreme Soviet on 26 Jan 93) City of Kiev

* * *

The Law of Ukraine "The National Guard of Ukraine"

The National Guard of Ukraine is a state armed body created on the basis of the internal-service troops called upon to protect the sovereignty of Ukraine and its territorial integrity, as well as the life and personal dignity of citizens and their constitutional rights and freedoms against criminal infringements and other anti-social actions.

The National Guard is guided in its activity by the Constitution of Ukraine, this Law, the edicts of the President of Ukraine and other legislative acts of Ukraine. The activity of the National Guard is structured on principles of legality, humanism and respect for the individual and his rights and freedoms.

Article 1. The principal tasks of the National Guard are:

1. protection of the constitutional order of Ukraine and the integrity of its territory against attempts to change it by violent methods;
2. participation in supporting a state of emergency under the procedure envisaged by the legislation of Ukraine;
3. participation in cleaning up the consequences of accidents, catastrophes and natural disasters;

4. the formation of units at special times to protect and defend important state facilities;
5. the rendering of assistance to the border troops in the apprehension of violators of the state borders of Ukraine using the manpower of units stationed in the border regions;
6. participation in combat operations to repel an attack from without and to protect the security of Ukraine;
7. protection of diplomatic and consular representations of foreign nations on the territory of Ukraine; and
8. participation in the protection of public order.

The use of the National Guard for the performance of tasks not envisaged by this law is not permitted.

Article 2. The National Guard is structured on the principles of centralized leadership, individual command responsibility and a combination of the principles of volunteer service and universal military obligation.

Article 3. The National Guard, taking into account its official purpose, is organizationally composed of formations, military units, subunits, bodies, military educational institutions and training units.

The organizational structure, standard size and stationing of the units and subunits of the National Guard are designated by the President of Ukraine on the recommendation of the commander of the National Guard.

The financial, military and logistical support for the activity of the National Guard is accomplished by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

Article 4. The National Guard, in the performance of the tasks entrusted to it, has the right to detain citizens, check their documents, employ means of physical influence, firearms, special means, combat hardware and arms and to make use of other means of influence.

The procedure for the employment of those means is established by the Statute on the Obligations and Rights of the Personnel of the National Guard as approved by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, as well as military regulations and other legislation.

Article 5. The National Guard is provided with the necessary special means and combat and special equipment to perform the tasks envisaged by this law.

The personnel of the National Guard are provided with weapons and means of protection.

Article 6. Citizens of Ukraine regardless of nationality or origins are accepted for service in the National Guard.

Manpower acquisition for the National Guard is accomplished under contract. Manpower acquisition during the transitional period is accomplished both under contract and by draft in accordance with the Law of Ukraine

"Universal Military Obligation and Military Service." The contract is concluded for a term of three years, and may be extended for a new term.

The term of service in the National Guard under draft may not exceed the terms of service in the armed forces of Ukraine that are equivalent to it.

The activity of any political parties and movements in the National Guard is prohibited. The membership of servicemen in any political party, organization or movement is not permitted during the period of service in the National Guard.

Article 7. All servicemen in the National Guard take the Military Oath, the text of which is approved by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine. Officers and warrant officers also swear to uphold the code of honor.

Article 8. The personnel of the National Guard enjoy all of the political, socio-economic and individual rights and freedoms envisaged by the Constitution of Ukraine and other laws of Ukraine, with the exceptions stipulated by this Law.

Article 9. Servicemen of the National Guard are under the protection of the state in the performance of their official duties. No one has the right to interfere in their official activity, with the exception of bodies and officials authorized to do so by the Law.

The legal demands of servicemen of the National Guard in the performance of their official duties are mandatory for fulfillment by citizens and officials across the entire territory of Ukraine.

Failure to fulfill the legal demands of servicemen of the National Guard, insults, disobedience, threats or attempts on their life and health, as well as other actions that hinder the performance of the duties entrusted to them, are subject to the liability stipulated by the Law.

Article 10. The state guarantees social and legal guarantees for servicemen in the National Guard and the members of their families in accordance with the Law of Ukraine on the social and legal protection of servicemen and the members of their family.

Article 11. The National Guard is subordinate to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.

The immediate supervision of the National Guard is accomplished by the commander, who is named by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine at the recommendation of the President of Ukraine for a term of five years. One and the same individual may not be the commander of the National Guard for more than two terms in a row.

The assistant commanders of the National Guard are named to their positions by the President of Ukraine at the recommendation of the commander.

Article 12. A Military Council is created in the National Guard, and its personnel composition is approved by the

President of Ukraine at the recommendation of the commander and the Chief Directorate of the Commander of the National Guard.

The activity of the Military Council and the Chief Directorate of the Commander of the National Guard is accomplished in accordance with their Statutes as approved by the President of Ukraine.

Article 13. The state language is used in the National Guard of Ukraine in accordance with prevailing legislation.

[Signed] Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine L. Kravchuk
City of Kiev, 4 Nov 91

The Statute "Procedure for Manpower Acquisition and Military, Logistical and Financial Support for the National Guard of Ukraine"

This Statute, in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "The National Guard of Ukraine," sets forth the procedures for the manpower acquisition, military, logistical and financial support of the formations, military units and military institutions of the National Guard of Ukraine.

Manpower Acquisition for the National Guard

1. Manpower acquisition for the National Guard is accomplished under a contract concluded by the individual who has expressed a desire to serve in the National Guard, on the one hand, and by the corresponding commander (superior officer) who has the right to make appointments, on the other, after the completion of the draft commission for selection to the National Guard.

The contract is concluded for a term of three years, and may be extended for a new term.

The form of the contract is approved by the commander of the National Guard.

Manpower acquisition of soldier personnel for the National Guard during the transitional period is conducted under the draft, on the basis of universal military obligation.

Manpower acquisition for vacant officer positions and the positions of warrant officers is accomplished on a competitive basis under the procedure established by the command of the National Guard.

2. The personnel of the National Guard are composed of citizens of Ukraine, as a rule of male gender and between the ages of 18 to 27 years for enlisted personnel and up to 30 years of age inclusive for warrant officers and junior officer personnel.

Individuals who are accepted into service with the National Guard should have completed secondary

education, be physically fit, have vision of 1.0 (each eye) without correction and with normal color perception, not have any pronounced defects of speech, face, hands, neck and tattoos on exposed areas of the body, and have a height of no less than 175 centimeters. There are no height restrictions for tank and support subunits. The selection of pre-inductees is made with a reserve of no less than 20 percent in case of elimination.

Certain positions, the list of which is designated by the commander of the National Guard, may be filled by female personnel.

3. Civilians are accepted to support the activity of auxiliary services of the National Guard under the procedure that is stipulated by the labor legislation of Ukraine.

Civilians take the "Oath of Service Obligation to the National Guard," the text of which is approved by the commander of the National Guard.

4. Selection to the National Guard is accomplished by draft commissions under the military commissariats and with the participation of representatives of the National Guard.

The authorized representatives of the National Guard are granted the right to study and select the candidates for service in the National Guard in advance (before the start of the draft).

5. The number of citizens that are subject to the draft to the National Guard is established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine by request of the commander of the National Guard.
6. Responsibility for the state and quality of manpower acquisition and the organization of professional-psychological selection for service in the National Guard, the division of the young reinforcements among the formations and units, and the timely and organized discharge of conscript servicemen who have completed their stipulated terms of active military service is entrusted to the commander of the National Guard.
7. The procedure for the transfer of servicemen from the armed forces of Ukraine to the National Guard and vice versa is established by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine in conjunction with the commander of the National Guard.
8. Each military formation and military unit has its own banner. The numbering of the formations and units is established by order of the commander of the National Guard.
9. The military ranks conferred on individuals who are serving in the National Guard are:

enlisted personnel—soldier of the guard, senior soldier of the guard;

NCO personnel—junior sergeant of the guard, sergeant of the guard, senior sergeant of the guard, first sergeant of the guard;

warrant-officer personnel—warrant officer of the guard, senior warrant officer of the guard;

junior officer personnel—junior lieutenant of the guard, lieutenant of the guard, senior lieutenant of the guard, captain of the guard;

senior officer personnel—major of the guard, lieutenant-colonel of the guard, colonel of the guard;

superior officer personnel—major-general of the guard, lieutenant-general of the guard.

10. The military ranks from major-general to lieutenant-general of the guard are conferred by the President of Ukraine, and the other officer ranks by the commander of the National Guard of Ukraine.
11. Citizens who have military ranks (aside from soldiers, junior lieutenants and individuals equivalent to them) may be demoted in military rank by one level for actions incompatible with the calling of the National Guard. Demotions in military rank by one level, as well as the restoration of military ranks, are performed by those bodies and officials that have the right to confer them under their authority.
12. Servicemen serve until they reach the maximum ages of:
 - 40 years for soldiers, sergeants and first sergeants under contract;
 - 40 years for female servicemen who occupy positions of soldiers, sergeants and first sergeants, as well as warrant officers;
 - 45 years for male warrant officers;
 - 45 years for junior officers;
 - 45 years for senior officers;
 - for superior officers, 50 years for those at the rank of colonel, and 55 years for major-generals and lieutenant-generals.
13. The period of military service in calendar terms is established as:
 - a) for soldiers, sergeants and senior sergeants who are completing conscript service:
 - under draft: 1.5 years (for individuals with higher education—one year);

—under contract: three years after three months of training during the period of completion of a term of service under draft.

When a contract is broken off prematurely at the initiative of the serviceman (aside from instances of discharge from the service, illness, family circumstances and in case of a conviction), the service is counted as conscript service, with the deduction of the difference in salaries of servicemen who complete service under contract and servicemen who are completing service under the draft over the whole term of the contract;

- b) for female servicemen in the positions of soldiers, sergeants and first sergeants—no less than three years;
- c) for warrant officers—no less than three years;
- d) for officers—no less than three years.

14. Citizens are drafted for military service in the National Guard once a year, in the fall.

15. Servicemen (except for officers) who are studying at military educational institutions are cadets.

The term of study at a military educational institution for servicemen-cadets dismissed from an institution is counted as active military service. Citizens who have completed service in the National Guard are granted the right to priority entry into military (higher) institutions of Ukraine.

16. Officer personnel of the National Guard are obtained from:

- a) servicemen who have received the rank of officer upon completion of military and other training institutions;
- b) officers in the reserves;
- c) warrant officers and servicemen on extended service in the National Guard who have higher or secondary education related by field of training to the corresponding military specialty, with the awarding of the rank of officer;
- d) women who have higher education related by field of training to the corresponding military specialty, who have entered active military service with the awarding of the rank of officer.

17. Positions that are filled by warrant officers are manned by:

- a) soldiers, sergeants and first sergeants who are on active service under contract, after completion of warrant officer school;
- b) soldiers, sergeants and first sergeants who are on active service under contract, after completion of

the school for technicians under the program of a secondary special educational institution;

- c) soldiers, sergeants and first sergeants who have higher or secondary education related by field of training to the corresponding military specialty, and who have served no less than one year on active military service under draft;
- d) soldiers, sergeants and first sergeants in the reserves who have higher or secondary education related by field of training to the corresponding military specialty;
- e) soldiers, sergeants and first sergeants of the reserves from among individuals who have completed active military service, after completion of warrant officers' school;
- f) warrant officers in the reserves;
- g) women with the corresponding special training.

18. The National Guard has its own military educational institutions and training units, which perform training and skills enhancement for the personnel.

The higher educational institutions of the National Guard, aside from military-accounting specialties, provide for the receipt of education in a civilian specialty.

The training of officers and specialists for the National Guard is also organized at the higher military educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and other states on a coordinated basis.

The training of warrant officers, sergeants and specialist soldiers is accomplished in the training units of the National Guard.

- 19. Classes for servicemen to study the Ukrainian language are created in the staffs and subunits of the National Guard.
- 20. The moral-psychological training of the personnel of the National Guard is conducted in a spirit of loyalty to the people of Ukraine, the irreproachable fulfillment of the provisions of the Constitution and other laws of Ukraine, the decisions of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, the edicts of the President of Ukraine, oaths and military regulations. Commanders, senior officers and other officials organize that work.

Military and Logistical Support

- 21. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, through its bodies, provides the National Guard with arms, military and other hardware and material resources.
- 22. The National Guard is formed of the logistical, barracks/housing, housekeeping and storage bases of

formations, units and subunits of the internal service troops, the military formations of the Committee for State Security and units of the Soviet Army stationed in the territory of Ukraine. The provision of the National Guard with arms, hardware and matériel is accomplished both through the indicated formations, units and subunits and through military units that have been transferred from abroad onto the territory of Ukraine for disbanding.

23. The rear and military services of the National Guard, their formations and units are rear units, institutions, subunits and housekeeping facilities intended for the uninterrupted support of official or combat activity, combat and moral-psychological training, logistical requirements of the personnel, the operation, servicing, repair and preservation of arms, combat and other hardware, ammunition, fuels and other material resources.
24. The housing stock, administrative and service buildings, treatment and health facilities and auxiliary structures of the military units, educational institutions, training facilities and their physical plant and technical means of training, standard-issue arms, means of transport etc. are transferred by the state for the utilization of the National Guard.
25. Areas of land for military compounds, training facilities, stores, institutions, private subsidiary farming, collective gardens and for the construction of dachas are allotted for the use of the National Guard under stipulated procedure.
26. The National Guard is furnished with all types of arms, aviation, armored-vehicle and special hardware, technical, material and special means, barracks and housing allocations, other buildings, repair, municipal and other types of services in accordance with norms that are approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.
27. The servicemen of the National Guard are provided with foodstuffs or monetary compensation, at their request, in accordance with the approved norms.
28. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, in accordance with the requests of the National Guard, designates the suppliers of matériel and the performers of contract and other operations.

The National Guard has the right to conclude direct business contracts with state or other enterprises, institutions and organizations.

The National Guard is prohibited from engaging in production activity.

29. The National Guard has the right to act as customer for the planning and construction of new facilities, the repair of existing ones and the assimilation of

plots of land within the limits that are allocated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and its own funds.

30. Servicemen, workers and office staff of the National Guard (with the exception of conscript servicemen), as well as the members of their families who reside with them, are granted living space in accordance with the housing legislation of Ukraine. These individuals and the members of their families, before the receipt of housing, have the right to registration and residence by place of service with related or other individuals by agreement.
31. The National Guard is released from the transfer to the local soviets of people's deputies of a portion of the housing built at the expense of dedicated state capital investment and its own funds, which it uses to give to servicemen, workers and office staff.

The servicemen of the National Guard have the right to join housing-construction cooperatives or other organizations for the construction of housing space at populated areas of Ukraine they select, on favorable terms, under the procedure established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

The servicemen of the National Guard retain the housing that they had before conscription or voluntary entry into service with the National Guard. They also keep their place for the receipt of housing space by place of permanent habitation or work.

32. Servicemen who have served in the National Guard for more than 20 years and have been discharged into the reserves or have retired, as well as their families, are granted housing within the limits of prevailing norms by the place of residence chosen on the territory of Ukraine. Payment for housing by servicemen, as well as those discharged into the reserves or retired and the members of their families who reside together with them, is made on favorable terms as stipulated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.
33. A network of stores and domestic-services enterprises is created within the National Guard system for the trade and domestic support of servicemen, workers and office staff and their families.
34. The servicemen of the National Guard are guaranteed medical care, which is provided through the performance of sanitary-hygienic, epidemiological, preventive and treatment measures at the hospitals of the National Guard, constant monitoring of the state of health, the granting of medical assistance to them at times of injury or sickness, medicines and various medical services at military medical institutions, along with guaranteed sanatorium and resort services.

Servicemen of the National Guard are accepted for out- and in-patient treatment at the treatment facilities of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and other ministries and agencies of Ukraine.

Family members, as well as servicemen who have been discharged into the reserves or who have retired and have served no less than 20 years, have the right to medical services at treatment facilities of the National Guard and other military medical facilities.

35. The servicemen, workers and office staff of the National Guard, as well as the members of their families, are granted passes to their own sanatoria and rest homes, as well as sanatoria and resorts, rest homes and tourist camps of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and other ministries and agencies of Ukraine, on contract terms for sanatorium and resort treatment and holidays.
36. The Chief Directorate of the Commander of the National Guard supports the functioning of auxiliary services and enterprises and the social and legal protection of workers and office staff in accordance with labor legislation and other legislative acts of Ukraine.

The Chief Directorate of the Commander of the National Guard, within the limits of its authority, approves standard documents on questions of rear support and the management of military facilities and monitors their fulfillment, as well as organizes the development and approval of the functional duties of officials of the National Guard who organize rear support and the management of military facilities.

37. The requirements of the National Guard for funding to carry out official operational activity, combat training, provision of the personnel with monetary sustenance, care of arms and matériel, house-keeping, cultural, domestic and other services are satisfied in accordance with the estimate approved under stipulated procedure. The National Guard is financed from the republic budget.
38. Special (extra-budgetary) funds and transfer (payable) amounts, expended for requirements that are conditioned by the corresponding orders of the commander of the National Guard and the estimates of income and expenditures, may be created in the military units of the National Guard apart from the budgetary funds.

Financial Support, Accounting and Reporting

39. The National Guard is guided in its activity by the prevailing financial legislation and orders of the

commander of the National Guard on financial issues within the limits of his authority.

40. The Chief Directorate of the Commander of the National Guard finances the expenditures of all of the military formations, units and institutions subordinate to it by means of the transfer of funds to the corresponding current accounts at subdivisions of the National Bank of Ukraine.
41. A financial-planning body is created within the Chief Directorate of the Commander of the National Guard, and is entrusted—aside from questions of planning and finance—with the functions of analyzing, developing and preparing recommendations (orders, directives, instructions) on financial issues, organizing accounting and reporting, drawing up pension documents for servicemen of the National Guard discharged into the reserves or who have retired and performing control and auditing work. The financial-planning body is headed by a chief. He organizes the work of the financial apparatus in accordance with prevailing legislation.
42. The bookkeeping and statistical reporting for the National Guard as a whole is issued in an agreed amount by the Chief Directorate of the Commander of the National Guard to the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine and the Ministry of Statistics of Ukraine respectively, and at the times stipulated by them.

The documents that regulate the activity of all financial structures in the National Guard system are developed by the financial-planning body and are, where necessary, coordinated with the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank of Ukraine.

43. Pension support for servicemen in the National Guard of Ukraine is accomplished at the expense of the republic budget, through the bodies for social security according to the place of permanent residence.

Authorizations for the payment of pensions are sent to the bodies for social security by the pension departments of the corresponding subdivisions of the National Guard.

44. The state registration of legal persons of the National Guard is accomplished by the Chief Directorate of the Commander of the National Guard. The Chief Directorate of the Commander of the National Guard sends the data on the state registration within ten days to state statistical bodies for the establishment of their codes.

The Statute "The Duties and Rights of Personnel of the National Guard of Ukraine"

Section I. Duties of the Personnel of the National Guard of Ukraine

The personnel of the National Guard of Ukraine, in accordance with its principal tasks as defined in the Law of Ukraine "The National Guard of Ukraine," are obligated:

- 1) to prepare manpower, weaponry and means supporting the fighting ability and combat readiness of the subunits, units and formations of the guard for the protection of the sovereignty, constitutional order and territorial integrity of Ukraine against attempts to alter them by force, to participate in combat operations to repel an attack from without and to accomplish the territorial defense and protection of the security of Ukraine;
- 2) to take part in eliminating sabotage, reconnaissance and terrorist groups and illegally created military formations;
- 3) when a state of emergency is instituted:
 - to take part in supporting the designated legal regime, public order and the guarantee of the security of citizens;
 - to protect and defend against attack the most important facilities that support the vital activity of the population and the normal functioning of administrative and social structures, according to the list defined by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine;
 - to support the pass regime and the special procedures for the entry and exit of citizens;
- 4) to support, along with the armed forces of Ukraine and other military formations created in accordance with the legislation of Ukraine, the maintenance of a regimen of martial law in certain localities or across the whole territory of Ukraine in cases of the declaration of war or the threat of military attack (aggression);
- 5) to assist the border troops in detaining violators of the state border of Ukraine;
- 6) in zones of special regimes, to monitor along with the border troops and bodies of internal affairs the upkeep of the stipulated rules of that regime and the principles of law and order by citizens and officials;
- 7) to provide external protection, where necessary in interaction with the directorate for state protection, for the residences of the President of Ukraine and the buildings of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine;
- 8) to provide external protection for buildings and facilities of the diplomatic and consular representations of foreign powers on the territory of Ukraine;
- 9) to take part in the performance of urgent measures with regard to the clean-up of consequences of accidents, catastrophes and natural disasters, the rescue of people and the rendering of assistance to them, and support for the performance of quarantine measures and sanitary-epidemiological measures during epidemics and epizootics.

- 10) To perform functions, in conjunction with the bodies of internal affairs, to protect public order in populated areas, as well as during the holding of mass public political, sporting and other functions, the halting of mass disorders that are directed toward the violent change of the constitutional order or disrupting the work of state authorities and administration, or at enterprises, institutions and organizations.

Section II. Rights of the Personnel of the National Guard of Ukraine

The personnel of the National Guard of Ukraine, in the performance of the duties entrusted to them, are granted the right:

- 1) to require of citizens and officials the maintenance of the public order and to halt violations of the law;
- 2) to block (blockade) areas of a locality and perform a search with the aim of apprehending violators of the state border or sabotage, reconnaissance and terrorist groups, as well as armed military formations created illegally;
- 3) temporarily to restrict or prohibit access of citizens to certain areas of a locality or facilities in the clean-up of the consequences of accidents, catastrophes and natural disasters;
- 4) to create monitoring posts and checkpoints for the maintenance of the pass regime or special procedures for the entry and exit of citizens;
- 5) to perform special inspections of the items of citizens at monitoring posts or checkpoints, to halt means of transport and conduct a search of baggage, luggage and passengers with observance of the procedures stipulated by law;
- 6) to apprehend and deliver to the bodies of internal affairs citizens suspected of committing crimes, as well as in cases where other measures envisaged by law for the curtailment of their violations of the law have been exhausted;
- 7) to check the documents of citizens certifying the individual when they are suspected of having committed a crime;
- 8) to take from citizens firearms or sidearms, ammunition, explosives and, at enterprises, institutions and organizations, military training hardware in cases of its illegal acquisition or retention;
- 9) to enter the premises and enclosures of enterprises, institutions and organizations during the pursuit of individuals suspected of committing a crime or with the aim of curtailing violations of the law that threaten public order and the safety of citizens, in cleaning up the consequences of accidents, catastrophes and natural disasters and in the presence of other extraordinary circumstances;

- 10) to detain individuals who have violated the regime of a state of emergency or a special regime zone, and to transfer them to the bodies of internal affairs;
- 11) to utilize without charge in urgent cases the means of communication of enterprises, institutions and organizations, as well as citizens with their consent;
- 12) to utilize, with the subsequent reimbursement for expenditures, means of transport that belong to enterprises, institutions and organizations, as well as citizens with their consent, aside from the means of transport of diplomatic, consular and other representations of foreign powers and organizations, special-purpose means of transport, for travel to the location of events, natural disasters, the delivery of individuals who require immediate medical assistance to treatment facilities, or for the pursuit and apprehension of individuals who are suspected of committing crimes;
- 13) to retain, carry and employ arms and special means on the principles and under the procedures envisaged by the regulations of the armed forces of Ukraine, the Law of Ukraine "The Police" and other legislative acts.

Adopted by Decree of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine of 19 May 92.

IV Congress of Ukrainian Officers' Union Described

93UM0586A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
13 Apr 93 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Mykola Horenko: "To Become an Influential Force—From the 4th Congress of the Union of Officers of Ukraine"]

[Text] *The 4th Congress of the Union of Officers of Ukraine [SOU] took taken place. Some 600 delegates from oblast and regional organizations and close to 200 guests took part in it. After Father Marko (Cherkashyn), the apostolic administrator of the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church, blessed the coming work, the congress began to consider the issues...*

Speaker SOU Chairman Colonel Hryhoriy Omelchenko gave an analysis of the socio-political situation that has taken shape in Ukraine at this time. The fact that we are experiencing "difficult times" and that "the activity of the *nomenklatura* Supreme Soviet conceals a certain danger in it" were emphasized...

A parallel was drawn between the activity of the parliament and the state of affairs in economics and finance. The SOU feels that "Ukraine is at the level of bankruptcy."

The Supreme Soviet was criticized on questions of the extremely slow development of a military doctrine for Ukraine, for the lack of a law on the cutback of the

armed forces and for the excessive "concerns" of individual servicemen. The figures of deputies' inquiries in particular were cited—there were 1,176 over the past year, with 580 concerning transfer to Ukraine and the rest the awarding of military ranks. "Party-*nomenklatura* protectionism has been replaced by deputy protectionism," was the conclusion.

A considerable portion of the presentation was devoted to revealing instances of corruption and abuses of official position by certain servicemen.

The Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen was also criticized—a proposal was made in the speech to shut down the committee, taking into account the considerable dissatisfaction with its work; on the second day of the congress the replacement of Major-General V. Martyrosyan as head of the committee with Colonel Slyusarev was proposed. Summing up this section, H. Omelchenko voiced the sad conclusion of the SOU—the officers had for the greater part lost faith in legality, and according to the data of independent polls 70 percent of them are ready for terrorist activity...

The speaker proposed that the congress create a commission to develop a military doctrine, that the Cabinet of Ministers be directed toward this issue, favored the ratification of the START-I Treaty on principles of parity provided that guarantees of the security of Ukraine are maintained, along with the immediate dismissal from the ranks of the army of those people who harm the organizational development of the armed forces of Ukraine, the advancement of young officers to supervisory positions regardless of their knowledge, approval of the idea of introducing the institution of chaplains into the army etc.

The chairman of the SOU indicated toward the end of his speech that the Union condemns the politics of destabilization in the state that could lead to civil war, supports the President of Ukraine and the minister of defense of Ukraine, and favors consolidation with democratic parties and movements.

Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Kostyantyn Morozov also spoke to the congress. He responded approvingly to the activity of the Union, and outlined the main tasks in the practical development of the armed forces. He cited among them work on the preventing a schism in the ranks, a consistent fight for firm military discipline, the planned creation of the VPS (Airspace Defense Troops), the resolution of the knot of problems that has been taking shape in southern Ukraine, the cutback in conventional weaponry, the search for organizational forms of patriotic indoctrination for the personnel, the resolution of questions of personnel, social protections for servicemen and the members of their families etc.

The minister of defense cited as the main task the creation of combat-capable ground troops in the armed forces of Ukraine.

The Strategic Missile Army that is stationed in Ukraine—and which has been financed by the Ukrainian government since December of last year—should take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine.

He spoke in particular of southern and Black Sea matters.

Our approaches to the conceptual model according to which Ukraine has to be a naval power the minister of defense called just, emphasizing that what is located on our territory is ours. He called the agreements in Dagomys and Yalta acts of good will. Examples were cited of the opposition of the Russians, and especially the command of the ChF [Black Sea Fleet], to the agreements that were reached. These were the introduction of various types of moratoriums, the sell-off of Crimean land to commercial structures, the removal of hardware, weaponry, material and technical reserves etc. This is markedly hindering the process of development of the Ukrainian Navy, the defense minister emphasized.

He proposed several cardinal themes and decisions that have already been made pertaining to solving the problems in the Black Sea.

"I believe in our fleet, and I believe that we will build it," declared Colonel-General K. Morozov.

He expressed anxiety, at the same time, over the state of affairs on the ships with regard to military discipline, pointing out that the old ways of the imperial army—and "hazing" in particular—have been transferred to the new ships of the Ukrainian Navy. The minister, in connection with certain manifestations of this ugly phenomenon, stressed the necessity of raising the quality of patriotic education of fleet personnel. "Train a new person with a new outlook" is the task. The officers should shoulder the chief burden of this task. The Union of Officers of Ukraine should also not be a bystander...

The minister of defense also touched on personnel work, condemning instances of abuse of official positions that have occurred in the Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense by two young officers, describing working conditions that, in his words, are reminiscent of persecution lately. The socio-psychological service in particular. The cause, the minister indicated, is in the consistent inclination of the idea of Ukrainian patriotism and independence of Ukraine. The minister observed that regardless of the pressure, "neither I nor my company will leave our posts voluntarily..." which elicited passionate approval from the delegates at the congress.

The congress adopted program documents and some declarations, on the nuclear status of Ukraine in particular.

Major-General Oleksandr Skypalskyy, the chief of a directorate at the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, was elected the new chairman of the SOU. The elections were conducted on a competitive basis. Among the other candidates was Major Volodymyr Tymofeyev, who

wanted to draw attention to himself, including for the fact that he was the initiator of the lawsuit against the "mafia" of NARODNA ARMIYA. An overwhelming majority voted for Skypalskyy.

New Officers' Union Chief Skypalskyy on Goals, Work of Union

93UM0586B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
13 May 93 pp 1-2

[Discussion by Lieutenant-Colonel Mykola Horenko with Officers' Union of Ukraine [SOU] Chairman Major-General Oleksandr Oleksandrovych Skypalskyy and Kiev SOU organization Chairman Colonel (Retired) Volodymyr Saladyak: "The SOU: For the Statehood of Ukraine, for a National Army, for the Dignity of the Officer"]

[Text] *The time passes since the 4th Congress of the Union of Officers of Ukraine. The editors have been receiving a host of mail daily pertaining to the nature of the SOU—the readers are interested in just what this organization is today. Is this a new political structure in the armed forces of Ukraine? Is the Union trying to take on certain authoritative functions? Or do they not intend to influence personnel policy? And is it not trying in general to subordinate to itself—the question exists—the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine...?*

There is exaggeration in the letters, of course. So we decided to ask the new leaders of the Union to pay a visit with the editors, as has now become a tradition, in order to put certain limits on the talk about the SOU, illuminate the most important areas of its activity, show the plans of the leaders etc.

Officers' Union of Ukraine [SOU] Chairman Major-General Oleksandr Skypalskyy and Kiev SOU organization Chairman Colonel (Retired) Volodymyr Saladyak answered journalists' questions at the offices of the editors.

"I am grateful for the chance to meet with the editorial collective. Taking advantage of the opportunity, I will talk about some aspects of the activity of the Union of Officers of Ukraine," is how Major-General Oleksandr Skypalskyy, chairman of the SOU, began the discussion in the offices of NARODNA ARMIYA.

Oleksandr Oleksandrovych described the socio-political situation in Ukraine and how it is perceived and evaluated by the Union as "difficult," taking into account at the same time that "it has never been easy since the day of proclamation of independence." Research conducted by specialists from the Union shows that "most people today have a pessimistic evaluation of the economic situation in the nation."

One of the main reasons for this, in the opinion of the head of the SOU, is the weakening of patriotic education as a whole in the nation. "We have long thought about how we would be working after the 4th Congress of the

Union, and we decided that the pivotal direction for our work should be cultivating a feeling of pride in the independence of the Ukrainian state among the servicemen." He also stressed that the SOU is planning to consolidate the officers who are members of the Union on the idea of Ukrainian statehood.

"I think," said Skypalskyy, "that having the right to express one's position openly in support of the creation of one's own nation and one's own armed forces, as is written in the laws of our state, is not in violation of the Constitution or military laws, but some are trying to make it just that today when discussing the activity of the Union. This is, first and foremost, the right of people to have their own views. Proceeding from those principles, we created the Union—not as some alternative organization with claims to exclusivity, but rather as an organization of military people trying to have a positive influence on the process of development of the armed forces of Ukraine... The SOU Charter says 'foster the building.' We are not able to accomplish everything—there are different people and different approaches in the SOU. But the 4th Congress of the Union has confirmed yet again the position of the SOU—the position of supporting the processes of military organizational development and support for the President of Ukraine and the minister of defense on these issues."

The head of the SOU emphasized that the 4th Congress of the Union was held exclusively to affirm the readiness and aspiration of the SOU to take an active part in the building of the Ukrainian Army.

"I would like to say, in assessing the congress, that it was conducted in a quite organized fashion, fit into the planned time and achieved its aims."

The guest of the editors touched on the sharp question of the pressure on the minister of defense that is being incited by certain people's deputies, on the socio-psychological service and the Union of Officers.

"They are trying to make the Union into an 'incomprehensible and illegal organization.' People's Deputy of Ukraine Charodeyev, for example, has twice tried to prove his 'idea' in parliament. He and I got together for a bit in gentlemanly fashion during a recess. I told him and I repeat again, that I especially do not understand the stance of people's deputies when they come out against an organization in which the idea of Ukrainian patriotism is inherent. And how do the voters regard such deputies, who are not furthering the strengthening of the state but are rather, on the contrary, coming out against national-patriotic thinking? This question is an entirely logical one, in my opinion. And our discussion today, which will be appearing in the columns of your newspaper, will help people to orient themselves on this issue..."

Colonel (Retired) Volodymyr Saladyak, developing on what was said by General Skypalskyy, dwelled in particular on the principal areas of activity of the Kiev organization of the SOU. He stressed four of them:

"First, work to bring the Union closer to the command of the units, formations and educational institutions. The organizations of the SOU in southern Ukraine and the Kiev organization are isolated from the command, and there are still no close ties... We are trying to see that the commanders feel our support, and do not perceive the Union to be an enemy.

"The second important area of our activity today is work to consolidate all of the social organizations of a military thrust. We are creating an organizing committee that will seek points of contact with all organizations, with the aim of uniting their efforts.

"The third area of work is the development of the cadre policy that is written in the Charter of the Union. Quite a bit of talk surrounds this issue, and I would like to take advantage of the opportunity to introduce some clarity—the commanders should not fear this activity of ours. The cadre policy of the SOU, after all, has nothing in common with interfering in the command of units and subunits, as some are trying to make it appear. No and no again! The discussion here concerns recommendations pertaining to capable and hard-working, patriotically inclined officers that we will find and recommend to the primary commanders, and then it is their matter to decide—whether that officer will be named or not..."

"And the last major area is working with the youth. We all know how difficult the situation is with obtaining troops and young officers, and we know that many of them are today submitting applications for discharge. One of the causes of this is inadequate work with the youth of pre-draft age. We will thus be setting up relations with the military commissariats and conducting military-patriotic work..."

The guests answered a number of questions from the journalists.

"The most acute question today," General Skypalskyy called social protections for servicemen, when answering the question of whether the Union is planning to make a contribution to resolving the whole set of problems of social protections and how the SOU evaluates the activity of the Committee on Issues of Social Protections for Servicemen of the Cabinet of Ministers.

Oleksandr Oleksandrovych pointed out that "I will not be discovering America on this question; you know how many officers we have today without apartments, how many want to come back to Ukraine, how much a set of furniture costs etc. The Union, of course, is morally on the side of every officer who needs social protection. We were talking about that at the Congress, were asking questions and even appealed to the President and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. But all should realize that the Union is a social organization, it will not be building any apartments and has no funds. We can—and we have been and will—raise those issues that draw the attention of government structures, encouraging them to solve more effectively the problems of social protections for servicemen.

"As for the committee, the question was raised more than once at the congress less of evaluating the committee than its chairman, General Martyrosyan. I would never have a negative evaluation of his contributions in the early stages or of him as a person, since I have a positive impression of him overall as an individual. But the question of such an evaluation arose and was put to a vote, and the congress had a negative regard for his work. The Cabinet of Ministers was notified of this. The committee, one might say, is a child that was created by the SOU to resolve questions of social protections for servicemen. Its contribution is therefore substantial. But I personally do not agree with the statement of Vilen Arutyunovych that 'the wrong people' have come to lead the Union, and so on and so forth. People are different everywhere, including on his committee, with a varying spectrum of ideas. I think that his assessment is too unfair. And the fact that he has left the Union is his own personal affair. The SOU Charter says that anyone can go without explaining why he is leaving the organization. Vilen Arutyunovych declared that he was leaving because he does not want to bear responsibility. But he wasn't responsible. I must speak the truth—when after the 2nd Congress it was not changed, he was no longer working, he did nothing for the activity of the Union of Officers, and even did not show up, like he did not show up at the 4th Congress itself, where he could have spoken and shown his position. Had that happened, I think, the stance of the delegates might have been different...

"We are not dramatizing the situation. As long as the committee exists, we will work with it, we are not dissociating ourselves from the committee. But the question of replacing the head of it came up, the government was informed and it has the last word. The committee as a whole, and especially the organizations in the oblasts, are needed..."

The journalists asked for an assessment of NARODNA ARMIYA.

"We regard the newspaper as like thinkers of the Union. You have achieved greater success in some things, and in some that still lies ahead. But as a whole you are working in the interests of building the armed forces of Ukraine. And that is what we are working for, there are no differences here..."

To a request to talk some about himself and his service activity, General Skypalsky answered thus:

"I was almost 29 before I put on the military uniform. My last post was as chief of the Military Counter-Intelligence Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine. Now I am serving at the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Doing what?

"With the separation of Ukraine into an independent state, we lost our strategic intelligence capability. Tactical intelligence, as a structure in the field, remained with the troops. But all the rest—that is, the main subunits of the Chief Reconnaissance Directorate—remained in Moscow. But life shows that the armed

forces cannot manage without military intelligence. That is just what I am working on, along with many of my colleagues. I can tell you a great deal about intelligence and the necessity of it. But we will still have to work in the future, and we would not want—such is our profession—those who would hinder us to know our approaches, intentions and plans. You will thus understand me correctly when I say that I am not one of those who does not want to be open with you, but that I cannot."

To the question of how he regards the ideological unity of the Union of Officers of Ukraine and whether a schism from within is not threatening the SOU, the guests answered thus:

Skypalsky: "I think that that very ideological unity allowed us to unite at the congress. That is regardless of the fact that even though the Union really does have adherents of radical action, although I would sooner call them immoderates, sometimes even actions that go beyond the bounds of our authority as a social organization, we are a single, united mass as a whole. A schism would harm the unity of the armed forces first and foremost. I think that we at the congress were able to persuade some of them and prevail in getting the idea of unity across to certain members of the Union. The ideological base of our activity is Ukrainian patriotism, the independence of Ukraine and our own armed forces.

"I could add to the development of the issue. Ideological struggle is natural and logical, with philosophical and historical underpinnings. But it is being coordinated by certain centers from outside so as to rupture the unity of the democratic forces of Ukraine, split it apart in various directions, break up the unity of the armed forces into adherents and opponents of it—in general, a very complex issue. I think that only each individual separately is able to understand who is sincere and who is preparing for a situation, who is pleased by such a stance..."

"There are thus attempts being made today to speed up the passage of time, the situation. But one cannot jump 'five stairs at once' without the health for it. The steps have to be mounted gradually. That is, in my opinion, the sole difference of opinion within the Union. I think that either we will explain that to these people, or most of them will gradually reconcile themselves to a centrist position—we will be doing everything possible until they do understand..."

Then came this question: there was talk going around the corridors of the congress that, as was said, the leadership of the SOU "is only yearning for power." So what privileges does the head of the Union have?

"The sole privilege that Hryhoriy Omelchenko got over the past year was his gray hair..."

"The post of chairman of the Union is not an official one, it provides no financial advantages, you do not get promoted. The 'privilege,' I can confirm objectively, is an increase in working time of about 40 percent, not

less... This time is spent solving dozens of problems—both on the spot and by traveling. Privilege without quotation marks is perhaps for those who are trying to show off a little in front of the cameras for television etc. It is, that is to say, exclusively populist, and perhaps brings some satisfaction. I have told and repeatedly emphasized to my colleagues my own point of view—participation in the activity of the Union brings just moral satisfaction for me from participating in the development of the armed forces of Ukraine.

"I'll say it to you as well..."

Saladyak: "Yes, there were different positions among the members of the Union the day before the congress. But it is necessary to point out that some of the adventurers who have made it their aim to head the Union and get something from it also came to the congress... Either positions or ranks. Such a thing unfortunately does exist—some of the officers came to the Union for the sake of gain..."

"We are working on improving the situation, although you wouldn't call it threatening—these are insignificant forces, I emphasize. It appeared to us at one time that these people were joining the Union genuinely motivated by patriotic sentiments. That was our mistake..."

Skypalskyy: "The Union of Officers of Ukraine has an open-door policy. It is enough for us that an officer be accepted into the Union if he supports the idea of the independence of Ukraine and really furthers the practical development of the armed forces of Ukraine. That is, I emphasize, enough... I feel that the more of these convinced patriots we have, the more effective our armed forces will be..."

Another question was also asked. The terms for dismissal from the Union were also discussed quite heatedly at the congress, and first and foremost officers who have compromised themselves as plotters. Is there a mechanism to purge the SOU of such officers?

"I can say this—we will not be creating any tribunals to expel members of the Union. The Union has as yet done only one thing on this plane—it declared its position in the press in relation to the officer Chechylo. He is the former first deputy who, having obtained—with the help of the SOU—an opportunity to renew himself in the ranks of the army and having received the rank of lieutenant-colonel (he had been a captain), switched over to criticizing the Union. Today he says that his mission is to ruin the Union. This is ignoble and ungentlemanly. We have made our statements regarding him openly, both at the executive committee and in the press. And I feel that that will suffice to make known just what the attitude of the executive committee of the Union is toward such cases and such officers."

Saladyak: "The time has obviously come for officers who have remained and are agreeable to serve in the armed forces of Ukraine to say, I am with you or against you. Just like that, like an officer."

Skypalskyy: "There is a legal basis for the thinking on this issue. A military person in the armed forces exists to protect the sovereignty and inviolability of the state. It is nonsense when there are military who do not share that position. What kind of a defender of sovereignty is it that does not wish for the existence of an independent state? They have to say more openly, more honestly—I am a military man who should be a defender, but if my heart is not in defending my own land... Let such people go! And the decision on that should be made separately by each who has doubts in regard to full-fledged independence or the building of a highly combat-ready army for independent Ukraine... This is a pivotal element, and we do not and will not tolerate any compromise on this issue... We may be reproached for this, that is their right, but that is our fundamental policy..."

This sharp question was also asked—won't certain officers "make use" of the Union to move up the service ladder all the same? A name was mentioned, not insultingly, in polite form...

Skypalskyy: "As for Hryhoriy Omelchenko... Well, being a candidate for people's deputy is an individual's constitutional right. Receiving a rank? I have known Omelchenko for a long time. I know that this person received a rank as a present and with assistance, that is, through the proposals and favors of Vilen Arutyunovych Martyrosyan and Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Colonel-General Andriy Volodymyrovych Vasylyshyn in particular. I think that this is more than a coincidence. Omelchenko was a high-up specialist at the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Academy..."

"We should overcome passivity of thinking with regard to patriots of Ukraine. If everyone takes a position of support in relation to the leading officers, then we cannot hope for progress. Progress occurs when new people come in, progressive people, and we have many of those. They all share the idea of the independence of Ukraine and the building of our army. And they themselves are ready to do everything, and are doing so. The approach of the SOU to this problem is thus a positive one—intelligent people should come naturally to leadership, and be on top. That is an intelligent path, and the sole possible one for obtaining progressive changes..."

"Life is life. I think that our approach apropos of the Charter of the Union is fitting: we will look positively at cadre policy, but we will not be able to assume any obligation or demand position apropos of prevailing legislation. We will continue to take a consultative stance... If there is disagreement by the SOU, we will criticize, openly, and set forth the disagreement in the press. But without pressure or interference. We will not be making demands or condemnations. I think that through an education of consciousness, through the supporters of the Union who hold key positions, we will have an influence on the formulation of military policy and cadres—that is the best way to set an example in work and discipline. And that will be the best personnel recommendation. We will not be thinking up anything

new, and we will not be taking a rigid stance demanding changes. That, after all, contradicts the principle of the individual nature of command."

To a question of whether existing policy and the social directorate in general are superfluous and dangerously soft, not making it possible to instill the necessary order in society, General Skypalskyy answered:

"The rigidity, rigidity of command and leadership at the level of the development of society that we are experiencing today cannot, in my opinion, be successful... We have legislation. It is not in force to the full extent, but is rigidity needed? That is even though I agree that a sense of fear plays a certain role. But think about this—in the West, when some are hung for their faults, others among the bystanders grab the wallet where the rest of the money is from the pocket... Which is stricter, to punish or pardon the indigent? I can support the author of the question on one thing—if a murderer is cynical and cruel, then he will continue to do similar things, then in that case justice must be served... The Union of Officers thus will not be taking a strict course."

"What do you see as the future of the SOU?" The guests answered this question in different ways.

Saladyak: "What will be the growth of the SOU? It seems that I appeared in your newspaper against the idea of creating trade unions in the armed forces. I indeed said that today, when reformation of the old armed forces is underway and we do not have our own army, the introduction of trade unions is harmful and dangerous. Trade unions envisage a contract between parties, and in this case the state cannot provide the contracting parties. Second, cutbacks and the reformation of the troops are underway; trade unions are again possible in the case of the existence of a contract..."

"I will come to the main question—what do we see in the Union? When the army of Ukraine goes entirely to manpower acquisition on a contract basis, the Union of Officers will grow into an independent trade union.

"As for the question of increasing our ranks, we had a great influx of members to the SOU at the first and second congresses—people felt that they would be getting certain privileges... The Union did not and will not grant such things... The situation has changed today; the patriots who came to the SOU from the very beginning for the idea of it have remained in the Union. There are 'shaky' ones, that is expected, but we know whom to rely on."

Skypalskyy: "I do not agree with the idea that officers on the editorial staff cannot be members of the SOU. I would like very much for an organization of the Union of Officers of Ukraine to exist among the editors. Affiliation with the SOU is a certain political definitiveness. But let us reflect on it frankly and logically. Are you supporters of the independence of Ukraine? Yes. Are you supporters of the development of the armed forces of Ukraine? Yes. Do you not favor social protections for

servicemen, or that we get on better? You do. So where are the differences? There aren't any..."

"Your newspaper takes a position that coincides with the position of the Union of Officers of Ukraine. We are ready to accept the editorial staff of NARODNA ARMIYA as honorary members of the SOU. We are ready to do that as an exception, even if only for the fact that the newspaper favors the statehood of Ukraine and its national-patriotic resurrection..."

Major-General Oleksandr Skypalskyy said at the conclusion of the meeting, "Thank you once again for the opportunity to tell people that the Union of Officers of Ukraine is not acting as some sort of audit and control organization, we did not create it for that purpose... It acts to see that all, even including those who do not quite share our views, are assured of the supremacy of peace in Ukraine through common efforts... That Ukraine is economically strengthened, and that it is not encroached upon..."

The journalists of the editorial staff express their gratitude for the interesting and helpful discussion, the notes on which were kept by Lieutenant-Colonel Mykola Horenko.

Defense Commercial Center Liquidated

93UM0619C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jun 93 p 2

[Article by Anatoliy Polyakov: "Ukrainian President Liquidated Commercial Center Under the Republic's Ministry of Defense"]

[Text] This decision was motivated by violations committed by the commercial center in its economic and financial activities.

It was assumed that assets received from the sale of equipment, armament and property through the center would be used to build housing for servicemen. However, all too often the money "stuck" to the hands of military "entrepreneurs."

Need For Unified Air Defense Command and Control System

93UM0628C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
16 Jun 93 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen (retired) Yu. Rodskiy, member of the Military Scientific Association under the General Staff of Ukraine's Armed Forces, under the rubric "Armed Forces Organizational Development: Experience, Problems, Prospects": "What Should the Air Defense Forces Be?"]

[Text]

4. Effectiveness of Intelligence

The structural reforms being carried out within the PVO [air defense] system must involve the integration of all

functionally related structures into an overall, unified system of command and control. This is not an original conclusion. The efforts of all the warring countries in World War II were directed toward this goal. It was undertaken also in the Soviet Union following the war and involved combining the command posts of the PVO commanders of combined-arms formations with the command posts of the fighter aviation of air armies and the command posts of the nation's PVO Troops. This was accomplished most successfully within a branch of the armed forces in the nation's PVO [Air Defense] Troops. It was effected on a high organizational and technical level within the NATO air defense system.

The integration of all related structures is the only way to assure the accomplishment of such relatively narrow but always urgent missions such as the establishment of a single information space, a single system for combating various types (kinds) of SVN [Offensive Air Weapons Systems], the coordinated determination of degree of importance of axes (zones) of employment of cruise and ballistic missiles, the coordination of measures to combat operational and tactical airborne formations, and so forth.

The capabilities of the integrated intelligence system will now be substantially greater as a result of the combining of the nation's PVO Troops, air forces and PVO troops of the Ground Troops into a single branch of armed forces. The joint efforts of intelligence personnel and facilities must focus on the achievement of the priority objective of exposing enemy preparations for conducting an offensive air operation, as well as providing command and control agencies with information for combatting highly accurate weapons and the vehicles for such weapons.

The successful achievement of this objective can contribute to the resolution of four difficult problems: establishing the legal basis for inflicting preventive strikes or for taking responsive counteraction to thwart an enemy air operation; singling out in the great diversity of SVN those posing the greatest danger to the objects being covered; identifying the PVO assets whose combat capabilities can be employed most successfully in the specific situation which has developed; providing the conditions for coordinated action by various PVO assets.

The intelligence assets which the forces will possess cannot with adequate reliability provide the command and control agencies at all levels involved in the preparations and the conduct of a PVO operation with the necessary information, however, without interacting with other kinds of intelligence efforts even after their organizational development has been completed and an integrated information system has been created.

The organizational solution to this problem lies in establishing a unified information field based on the comprehensive, coordinated use of all types and means of reconnaissance employed by the various branches of armed forces and troop arms at various levels. The main

role in the functioning of a united intelligence system must be assigned to the PVO troops with the most diversified range of intelligence facilities. The system will have to perform the following missions.

On the strategic level radio, space and agent reconnaissance must mainly reveal the grouping and ascertain the degree of readiness for employing strategic and operational SVN, including ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, identify the axes with the greatest danger of missile attacks, the basing areas, the composition and possible axes of action by strategic and tactical aircraft, particularly the delivery vehicles for cruise missiles, the existence and the possible scale of employment of aircraft designed with Stealth technology, the types and the capabilities of space-based target-designation and intelligence facilities, as well as the command and control centers for these assets. In general, intelligence assets at the strategic level must determine the possible scope (overall front, depth and duration) of an offensive air operation, the possible number of massive strikes, their arrangement and their duration on various operational axes. The extent and content of the intelligence must make it possible to specify the composition of the troops whose effort will be directed toward thwarting an offensive air operation.

For missions on the operational scale radioelectronic, air, agent and tactical intelligence assets must perform missions to support the successful conduct of military operations on the corresponding operational axis. Such missions should include the detection of basing areas and sites, the arrangement of agencies of command and control of tactical aircraft, areas and sites of deployment of army aviation, the anticipated density of employment of SVN, possible timetables, likely sectors of action, the disposition of the aviation and the degree of coverage of information channels with PVO personnel and equipment, should the enemy conduct massive air strikes, possible areas of deployment of ground components and patrol zones for components of PLSS- and Dzhisak-class VTO [precision guided munitions] systems, possible scales of employment of airborne formations and remotely piloted vehicles (BLA) in the execution of operational missions, and the extent of suppression of radioelectronic PVO facilities with radioelectronic assets and fire strikes.

The combat efforts of intelligence systems and agencies must make it possible to determine the most likely targets of air strikes, the means and tactics for carrying them out, specific and interlinked missions for repelling SVN strikes by diverse PVO formations and units operating as part of a large operational formation, as well as to determine the composition and the missions of troops which could be assigned to the reserve, and operational camouflage measures.

The system of reconnaissance of an air enemy at the tactical level with radar assets and visually, as well as combat reconnaissance must provide for the detection of in-flight SVN at ranges making it possible to commit to

the battle the necessary quantity and types of anti-aircraft weapons, basing areas and sites of army aircraft in the enemy's tactical zone, the most likely axes and lines for their commitment to battle and their targets, and possible landing areas and missions of enemy airborne troops. The intelligence must facilitate decision-making on the employment of anti-aircraft subunits and the arrangement of their fire.

And so, the system of reconnaissance for SVN at each level makes it possible to employ in an organized and coordinated manner the means appropriate to that level for combatting an air enemy while simultaneously providing the necessary, basic information for intelligence agencies and weapons for destroying SVN at the lower level, and to precisely define the missions, the areas and boundaries of responsibility of intelligence agencies at the corresponding level, as well as the means of destroying the air enemy. Such an intelligence system forms the foundation for informational interaction both hierarchically and among systems on the same level, and provides for implementing the principle of structural and technological linkage of information systems, and creates the conditions for coordinating the functioning of command and control agencies at the various levels within the structures of the branches of Ukraine's armed forces.

BELARUS

Belarus Unable to Place 20 Percent of Military School Grads

93UM0619B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jun 93 p 2

[Article by Valeriy Kovalev: "Not Enough Places in the Belarusian Army for All Military VUZ Graduates"]

[Text] Because of continuing reductions of the armed forces, Belarus will be unable to accept and place 20 percent of the graduates of military schools of the CIS countries having the right to citizenship in the republic and wishing to serve in its army. This was announced by Lieutenant General Nikolay Churkin, chief of staff of the Belarus Republic Armed Forces.

Only gunners, signalmen, pilots and aircraft technicians will be received in their entirety without exception, and some graduates of engineering schools will be accepted. The rest will have to either serve on the basis of a contract in Russia or Ukraine, or be discharged into the reserves.

BALTIC STATES

Survey of Development of Lithuania's Armed Forces

93UM0639A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Jun 93 p 2

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank Valeriy Gromak of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA under the rubric "National Armies: A Commentator's View": "The 'Iron Wolf' Gets a Profession"]

[Text] All the armies that were created in the republics of the former Union are similar to each other. Virtually all of the new states "privatized" the property of the armed forces of the USSR on their territory and formed national armies on that basis. The countries of the Baltic, not part of the CIS but the first to start creating their own armed forces, are a special case. The department (today the Ministry of Defense) arose in Lithuania as early as March of 1990, after the proclamation of independence. What have they been able to accomplish over the three years?

A former convocation of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania (the Sejm is operating here today), in concluding its activity at the end of November of last year, adopted the bill "Resurrection of the Army of the Lithuanian Republic." This document was tied to November 23—Army Day, proclaimed in 1918. All military experts share the opinion that the parliament and the government of the country have in reality done a great deal of work to create the armed forces.

Even judging by purely outward observations, three years ago the first military volunteers—and there were just a hundred of them—simply sat around and read newspapers at state institutions, sometimes making the rounds and checking passes as watchmen. Then weapons taken from the DOSAAF at, as they say, the dilettante level began to appear.

The process got started, in short, with the adoption of the first laws (a temporary law on military service obligation on 17 Jun 90, a law on alternative (labor) service on 16 Oct 90 and a law on defense on 20 Nov 90). The size of the Lithuanian Army is approximately 10,000 people as of today, with 26,000—27,000 planned by 1995 (counting the border guards and civil-defense structures). There were, by way of comparison, more than 38,000 soldiers and 1,817 officers (17 of them generals) in the old army as of 1 Mar 40. Lithuania simply cannot yet afford to have that many servicemen.

Today the term of conscript service is one year. But the Ministry of Defense has already prepared proposals for the parliament to lengthen that to a year and a half, since it is felt that it is virtually impossible to train a soldier over one year. High maximum age "ceilings" have already been set for officers, at up to 45 years of age for lieutenants, 47 for captains and 51 for majors. The maximum term of service for lieutenant-colonels and colonels is 55 and for generals 60 years, although it may be extended for another five years by government decision.

The basic army symbol is the state coat of arms (the white Vitus against a red background) that appeared as early as 1323. The insignia for all of the branches of service have been devised. Every border guard, for example, has a stripe on the sleeve that depicts the border symbol and an oak branch.

The army is politically neutral by law. The military may not hold elected or appointed positions in the state civil service, or take part in the activity of political parties and

organizations. It is namely the non-participation of defense structures in political processes that has made it possible for Audrius Butkevicius, a 33-year-old physician and psychotherapist from Kaunas who was one of the creators of the Sajudis independence movement, to hold the post of minister continuously since March of 1990. But even when Sajudis lost the fall elections to the Sejm last year, and became an opposition organization while Chairman of the Democratic Labor Party Algirdas Brazauskas was elected president, Butkevicius has remained part of the Cabinet of Ministers.

Four military programs have been developed in Lithuania under which the Ministry of Defense is financed. The **first program** is providing for the protection of the land, sea and air boundaries. This includes, aside from the border service (about 2,000 people), a naval flotilla based at Klaypeda (commander Commander Raymondas Boltushis) with 750 men (including 114 officers). The fleet has the task of protecting the economic zone and working fields against poachers.

The Baltic Fleet of Russia, in exchange for the construction of housing for servicemen in Kaliningrad Oblast, has transferred to Lithuania two small ASW ships (frigates under Lithuanian terminology), two torpedo boats, which have become coastal defense craft here, and a pilot craft. There is also a scientific-research vessel being used as a training ship. Lithuania intends to obtain another five small craft (two of them missile craft) and a sweeper in the near future. That will make it possible for the flotilla to handle fully the tasks entrusted to it. The naval forces, judging by statements of representatives of the Ministry of Defense, will not be supplemented for the next 5—10 years.

The **second program** being financed by the government is the program of territorial defense. This includes the protection of the most important facilities (including those of industry and nuclear-power plants), the military administration—which conducts the call-up into the army, and mobilization where necessary—and the national guard, which is being formed from the current volunteer defense service.

The **third and most important program** is the creation of units in the regular army. This pertains first and foremost to the Gelezhinas Vilkas ("Iron Wolf") brigade. The brigade commander is Colonel Cheslavis Yezerskas, and it is 5,000 strong. Seven battalions have already been formed up, and are stationed in Vilnius and Kaunas.

The brigade is being trained according to the principles of rapid reaction. The focus is currently on the individual training of the soldiers. The experience of Soviet airborne forces has been taken as the foundation. The brigade already has well-trained groups for fighting terrorists and for firefighting. The use of 24 An-2 aircraft at Panevezhis is planned for the redeployment of the sub-units, in view of the lack of helicopters.

Lithuania recently procured four L-39 trainers from Azerbaijan, which have been refitted for combat operations. These aircraft are also based at the former Russian Air Forces airfield at Panevezhis. The creation of air power is a priority in the activity of the Ministry of Defense. Matters have not yet reached actual plans, however.

The **fourth program** is civil defense. This is most likely a rescue service in the Lithuanian variation.

Virtually all of the Lithuanian cadre personnel came from the armed forces of the USSR. They are not restricted here in their service advancement, as opposed to Latvia and Estonia. The chief of staff of the armed forces, Colonel Stasis Kiyazis, completed the PVO [Air Defense] Military Academy, and has experience in command and staff work. Commander Raymondas Boltushis was the former flagship navigator of the Baltic Fleet. Colonel Cheslavas Yezerskas served in the airborne forces, was an excellent sportsman for many years on the USSR all-star team in sambo fighting, and was world champion.

The young army as a whole, however, is experiencing a shortage of qualified command personnel. Aside from the fact that a two-year officers' school is operating based on the former Higher Command School for PVO Electronics in Vilnius, military specialists for Lithuania are being trained in Germany and France. Fifteen graduates of Western military academies were recently assigned to the armed forces staff. Experts, however, feel that their accelerated training is far from complete. The fact that they have immediately occupied high positions has also caused consternation among their colleagues. The former chief of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Valdas Tutkus, who had experience in the war in Afghanistan and was a graduate of the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze in 1991, is thought to have retired for namely that reason. He has decided to leave the system of defense altogether.

Today, when Russian-Lithuanian relations have become more active with the election of Algirdas Brazauskas as president, it has been decided that starting this year Lithuanian youth will receive full education at the Ryazan Higher Airborne Assault and Kaliningrad Higher Naval schools.

The economic crisis being experienced by the republic is leaving its imprint on the army as well. The wage levels of the servicemen are very low. The pay is 8,000—14,000 coupons (the transitional monetary unit) a month for officers in the elite Gelezhinas Vilkas unit. Sociological research shows that enlisted men are prepared to serve on a professional (contract) basis only for 20,000 coupons.

Many officers with whom I was able to speak candidly admitted that they were serving only out of fear of unemployment if they were to leave the army. The housing situation is a difficult one as well. There are 30

officers in the Vilnius battalion of the Gelezhinas Vilkas brigade, for example, and they are all without apartments.

Questions of material supply for conscript servicemen have also not been fully resolved. They are being issued only one complete uniform instead of two. The jacket is figured only for three years' wearing—that is, it is intended for three generations of recruits. It was necessary to draft 4,000 people in the spring of this year. The government authorized the Ministry of Defense, however, to provide the army with only 2,700 draftees owing to the lack of funds, uniforms, accommodations and weapons.

Everyday disorder and the shortage of personnel are not facilitating a strengthening of discipline in the ranks. There are instances of desertion and "hazing." Audrius Butkevicius was recently called before the Sejm for

negative phenomena in the army. The institution of assistant commanders for personnel work has been introduced into the defense systems as of March 1 of this year. This will make it possible, in the opinion of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, to strengthen the indoctrination of the personnel.

So then, the army has been created. But Audrius Butkevicius himself feels that only in two or three years will it be possible to speak of a real system of security. The young army is counting on receiving well-equipped base locations, proving grounds and airfields after the departure of the Russian troops from Lithuania, which should occur before August 31 of this year. And if the government seeks out still more opportunities for additional injections of finances into the system of defense, the predictions of the head of the defense agency will be entirely realistic.

ARMS TRADE

Correction to Russian Presidential Missile Export Control Directive

93P50231A

The following correction pertains to the item published as the JPRS Report CENTRAL EURASIA/MILITARY AFFAIRS: Russian Presidential Missile Export Control Directive, JPRS-UMA-93-007, 3 March 1993, on page one, Table 1, Point I.1.1., make read:... complete rocket systems (ballistic missiles, space-launch vehicles [raketynositeli], and research rockets... (changing "completed missile systems" to "complete rocket systems," changing "missile platforms" to "space-launch vehicles [raketynositeli]," and changing "research missiles" to "research rockets").

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Korotchenko Backs Russian Look at Lessons Learned From Gulf War93UM0624A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jun 93 pp 2-3

[Article by Yevgeniy Korotchenko: "We Need a 21st Century Army"]

[Text] From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's dossier on Yevgeniy Grigoryevich Korotchenko: Born in 1937 in Velikiye Luki. Graduated from the Kiev Combined Self-Propelled Artillery School (1958) and the military academies imeni M. V. Frunze and the General Staff, where he now serves as deputy chief of the Department of Operational Art. Candidate of military sciences, professor. Author of over 200 published scientific works. Major General.

I am tackling this topic in the hope that in building our defenses, we will not go to extremes—from categorical rejection of the views that are "obsolete" or which "do not account for the unique features of Russia," to blind copying of foreign developments and someone else's combat experience.

Take for example the sudden reversals in thinking in regard to the Persian Gulf War. No one is about to deny, after all, that the value of the experience with which it has enriched military theory and practice is in a sense undergoing "reassessment" with the passage of time. In particular the enthusiasm of the Western press has diminished. Our analytical surveys are becoming deeper and more objective.

Special emphasis should be laid on the importance of the latter, inasmuch as the lessons of Desert Storm are of practical interest to us, and it would be simply shortsighted to ignore them in creating the Russian Armed Forces. Of course the experience of other wars is interesting as well. The war in Afghanistan for example. But when it comes to influence upon world military development, it seems to me that the lessons of the Gulf War

are still the most instructive. Moreover I think that the air and missile strikes by the USA and its allies against Iraq in January of this year compel us to rethink the dramatic events that unfolded in the Persian Gulf zone two years previously.

And so, let us return once again, without prejudice, to one of the conclusions reached by many analysts, and agree with the idea that the Gulf War was typified by qualitatively new characteristics, and that Operation Desert Storm is a kind of prototype of operations of the future. In the estimation of specialists at Harvard University the priorities regarding the "contribution" of weapons to the destruction of the Iraqi grouping sort themselves out as follows: the resources and systems of "information technology"; precise guidance resources; resources and systems intended to suppress air defenses, and for conducting combat activities at night; systems and resources for reconnaissance and troop (force) command and control, and others.

That is, the fact that different weapons systems were used within the framework of a single fighting super-system is obvious. And regardless of our attitude toward Western experience, the concept of a fighting super-system will obviously become one of the principal directions that will be followed by development of the material and theoretical base of wars and military conflicts of various scales in the foreseeable future. Thus the young Russian army, and the armed forces of other states as well, are facing the need for accelerated development and practical introduction of new forms and means of conducting military activities which would satisfy more fully the requirements of the present military-political situation in the world and in particular regions, and which correspond to fundamental changes that have occurred in the material base of war. This specifically is what our theorists and military specialists are doing now.

Consider for example the experience of the air campaign that the USA conducted in the Gulf zone, for the first time after Vietnam. For 38 days, the multinational forces carried out massed air, missile and electronic strikes without committing the main strike groupings of the ground forces and navy. The purpose of these strikes was to disrupt Iraq's control over the state and the military, suppress its air defense systems, destroy aircraft and operational-tactical missile systems, disrupt lines of communication and supply bases, and in the final phase, destroy the main groupings of Iraqi forces. As we know, the goal of the campaign was reached. Considering the importance attached today in NATO armies to deep, highly precise and intensive fire (chiefly air and missile) strikes, we can anticipate that this form of military activities will become a regular phenomenon.

Or consider this characteristic point. In its preparations for Operation Desert Storm the U.S. leadership devoted special attention to attaining surprise relative to the day and hour of a strike. For this purpose, a few months prior to the beginning of military activities the Americans implemented a "special operation" plan (and within its

framework, a "psychological operation" plan) and carried out an extensive, carefully developed package of measures of disinformation.

Thus, analyzing the means of action of the multinational force groupings during the air-land-sea operation and the experience of the operational and combat training of NATO Joint Forces, we can single out the following features that I believe would be of interest to us. Reliance is placed in such an operation on intensive destruction by fire, on effective electronic suppression and on close coordination of troops, forces and specific technical fighting systems. Special importance is attached to the effectiveness of the air offensive operation and to the first massed strike by aviation and high-precision weapons. When it comes to offensive operations by ground force groupings in their usual form, they may not even occur in the first days or even weeks of a war. Strike groupings operate according to nonstandard and as a rule previously unknown methods. Land, sea and air groupings conduct activities around the clock, in all weather and in extremely maneuverable forms. Also typical is the wide use of airborne and diversionary forces (special operations and rapid deployment forces, troop and naval diversionary and reconnaissance formations, air, aeromobile and marine assault forces, and local guerrilla formations and the nationalistic underground interacting with them).

Finally, the experience of the Persian Gulf War quite obviously confirmed the well known truth that the side that relies only on defense (as was the case with the Iraqi armed forces) is destined to defeat. As we know, there was a time when we ignored this truth as well. Strong emphasis was laid in troop training on defense, often at the expense of training in reconnaissance, offensive actions etc. It is a good thing that we now approach this issue in a more balanced way. Now let's consider this fact: The Persian Gulf War showed that not only tactical and operational but also strategic objectives can be reached today by delivery of conventional fires. Ones like disrupting state and military command and control, suppressing air defenses and destroying the principal air and naval forces, disrupting the economy, demoralizing the forces and the population, foiling delivery of reserves to the front, attaining and maintaining air supremacy, and so on. Delivery of conventional fires has become a decisive operational factor. What conclusions naturally follow from this in application to our military development?

First of all, the apparent conclusion that the troops must be ready to act in the face of the opponent's significant overall fire superiority. In our country, as we know, following the signing of the Paris Treaty and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, an imbalance appeared in the quantity of attack and fire weapons in comparison to the quantity of these weapons in armies of a number of other states. We obviously need to compensate for this imbalance both through qualitative development of fire weapons and fire delivery systems, and by developing new, promising forms of them. Things like, for example, the offensive fire operation, the fire battle, massive,

concentrated and individual strikes by high-precision artillery and aviation ammunition, and so on.

The sharply higher vulnerability of our economy to such strikes should also be kept in mind in this case. As we know, in all past wars the vast territory of Russia (the USSR) and the poor road network were our natural "allies." An aggressor with limited possibilities for hitting distant objectives could not inflict significant damage upon the country's economy within a short time. Now the situation is fundamentally different. Russia no longer has "geographic immunity," since all of its most important military objectives and industrial regions are now vulnerable to strikes by conventional weapons from all directions. This means that we need to track development of the mentioned imbalance and implement measures on priority to reduce and eliminate it, to develop industry and to structure our military-technical policy with regard for the new situation. With regard in particular for the fact that the viability of the economy, and especially of military industry, has become a factor of state importance.

Nor can we ignore one of the main concepts to which NATO countries now adhere in their development of the resources of armed conflict—"killing from outside the killing zone." The events in the Gulf showed that the NATO armies have attained a certain amount of progress in this area. We know for example that strategic B-52 bombers made their strikes from their permanent bases and then landed in Spain. Thus even if the multinational forces had been unable to attain air supremacy, Iraq would not have been able to destroy their strategic aviation at its airfields.

The possibilities of modern tactical aviation also make it possible to realize this concept. For example because of a large operating radius, NATO tactical aviation can perform strikes from extremely distant airfields. Moreover it possesses yet another quality that gives it long-range capability—air-to-air refueling. Moreover the quantity of air tankers is large enough to refuel large groups of tactical fighters in the air.

Incidentally the Voskhod-93 experimental exercise recently conducted by Russian air forces revealed our possibilities in this aspect.

As we develop our armed forces, have we the right to ignore the fact that new strategies and concepts, and new forms and means of combat activities are being developed primarily with an orientation on massive use of precision weapons of second and third generations? In particular, now that high-precision air-to-air long-range missiles have entered the forces, the NATO Joint Forces are capable of blockading enemy force groupings from the air (or clearing the airspace above their assault landing forces as well as above its groupings penetrating into the enemy's rear or groupings that are surrounded there) by making long-range missile strikes without having to have aviation enter the kill zone of land (ship)

air defense systems. This method can also be used when attacking ground objectives with long-range aircraft-mounted missiles. It would be sufficient to say that by the end of the century, up to 80 percent of NATO's tactical aviation will be capable of hitting targets with air-to-surface missiles without entering the kill zone of land (ship) surface-to-air missile systems. What is important here is not so much protecting the troops, forces and objectives in the rear per se, as the destruction and electronic suppression of the platforms delivering precision ammunition, the ammunition itself, reconnaissance and command and control systems, and systems supporting the precision weapons.

Experience shows that the role of combat in the enemy rear is growing today. For example in preparing for the operation in the Persian Gulf, multinational forces made wide use of the diversionary and reconnaissance formations of many of the coalition's countries, and in addition in the course of military operations, of assault landing and mobile (raiding) groupings, including helicopter-borne. Use of special operations forces was highly typical.

What is interesting about these elite formations is, first of all, their high numerical strength. Thus, over 9,000 special forces warriors operated within the region of the conflict within a relatively small area. Second, their extremely high professional level. To set the stage for the operation, they had to utilize special equipment and armament to seize control of the principal facilities of state and military command and control, the economy, troops, airfields, bases and so on.

There are also other lessons that we should keep in mind.

For example experience shows that identification of friendly forces is one of the vitally important problems today. Let's look at the statistics. During the Persian Gulf War, 28 cases of strikes by U.S. artillery and aviation against combat formations of friendly units and subunits were noted. Of the total American losses, 23 percent of the killed and 15 percent of the wounded were the victims of friendly fire, although in the concluding phase, mutual identification pickups were installed even on armored equipment. And in the future, in connection with the greater maneuverability of troops and forces, the problem of recognition will, we will have to believe, become even more acute. The need for us to have our own concept of a system for identifying our own troops is therefore obvious.

In addition there is another circumstance that we should keep in mind. The enemy may use a significant quantity of Soviet models of combat equipment and armament. The experience of combat activities in the Indo-Pakistani (December 1970) and Indo-Chinese (1971) conflicts shows how serious the consequences of this may be. Operations by enemy groupings armed with our airplanes and other equipment under today's conditions, in which the operational density of the troops would be extremely low as a result of reductions in combat

strength, could be especially dangerous. By misleading our troops with the use of our own equipment, under these conditions the enemy could achieve not only tactical but also operational success.

One of the reasons for the defeat of the Iraqi armed forces in the war is, as we know, low effectiveness of reconnaissance. There was an obvious gap between the rather high potential of the fire delivery forces of the major formations and the limited possibilities reconnaissance had for revealing groupings and objectives of the multinational forces with the needed efficiency and accuracy. Moreover the command of the multinational forces felt that implementing an intricate complex of measures to disorganize Iraqi reconnaissance was an especially important mission. According to the commander of the multinational force grouping, ground attack groupings were put into motion only after this goal was attained. This is an extremely instructive lesson.

The experience of local wars and conflicts also persuades us that it is impossible to attain even regional objectives without putting additional highly trained mobilization resources into play. This is especially important in connection with the significant reduction of the armed forces. We obviously also need a new statewide reserve training system, and a new system for mobilizational deployment. We need new approaches both to training troops, forces and command personnel, and to corresponding preparation of the country's leadership.

It would be pertinent to note here that the history of Russia astounds one with its remarkable consistency: As a rule, it (Russia) has never been ready for the beginning of a war. True, the courage and steadfastness of the Russian soldier are universal known, but in most cases we have had to teach him to fight and prepare the country for war when combat activities were already under way. The reason for this, I feel, is not that Russians are somehow unusually careless. The truth more likely lies in the country's unfit leadership, in unsatisfactory preparation of the armed forces and the state as a whole to repel aggression.

How will we look in the future in this aspect? Much depends on whether accurate conclusions are reached from the fundamental changes that have occurred and are now occurring in the development of the material and theoretical base of war, and in the views of different states on the use of their military might. It is obvious to specialists that the situation as it is today requires that we make decisions on an entire spectrum of issues concerned with development of Russia's defense. Here for example is just one of them.

I am referring to legislative (directive) establishment of the right of troop commanders of the military districts (fronts) and fleets (and in special cases, army commanders) to independently make the decision to repel aggression. Obviously, no one doubts that time will be

reckoned in the minutes immediately before the beginning of military activities. Will our response to the actions of an aggressor who has prepared for the attack be adequate and timely? Will there be enough time for frontal troop commanders to receive the command to commit their resources to action? The latter would perhaps be difficult to guarantee at least because, for example, we cannot exclude the possibility that communication with the Supreme High Command would be broken as a result of the enemy's use of electronic suppression, or of the action of agents, special forces etc. A situation in which the frontal or fleet commander will have to independently make the decision to repel aggression is quite probable. In this case he must know precisely what to interpret as the beginning of aggression. There is an international legal document that defines the concept "aggression"—a 1947 resolution of the UN General Assembly. It lists the variants of action by an attacker which are recognized to be aggression. However, the signs of aggression listed in this document do not fully reflect today's realities.

First of all, they are not specific enough to permit adoption of a decision, so vitally important to the country, such as setting operational plans in motion. Second, the content of the resolution does not fully reflect the entire assortment of means and resources the aggressor might employ at the beginning of military operations. Thus, massive electronic suppression of troop and weapon command and control systems of the Iraqi armed forces, which was started by the multinational forces almost a day prior to the first massive strike by precision weapons and aviation, in many ways predetermined the outcome of the Persian Gulf War as a whole. The UN Assembly resolution does not even mention electronic suppression.

Finally, the resolution presents a list of acts classified as aggression of one state against another. But the commander has to know what sort of actions by the other side are to be treated as the beginning of aggression, since it is precisely from this moment that most calculations are carried out regarding his repulsion, and operational plans are developed. On the other hand establishment, by directive, of a specific list of enemy actions that would be classified as an act of the beginning of aggression would legally establish the right of commanders in critical situations (absence of communication with the Supreme High Command, failure of the latter to make a prompt decision to repel aggression etc.) to independently make the decision to commit forces in accordance with a plan for repelling a first massive strike by the enemy.

The results of work on this problem in Russia could serve as the basis for discussing the issue at the international level. Adoption of our recommendations by the international community would make it possible to determine more specifically the code of behavior of the armed forces of the states in an extreme situation, and thus avoid accidental actions that the opposite side might interpret as an act of the beginning of aggression. And this in turn would help to raise strategic stability in the world and regionally.

Such are just a few of the details that would be hard to ignore in an examination of the problems of Russia's security and development of its armed forces through the prism of current world events. This experience can be looked at in different ways. And yet, I think that what is most important is that in creating a qualitatively new army, we must maintain clear and specific reference points.

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